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Abstract
This thesis consists of three papers on the semantics of natural language and formal
languages. Chapter one discusses how the possible interpretation of the noun phrases in a
sentence is affected by the syntactic structure of the sentence. In particular, we focus on the
phenomena related to principles (B) and (C) of binding theory. We can explain all these
phenomena, including the counterexamples that have been offered against standard binding
theory, by (i) viewing the binding principles as semantic principles that constrain the relation of
presupposed co-reference (ii) correctly identifying the context that is relevant for the application
of the binding principles, and (iii) viewing binding theory as just one among several sources of
semantic information that are used when interpreting the noun phrases in a sentence.
Chapter two attempts to provide support for George Boolos' proposal of interpreting
second-order quantification by means of plural quantification by arguing that several of the
criticisms that have been offered against it are not correct. We consider the criticisms put forward
by Charles Parsons, Patrick Grim and Michael Resnik.
Chapter three distinguishes two main senses in which a formal language can be said to
have been provided with an interpretation: (i) by having provided a model (or structure) and a
definition of satisfaction and truth in the standard way (ii) by having provided a translation into
a natural language. We argue that the sentences of a formal language interpreted as in (i) do not
mean anything. A formal language interpreted as in (i) models the way the truth of a sentence
would be affected by two factors: the interpretation as in (ii) of the language, and a way the
world might be. Viewing in this way the relation between interpreting a formal language as in
(i) and as in (ii) allows us to justify the conceptual adequacy of the standard model-theoretic
definitions of the properties of logical truth and logical consequence.
Thesis supervisor: Robert Stalnaker
Title: Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Philosophy
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Chapter One
Sentence Structure, Noun Phrase Interpretation,
and Context
0. Introduction
Structural relations among Noun Phrases (or NPs) in a sentence place constraints on the possible
semantic relations among those NPs. For instance, in (la)
(1) a. Andrew saw him
b. Everybody blamed him
Andrew and him can not refer to the same individual, and (lb) can not mean that everybody
blamed himself, that is, him can not be interpreted as bound by Everybody --'bound' in the sense
analogous to a logical variable being bound by a quantifier. Binding Theory attempts to account
for facts like the ones just described.
In this paper we focus on the phenomena related to the so called Principles (B) and (C)
of the Binding Theory and specially on the different kinds of sentences that have been offered
as counter-examples. I contend that we can account for the phenomena by: (i) Viewing Binding
-11-
Theory as a semantic theory about how to semantically interpret certain structural relationships
among NPs. (ii) Modifying principles (B) and (C) so that they are not about the relation of
having the same value, but rather about the relation of it being presupposed to have the same
value in a given context. (iii) Identifying what should be regarded as the relevant context for the
application of the Binding Principles. (iv) Identifying how the Binding Principles interact with
other sources of semantic information in order to yield the interpretation for a sentence.
The paper has eight sections. In section 1 I present what I will call Standard Binding
Theory. In section 2 I present some counter-examples for Standard Binding Theory that have
been offered in the literature. In section 3, I give an overview of the proposal I will defend and,
following Heim(1993), I give an alternative formulation of principles (B) and (C). In section 4
I show how we can explain the acceptability of some of the alleged counter-examples: those
crucially involving the interaction of different sources of semantic information. In section 5.1 we
show how under the Binding Principles we propose we can account for the counter-examples
involving 'non-presupposed coreference'. In section 5.2 we focus on another group of alleged
counter-examples: identity sentences. I argue that one attempt of dealing with these sentences by
appealing to pragmatic considerations is not satisfactory; I further content that there are syntactic
reasons for thinking that, nevertheless, identity sentences do not really pose a problem for
Binding Theory. In section 6 we make some heterogeneous remarks and further develop some
points made in the previous sections. In section 7 we discuss the necessity of distinguishing two
different stages in the interpretation of a sentence. Finally, in section 8 I present another kind of
sentences that would seem to pose a problem both for Standard Binding Theory and for the
-12-
version of Binding Theory that I defend. As far as I know, this kind of sentences has not been
considered before in the literature. I will defend that they can be accounted for by correctly
determining what the relevant context for the application of the binding principles is.
1. Standard Binding Theory
1.1. Principles (A), (B) and (C)
Consider the following examples, where two NPs in a sentence have the same index if and only
if either they both refer to the same individual, or one of them is a quantificational NP (like, e.g,
Every boy, or Somebody) and the other is bound to it; a "*" indicates that the sentence (with the
specific interpretation indicated by the indexation) is not acceptable:
(2) a. Cara i saw her.
b. *Carai saw her i
c. Shei saw her1 father
d. Matti, says that hei is tired
e. Matti, says that hej is tired
f. He, says that Tony is tired
g. *He, says that Tony, is tired
-13-
h. His, father says that Samuel1 is tired
i. *(His father), says that Robert, is tired
j. (His father), says that be1 is tired
k. Hei saw Deanj
I. *Hei saw Dean,
m. His, mother saw Dean,
n. *Everybody, saw himi
o. Everybody i saw himr
p. Every thief, fears that he, gets caught
q. In Tarragona, every single boy,'s mother sends the twerpi off to summer camp
r. *In Tarragona, every boy, thought the twerp, would hate summer camp
We can account for all the data in (2) by appealing to conditions such as Chomsky's
Principles (B) and (C) of the Binding Theory. We will use the term Standard Binding Theory to
refer to the Binding Theory introduced in Chomsky(1981). In this section we will present
Standard Binding Theory. Standard Binding Theory has three principles: the so called principles
(A), (B) and (C). In this paper we will be concerned only with the phenomena related to
principles (B) and (C). Nevertheless, for completeness in this first section we will introduce
principle (A) along with principles (B) and (C). In order to explain what these principles are we
need first to introduce the relation of c-commanding.
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The relation of c-commanding is a diadic relation between nodes in a tree. It can be
specified by means of the following definitions:
Node X immediately dominates node Y if Y is a daughter of X (i.e., if X is higher up in the
tree than Y and Y is connected to X by a single branch)'.
Node X dominates node Y, if either X immediately dominates Y, or there is a Z such that X
dominates Z and Z immediately dominates Y.
Node X c-commands node Y if any branching node dominating X also dominates Y, and X itself
does not dominate Y, nor Y dominates X.
For instance in (3a), node B c-commands C and E (but not A or D), D c-commands the
same nodes as B; A does not c-command any node; C c-commands B and D, and so does E.
Notice that in (3b), unlike what is the case in (3a), D does not c-command C or E.
If we define a tree as a non-empty finite sequence, and we inductively define 'N is a node
of tree T' as:
3X,...X m (T=<X,,...,Xm> and (3i(l1im and (N=X, or N is a node of X,)))
then we can define 'node X immediately dominates Y' as:
3X,...Xm (X=<X ,...,Xm> and (3i(l1im and Y=X,))
-15-
(3b)
A
B
D
C
E
Consider now the following sentences
[Zoltan's brother]i saw himself,
Zoltan i saw himself,
*Zoltan,'s brother saw himself,
*Zoltani thinks that Mary saw himselfi
The contrast between (3a-b) and (3c) illustrates that a reflexive pronoun has to have an
antecedent that c-commands it. We can see this more clearly by considering the syntactic
structure of the sentences. The (simplified) syntactic representations of (3a) and (3c) are,
respectively, (4a) and (4b)
(4a) IP
NP I'
NPb N
Zoltan's brother saw himself,
(4b) IP
NP,
NP N
Zoltan's brother saw himself,
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A
/
B
D F
C
E
(3) a.
b.
C.
d.
(3a)
I
The whole NP Zoltan's brother c-commands himself, but the NP Zoltan does not. The former,
then, can be an antecedent of himself, whereas the latter can not. On the other hand, the contrast
between (3b) and (3d) illustrates that the antecedent must be 'close enough' to the reflexive.
The dada in (3) is accounted for by the Principle (A) of Standard Binding Theory
Principle A: An anaphor must be bound in its Governing Category.
Regarding the terminology employed: An anaphor is a reflexive pronoun or a reciprocal;
an NP Y is bound by an NP X if X c-commands Y, and X and Y are coindexed; the notion of
Governing Category purports to capture the idea of 'being close enough' that we mentioned
above. For the purposes of the present discussion we can set aside some difficulties arising when
trying to specify the notion of Governing Category, and we can take the Governing Category
(GC) of a node X to be the smallest (i.e. the one containing less nodes) NP or S that contains
X. So, in (3a-c) the GC for the reflexive is the whole sentence, in (3d) is the Complementizer
Phrase (CP) that Mary saw himself. In (5b) below, the GC for him is the whole sentence,
whereas in (5)d is the CP that she loves him, and in (5)e the GC for his is the NP his mother.
(5) a. *Gabriel, saw himi
b. Gabriel, saw himj
c. His, mother loves him,
d. Gabriel, thinks that she loves him,
-17-
e. Gabriel, saw his1 mother
In the sentences in (5) we can observe the following: a non-reflexive pronoun (also called
a pronominal) does not need to be bound, as illustrated by the pronominal him in (5b) and (5c)
(notice that in (5c) His does not c-command him, even though His mother does); a pronominal
does not need to be bound but it can be bound, as illustrated in (5d) and (5e); a pronominal,
though, can not be bound in its governing category as (5a) illustrates. All these observations
follow from the Principle (B) of the Standard Binding Theory:
Principle (B): A pronominal must be free in its Governing Category
A node is free if it is not bound by any other node.
The examples in (6) show that names and definite descriptions are, subject to constrains
stronger than those for pronominals
(6) a. *She, saw Racheli
b. *Shei thinks that Racheli is smart
c. *Rachel, thinks that he loves Rachel,
d. *She, thinks that [the woman with the blue hat], is smart
The sentences in (6) suggest that a proper name or a definite description must be free not
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only in its GC but everywhere in a sentence. For instance, in (6b) She binds Rachel, and the
structure is unacceptable even though She is not in the GC for Rachel, which is the CP that
Rachel is smart.
If we use coindexation to also represent the relation between a quantificational NP and
the NPs it binds ('binding' not in the syntactic sense we have just introduced but in the logical
sense of a logic variable being bound by a quantifier), we observe that all the constraints
affecting a proper name or definite description also affect a quantificational NP 2:
(7) a. *Hei saw [some man]1
b. *Hei thinks that [every man], is smart
c. *[Some man]i thinks that Lisa loves [some man]1
d. *He, thinks that [some man], is smart
Proper names, definite descriptions and quantificational NPs are grouped under the
category of R-expressions. Principle (C) constrains their distribution. It completely agrees with
2 Quantificational NPs are actually subject to stronger constraints than proper names and
definite descriptions. We can see this in the contrast between (i) and (ii)
(i) His, mother thinks that Gabriel, is smart
(ii) *His mother thinks that every man, is smart
In both (i) and (ii) none of the two NPs binds the other. Binding Theory does not rule out either
sentence. Several principles independent of Binding Theory have been proposed that would
account for the ungrammaticality of (ii), in particular the so called bijection principle (Koopman
and Sportiche(1982) p.140)
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what we have observed with respect to the examples in (6) and (7):
Principle (C): R-expressions must be free (everywhere).
As mentioned above in this paper we will concern ourselves only with the phenomena
related to binding principles (B) and (C).
Different sets of conditions can be formulated that, even if they are not equivalent to (B)
and (C), are similar to them and are intended to account for the same kind of phenomena. We
will call disjointness conditions to any such set of conditions.
1.2. Some Comments
Notice that we are not using indexes simply as part of some provisional notational convention
to help us indicate what the reading of a sentence that we want to consider is. Rather, in the way
we are using them, indexes are an essential part of the syntactic representation of a sentence (in
the same way that each node in a tree is part of that representation). This is so because the
Binding Principles are formulated in terms of the relation of binding, which, in turn, appeals to
the relation of sameness of indexes.
Also notice that in order to account for the data in (1)-(7) we need to appeal not only to
the Binding Principles but also to a principle such as "Referential NPs with the same index must
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refer to the same individual, referential NPs with different indexes must refer to different
individuals; a NP is interpreted as bound by a quantificational NP if and only if they have the
same index". We mentioned this principle above as in passing, but notice that it is crucial.
Without it, Binding Theory would not explain, for instance, why (8a)
(8) a. Lisa likes her
b. Lisa, likes her1
c. Lisa, likes herj
is unacceptable if Lisa is coreferential with her: Even if (8b) is ruled out by Principle (B), (8c)
is not. If it were possible for two NPs with different indexes to have the same referent, then (8c)
could give rise to an interpretation that (8a) does not have.
This discussion shows also another point: a theory that tries to explain why (8a) can not
have a coreferential reading has to include, some way or other, a semantic component. The
explanation can not be given in purely syntactic terms. It might be, as it is the case with Standard
Binding Theory, that the bulk of the explanation is carried out by purely syntactic principles, and
that the semantic component is straightforward. Still the semantic part, even if straightforward,
is essential to explain what we want to explain.
It is possible to have a theory where the bulk of the explanation is at the semantic level.
We can, for instance, formulate disjointness conditions which are completely analogous to
-21-
Standard Binding Theory principles (B) and (C) but that operate at the semantic level (that is,
they are conditions that directly constrain which interpretations are possible for a given syntactic
structure). Chomsky(1993) offers one set of such a semantic kind of disjointness conditions.
Principles (B) and (C) are formulated there, roughly, in the following way:
(B) If a is a pronominal, interpret it as distinct in reference from every c-commanding
phrase in its GC.
(C) If a is an r-expression, interpret it as distinct in reference from every c-
commanding phrase.
(In order to account for cases like (2n)-(2r) where there is not co-reference involved, these
principles should, of course, be modified --or at least the term "distinct reference" should be re-
defined in such a way that it also applies to a relation such as the one between Everybody and
him in (2n). With such a modification in place, this theory makes the same predictions as
Standard Binding Theory with respect to what interpretations the different sentences can have).
2. Counter-examples to Standard Binding Theory Principles (B) and (C)
It has been observed in the literature that there are several different kinds of sentences that are
counter-examples to the Standard Binding Theory Principles (B) and (C). In (9) we have some
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examples of sentences that pose a problem for principle (C)3:
(9) a. Who is that woman over there? She is professor Rigau
b. Everyone has finally realized that Oscar is incompetent. Even he has finally
realized that Oscar is incompetent.
c. Mary, Betty and John have one thing in common: Mary admires John, Betty
admires John, and he himself also admires John.
d. What do you mean Oscar loves no one? He loves Oscar
e. The logic tutor while trying to explain the law of Universal Instantiation to a
student tells him: Look fathead. If everyone loves Oscar, then certainly he himself
must love Oscar
f. I think that woman talking on TV is Zelda. She says th; same things that Zelda
says in her book
Each of these sentences can be interpreted so that the two italicized NPs have the same referent.
3 Even if I do not specify the source of each of these sentences, most of them are adapted
or directly taken from the references mentioned at the end; the same is true of the sentences in
(10).
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If they are interpreted as having the same referent, then the two NPs must have the same index
in the syntactic structure of the sentence. In each of these sentences, though, one NP c-commands
the other, and, furthermore, the c-commanded NP is an R-expression. The syntactic structure, so,
is undesirably ruled out by Principle (C) of the Standard Binding Theory.
Analogously, the sentences in (10) pose a problem for the Principle (B) of the Standard
Binding Theory
(10) a. Mary, Betty and John have one thing in common: Mary admires John, Betty
admires him, and John himself also admires him.
b. At a Halloween party someone says: I think that the man with the devil costume
is Joe. It is suspicious that he knows him so well.
c. What do you mean no one loves Oscar? Oscar loves himn
d. What do you mean no one loves Oscar? He loves him
Some of these sentences (like (9a) or (10b)) are one hundred per cent acceptable, others
are not perfect but are good enough as to pose a problem for a theory according to which they
are simply ruled out.
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Heim(1993) offers some examples involving quantification which she claims are
marginally acceptable and, to the extent that they are acceptable, also pose a problem for
Principle (B), as for instance
(11) a. The logic tutor while trying to explain the law of Universal Instantiation tells his
student: Look, if everyone loves Oscar then it surely follows that Oscar himself
must love Oscar. And, of course, this does not hold just for Oscar, but for any
arbitrary man: if everyone loves a man, then that man himself must love him
b. Somebody said that what he had in common with his siblings was that his sister
admired him, his brother admired him, and he himself also admired him
3. An alternative proposal
3.1. Other Proposals
There are several ways in which we could try to deal with these problematic examples: One
possibility would be to claim that the disjointness conditions should not be constraints on the
relation of 'co-indexation' or of 'co-reference' but rather they should constrain some other
relation, and that when this is done the disjointness conditions will allow just those interpretations
that the sentences can actually have. This is the approach taken in Higginbotham(1992). Of
course the difficult task when opting for this view is to specify a suitable relation in terms of
which we can formulate the disjointness conditions. Higginbotham introduces the relation of
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common reference, and formulates the disjointness conditions in terms of it. This relation is
defined in terms of the intentions of the speaker.
Another possible approach is to accept principles (B) and (C) as they are in Standard
Binding Theory, but to modify the semantic part of the theory. Recall that the principle on the
interpretation of indexes requires that two NPs get assigned the same individual if and only if
they have the same index (and it also constrains how to interpret those NPs that will have an
interpretation analogous to bound variables). One possible modification to the principle is to
require only that if two NPs have the same index then they get assigned the same individual, but
allowing that NPs with different indexes might also get assigned the same individual.
Fiengo&May(1994) takes this kind of approach. The difficult part for this approach is not to
explain, for instance, why (9b) can have a co-referential interpretation, but rather why (8a) can
not usually have it. Fiengo&May(1994) tries to solve this difficulty by appealing to pragmatic
principles.
Another possibility is to think that in addition to disjointness conditions, we should also
have some other principle which will allow us to make the desired distinction between, on the
one hand, sentences like the ones in (9)-(10) and, on the other, sentences which are bad and
should be ruled out. This is, very roughly, the line followed both by Tanya Reinhart (in, for
instance, Reinhart(1983a,b) and Grodzinsky&Reinhart(1993)) and by Irene Heim (in
Heim(1993)). The main difference between the two is this: Reinhart distinguishes, among the
cases to which Standard Binding Theory applies, between the cases where there is binding and
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cases where there is merely co-reference, and proposes that the disjointness conditions should
only constrain cases involving binding, whereas cases involving co-reference should be accounted
for by another sort of principle (her Co-reference Rule), which is less restrictive than principles
(B) and (C) of the Standard Binding Theory. Heim, on the other hand, proposes that the
disjointness conditions apply to both the cases involving binding and the cases involving co-
reference; the cases involving co-reference, though, will be in addition subject to another
principle (her Co-determination Rule), which can redeem some sentences that the binding
principles would rule out.
I think that each of these proposals provides valuable insight into the phenomena. In this
paper, though, I will not comment any further on these or other theories. I would rather like to
propose here another way of looking at the phenomena we have been discussing'.
3.2. Overview
An adequate theory should not only account for the contrast between the sentences which are not
acceptable and those which are at least partially acceptable but it should also give an account of
why the sentences in (9)-(11) have different degrees of acceptability, and specially, it should
account for the difference between fully grammatical sentences like (9a), (9f) or (10b) and
4 Of course, a complete defense of the proposal I will put forward would require a careful
discussion of the alternatives. I intent to present such a discussion elsewhere. We should take
what we do in this paper not as an argument for the inadequacy of other theories but rather as
a defense of the existence of yet another promising approach.
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sentences which are regarded as grammatically awkward and only partially acceptable --like, for
instance, (9c) or (10d).
The proposal defended here does not consist in trying to find a set of disjointness
conditions with which none of the sentences in (9)-(11) is in conflict, but rather in taking the
disjointness conditions to be part of a more general account of what makes us regard some
sentence (with some specific interpretation) as acceptable. This general account will explain why
these sentences are acceptable even if some of them will be in conflict with the disjointness
conditions that we will provide.
In the present proposal I attempt to explore the idea in Chomsky(1993) of regarding the
disjointness conditions as semantic principles about how to interpret the NPs in a sentence.5
In summary the present proposal is the following: The sentences that are fully acceptable
can be divided in two groups: identity sentences, and non-identity sentences. I formulate [in
section 3.3] the disjointness conditions (in semantic terms) so that they do not constrain the
relation of co-reference but rather the relation of presupposed co-reference6 --in this I follow
Postal(1970) and Heim(1993). These disjointness conditions are then no longer in conflict with
5 All the main ideas put forward in the following pages, though, could be incorporated, with
some adjustments, into an account using a 'syntactic version' of the disjointness conditions.
6 Actually, once we take also into consideration quantificational NPs, the relation being
constrained is that of presupposed co-valueness. These notions are explained in the next section
(section 3.3).
fully acceptable non-identity sentences like (9f) or (10b) [section 5.1]. On the other hand, I argue
[in section 5.2] that identity sentences like (the second clause of) (9a) are not constrained by the
disjointness conditions, since one of the NPs is not an argument but a predicate.
One of the main contentions of this article is about what explains the (partial)
acceptability of sentences like (9c) or (10d): when interpreting an utterance of a sentence like
(9c) the speakers use several sources of information, the disjointness conditions being just one
of them. If the other sources determine an interpretation for the NPs in a clear enough way, the
sentence will be able to be understood in accordance with that interpretation even if it conflicts
with the information provided by the disjointness conditions. The existence of this conflict will
explain that the sentences are not regarded as completely good [sections 4 and 6].
I argue as well [in section 7] that we must distinguish two different levels in the
interpretation of a sentence: one where only the lexical items and the grammatical structure of
the sentence is taken into account, and a second level where contextual information is introduced
so as to produce the full interpretation of the sentence.
As we just mentioned, we formulate the disjointness conditions in terms of the relation
of presupposed coreference. Something is presupposed only with respect to a context. In the final
section of the paper [section 8] we examine some examples that make clear the need for
adequately identifying what the relevant context for the application of the disjointness conditions
is.
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3.3 Disjointness Conditions
In this section I propose a different formulation of the disjointness conditions. First I state the
principles, then I explain the notions involved in their formulation.
I think that we should understand the disjointness conditions in the following way:
(B)' If a sentence whose LF representation is of the form ...a.a..... (where P is a
pronominal, and a is an NP that c-commands P in its GC) is used in a context C,
it is not presupposed in C that a and 0 are co-valued.
(C)' If a sentence whose LF representation is of the form ...a...P... (where 3 is an R-
expression, and a is an NP that c-commands 3) is used in a context C, it is not
presupposed in C that a and P are co-valued.
Let's explain what we mean by the notions of 'being presupposed', 'context' and 'being
covalued' that we use in stating our disjointness conditions.
'being covalued with': NPs can have different sorts of semantic value. Corresponding to these
different sorts of semantic value, there are different possible relations among NPs in a sentence.
If two NPs refer to the same individual, we will say that they are in the relation of
common reference. If two NPs are in the same relation that his and Every boy are in (12) when
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we understand the sentence so that every boy loves his own mother --where one NP acts like a
variable bound by another NP--, we will say that the latter links7 the former.
(12) Every boy loves his mother
Our characterization of the distinction between the two sorts of relation is quite
uncommitted, but it suffices for the present purposes of defining the relation of 'being covalued',
since, as we will presently see, the two former relations get combined in the definition of the
latter'.
We define 'to be covalued with' as the transitive closure of the relation 'to link, to be
linked to, or to be in common reference with'9 . That is, NP a is co-valued with NP 0 iff a
belongs to any set s which is such that:
(i) p belongs to s and
(ii) if x belongs to s then any y such that x links y or y links x
or x is in common reference with y also belongs to s.
7 I borrow the terms "linking" and "common reference" from Higginbotham(1983,1992). My
use of them is not exactly his.
8 For our present purposes, for instance, we do not need to characterize the two relations in
a way which is precise enough as to decide whether in (i) (when it is interpreted as meaning that
Albert loves his own brother) Albert and his are in common reference, one links the other, or the
sentence is ambiguous with respect to which of the two sort of relations holds
(i) Albert loves his brother
9 This notion of 'co-valueness' is a very close relative of the notion of 'codetermination' in
Heim(1993).
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So, for instance, if in (13) we were to interpret both he and him as linked to Every boy,
then he and him would be co-valued (even though the two pronouns are not themselves in a
linking relation or in a common reference relation), and so such an interpretation would violate
disjointness condition (B)'
(13) Every boy thinks that he loves him
'Presupposition' and 'context': The notions of 'presupposition' and 'context' that we use in
stating our disjointness conditions are the same as in Stalnaker(1973,1974): linguistic
communication always takes place on the basis of a background of common beliefs and
assumptions, or context. Using the possible worlds framework we can identify a context in which
some instance of linguistic communication takes place with a set of possible worlds: those worlds
that as far as the participants in the conversation can tell could be the actual world. The context
set consists of those worlds that could be the actual world according to what the participants in
the conversation believe, and believe that the others believe, and believe that the others believe
that they believe and so on. (If we wanted to make this characterization more precise we should
take into consideration that what is relevant is not only what the participants believe but also
what they pretend to believe). A proposition p is presupposed in a context C if p is true in each
world in C. A sentence s carries the presupposition that p if it would be infelicitous to assert s
in any context where it is not presupposed that p.
The individual that a referential NP picks up at a world in the context w, is the individual
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that the NP would refer to if w were the actual world. A sentence is true in a world in the
context w, if the sentence would be true if w were the actual world.
Let's consider one example. Suppose I utter the sentence He is an artist while pointing
to a man who is in front of us. Since all the participants in the conversation will believe (and
believe that the others believe, etc.) that the man is in front of us and that I uttered He while
pointing at him, it will be part of the context that the man is in front of us and that he is the one
I am referring to by He. That is, for each world in the context w He will pick up that man in w.
Let's suppose further that we are unsure whether the man is Jim Harris. That means that there
will be some worlds in the context where the man in front of us is Jim Harris, but there will also
be some worlds in the context where Jim Harris is someone other than the man in front of us' .
He will pick up Jim Harris in those worlds where Harris is the man in front of us, but will not
pick up Jim Harris in those worlds where Jim Harris is someone else. This agrees with the
intuitive idea that, if we do not know whether the man is or not Jim Harris, then we are unsure
as well as to whether He refers to Jim Harris or to someone else.
10 If I were to utter He is Jim Harris, then this sentence would express the necessary true
proposition in those worlds where the man is Jim Harris and the necessary false proposition in
those worlds where Jim Harris is someone else. Not knowing which worlds in the context agree
with how the actual world is, we would not know whether the utterance was necessarily true or
necessarily false. Still the utterance would be informative since it would indicate to anyone who
accepted it, that those worlds where the man is not Jim Harris (and where the utterance expresses
the necessarily false proposition) are not compatible with what we take to be the case, and so
should no longer be regarded as part of the context. This picture helps clarify how it is possible
that an utterance expresses a necessary proposition but it is nevertheless informative. For a more
detailed explanation see Stalnaker(1979).
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We are finally in the position to understand the central notion in our formulation of the
disjointness conditions: Two NPs are presupposed to be co-valued if they are co-valued in each
possible world in the context. So if a and 3 are referential NPs then it is not presupposed that
a and j are co-valued if there is at least one world w in the context set such that: the individual
that a picks up in w is not the same as the individual P picks up in w (i.e., if w were the actual
world then a and j would not refer to the same individual). If a NP a is understood as linked
by another NP f, this fact is not dependent on the context in the way that the specific value of
a referential NP depends on the context, and a will be linked to f in each world in the context,
and so it will be presupposed that they are co-valued. So, if two NPs are not presupposed to be
co-valued, then it can not be that they are interpreted so that one of them links the other.
To end section 3, let's point out that the disjointness conditions formulated in this section
incorporate three kinds of ideas: First, the disjointness conditions are semantic principles that
specify what the semantic significance of certain structural relations among NPs is. They are not
syntactic principles that rule out certain syntactic representations. Second, the relation the
disjointness conditions are about is the relation of presupposed co-valueness (as opposed to the
relation of actually being co-valued)". Third, the principles apply both to sentences containing
quantificational NPs, and to sentences containing only referential NPs.
" As mentioned above, I take the idea of appealing to what it is presupposed rather than to
what is actually the case in trying to deal w.,h the phenomena related to the disjointness
conditions form Heim(1982,1993). Heim, in turn, credits Postal(1970) for this idea. The main
difference between Heim's formulation of the disjointness conditions and mine is that she states
her Binding Principles as purely syntactic principles that rule out certain co-indexations among
NPs.
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4. The Disjointness Conditions and Other Sources of Semantic Information
In this section I explain what I think accounts for the acceptability of sentences like (9b) or (10a)
which are somewhat awkward but which are good enough as to pose a problem to Standard
Binding Theory. The explanation in this section will make no essential use of the fact that we
have formulated the disjointness conditions in temls of the relation of presupposed co-valueness.
The importance of so formulating the disjointness conditions will become apparent in the next
section (section 5) when we discuss those sentences that, like (9f) and (10b) are completely good.
We will introduce the idea we want to put forward in this section by means of an analogy.
First, though, a comment regarding the numbers between square brackets that will appear
after some of the sentences from this point on: they are the mean grade that the sentence obtained
on a 0-7 scale according to the grammaticality judgments provided by a number of speakers 2.
We will make use of these dada at several points in this paper. Even though the specific mean
grade for a certain sentence is not in itself very significant (different speakers may, for instance,
have used different criteria regarding how good a sentence should be in order to be given, say,
a 5), the relative grade of a sentence with respect to other sentences is, I think, very significant.
I think that it is very difficult to use reliable data on the relative acceptability of different
12 I submitted two questionnaires to 11 English speakers, asking for their linguistic
judgements on a total of 36 sentences. The speakers were asked to give a grade to each sentence
according to how good or acceptable they felt the sentence to be; 7 being the grade for a
perfectly good sentence, and 0 the grade for a completely unacceptable one. They were asked to
evaluate the sentence without thinking of any special context where the sentence might be
uttered, unless such an special or uncommon context was explicitly provided in the questionnaire.
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sentences without having recourse to some methodology of the kind I have used 3 .
4.1. Analogy
I think it would help to explain what the present proposal is if we consider an analogy. Imagine
that an English speaker is asked to determine whether the sentences in (14) below are acceptable,
and that she is told that an index m is meant to indicate that we are considering a reading of the
sentence where the expression with the subindex m refers to some individual who is a male' 4
(14) a. Shem is wearing a nice dress
b. I didn't mean to hurt herm
The speaker would say that, given that subindexation, (14a-b) are unacceptable since these
sentences can not be used with she or her referring to a man.
If we place the sentence in an appropriate context, though, the speaker might say of each
of the two sentences that it is, at least, partially acceptable. For instance, if we postulate that the
sentence (14a) is uttered in a situation in which a male friend has put on a woman's dress: even
if all the people involved in the conversation are well aware that the speaker is talking about a
'~ For a very interesting discussion and criticism of the methodology employed in linguistics
see Schutze(1995).
14 Notice that here, unlike what was the case in previous examples, the index is not part of
the syntactic representation of the sentence, but just a device to indicate to the person giving
linguistic judgments what is the interpretation we want her to consider.
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man, the use of she to refer to him is acceptable. Similarly for (14b): if a rather male
chauvinistic speaker wants to suggest that some man who was offended by the speaker and is
crying is too sensitive, he might use (14b) where her will be understood by all the participants
to refer to the man who is crying. In (14a-b) the use of She and her carries the information that
the speaker is referring to a (human) female. This information, though, might be neutralized by
some extra information provided by the context in which the sentence is uttered.
What I want to suggest is that some of the examples involving violations of Principles
(B) and (C) are, in part, similar to those above involving the use of She and her: An English
speaker is asked to evaluate some sentence with certain intended pattern of coreference, like, for
instance, Oscar loves him with Oscar being co-referential with him. The sentence is declared as
unacceptable since the arrangement of the NPs carries the information that they can not be
assumed to corefer, that is, carries some information that contradicts what we have stipulated is
the intended interpretation we are considering. If we place the sentence in a suitable context,
though, for instance in (10c) [What do you mean no one loves Oscar? Oscar loves him], the
information provided by the different semantic factors that act on that context might overcome
the information provided by the arrangement of the two NPs in the last clause, and the person
providing linguistic judgements will say that it is possible to understand the sentence with
coreference in that particular situation, i.e., that the sentence (with the interpretation involving
coreference) is at least partially acceptable.
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4.2. The Interaction of Different Semantic Factors
We could try to account for the data we have considered in section 2 in the following way:
instead of trying to provide some principles that forbid certain sort of relation (be it co-indexation
[as in Standard Binding Theory], sameness of sense or codetermination [as in Heim(1993)],
common reference [as in Higginbotham (1992)], or referential dependency [as in Evans(1980)])
when certain structural relation among NPs obtains, I think we could rather look at the
disjointness conditions as describing what information certain structural relations among NPs
introduce. That is, instead of looking at it from the restrictive side (what can not be the case and
will be ruled out), we could look at it from the side of what it is contributed (what information
is introduced by certain structural relations). This allows us to see the Disjointness Conditions
as just one element in a more general picture: that of the different semantic factors that give
information about the interpretation of the NPs in a sentence. Then, I content, we have a better
and more natural way of explaining the grammaticality judgements of the speakers about some
of the problematic sentences: When interpreting the NPs in a sentence we have, on the one hand,
the information provided by the Disjointness Conditions (on the basis of the structural relations
among the NPs); on the other hand, we have the information provided by other aspects of the
sentence or the discourse, and by the context. These two sources of information usually concur,
but sometimes they might be in conflict. If they are in conflict and if the second sort of
information is strong and unequivocal enough it might overcome the information provided by the
Disjointness Conditions. Then the speakers will judge that the interpretation of the sentence
induced by the second source of information is possible. Nevertheless, and because of the conflict
with the Disjointness Conditions, the sentence will be judged as somewhat awkward or only
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partially acceptable.
Sentence (15) exemplifies this point. Consider (15) (which is the same as (10a)):
(15) Mary, Betty and John have one thing in common: Mary admires John, Betty admires him,
and John himself also admires him. [3.8]
The structural arrangement of John himself and him in the last clause carries the information that
we can not understand John himself and him so that it is presupposed that they are the same
individual; on the other hand, other factors force that we realize that the individual the two NPs
will refer to is the same. The final result is that we can understand the sentence with the
coreferential interpretation of John himself and him. Because of the conflict between the
information that different aspects of the sentence convey, though, the sentence has a somewhat
odd character (its mean grade is [3.8]). The factors that force that both John himself and him are
taken to refer to John are: John himself refers naturally to John --the same person named John
that has been referred to in the previous clauses--; this is reinforced by the fact that we are
expecting to be told what Mary, Betty and John have in common, and in the previous two clauses
the subject NP refers to, respectively, Mary and Betty, and so we expect the subject NP in the
last clause to refer to John; in addition the use of himself also forces John himself to refer to the
same male named John that the previous clauses refer to, since the use of himself carries the
presupposition that the person in question has already been mentioned. The use of also in the last
clause introduces the presupposition that a property that is being attributed in the last clause has
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already been considered (the last clause can be seen as involving the attribution of either one of
two properties: that of 'admiring him', and that of 'being admired by John'); the repetition in the
previous clauses of the attribution of the property of admiring John, makes that property
completely salient in order to be the property that also carries the presupposition about (as
opposed to the property of being admired by John); now, if also in the last clause introduces the
presupposition that the last clause is attributing the property of admiring John, that means that
him in the VP of the last clause should refer to John. Finally, the fact that it has been announced
at the beginning that we would be told what Mary, Betty and John have in common, and that we
have already been told that what Mary and Betty both do is to admire John, makes us to expect
that in the last clause we will be told two things: first (as we already mentioned above) what
John does, and, second, that what he does is the same that Mary and Betty do: to admire John.
That means, again, that both John and him will have to refer to John. All these factors force us
to interpret the sentence so that we realize that both John himself and him refer to the same
individual. That is, all these factors together counteract the information conveyed by the
disjointness conditions on the basis of the structural relation between the two NPs.
Notice that if the sentence were (16)
(16) Susan admires John, and he admires him
the sentence would be quite acceptable but the last clause would not be understood so that the
two NPs refer both to John but rather it would probably be taken to mean that John admires
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some man or boy who, it would be assumed, the speaker is treating as having already been
introduced in the conversation. If asked whether the last part of (16) can mean that John admires
himself, the subject offering her linguistic judgements would have to say that, if nothing else is
added, it can not. If forced to give a grade to the sentence 'when there is coreference' it would
be a very low grade ((16) --with the addition of italics to indicate intended coreference-- obtained
a mean grade below 1).
When a speaker is asked to evaluate a sentence like the last clause of (16) (with no
particular context) coreference is deemed unacceptable (since the only factor that gives
information about the relation between the two NPs is the structural arrangement of the two NPs,
and the information that this arrangement gives is that they can not be taken to corefer); but if
a discourse or context is added which provides additional information about who the two NPs
refer to, the speaker might judge that coreference is possible, and so that a co-referential reading
of the sentence is, at least, marginally acceptable. Something similar was the case with respect
to she and the possibility of referring to a male.
Notice that from the account of the (partial) acceptability of (15) that the have provided,
it trivially follows an explanation of why if we modify (15) so as to suppress some of the
features that we have said help the sentence to be regarded as good the sentence becomes less
good. For instance if we omit himself or also as in (17a) the sentence becomes less good; it
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becomes even worse if, in addition, we do not mention one of the women as in (17b)' 5 . Also,
if we omit to announce that we are going to tell what it is that the three people have in common,
as in (17c), the sentence is certainly worse than (15).
(17) a. Mary, Betty and John have one thing in common: Mary admires John, Betty
admire& him, and John admires him.
b. Mary and John have one thing in common: Mary admires John, and John admires
him.
c. Mary admires John, Betty admires him, and John himself also admires him. [2.2]
We will further develop the idea introduced in this section in section 6, where we will
comment on some of the other sentences in (9)-(11) that are regarded as acceptable for the same
reasons as (15) is.
5. Identity and the Disjointness Conditions
In this section we will focus on those sentences analogous to those in (9)-(10) that are completely
good ((9a), (9f) and (10b)). We will see that their interpretation does not involve any conflict
with (our formulation of) the disjointness conditions.
" Unfortunately, the linguistic judgements questionnaire I use did not include the totality of
the sentences we will use in our discussion. In particular, it did not include sentences (17a) and
(17b). I will have to hope that the intuitions of the reader with respect to these two sentences
coincide with my own --which are the ones expressed in the text.
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5.1. Non-presupposed identity
Under our formulation of the disjointness conditions it is easy to explain why the last part of
(10b) and of (9f) are completely acceptable sentences and, unlike some of the other sentences
in (9), (10) and (11), they do not have any flavour of oddness or of being only partially good.
Consider, for instance, (10b) (repeated here as (18))
(18) At a Halloween party someone says. I think that the man with the devil costume is Joe.
It is suspicious that he knows him so well.
The reason why it is completely good even if he and him in the last clause actually refer both
to Joe is this: when uttering the last part of (18) it is still an open question whether the man in
the devil costume (who is the one he refers to) is or is not Joe (who is the one him refers to).
Whether they are the same or not is precisely what is being discussed. Putting it in terms of
possible worlds: in some worlds in the context, Joe is the man that is wearing the devil costume
at the Halloween party, but in some other worlds in the context someone other than Joe is the
one who is wearing the devil costume. That means that we interpret he and him so that they refer
to the same individual in those worlds in the context where Joe is the one wearing the devil
costume, but they refer to different individuals in those worlds where someone else is wearing
the costume. So, we interpret the two NPs so that it is not presupposed that they refer to the
same individual (and so it is not presupposed that they are co-valued). There is no problem, then,
in interpreting the last part of (18) in accordance to (B)'.
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We could not interpret "He knows him so well" in (18) with He referring to whoever is
the man in the devil costume, and him referring to Joe if it were not an open question whether
the two individuals are the same or not. We can see this in (19), where the previous discourse
has been modified so as to try to make clear that when the utterance of the last clause takes place
it is presupposed that Joe is the man with the devil costume.
(19) A: Do you have the list of who is each person in the party?
B: I certainly do.
A: Could you tell me who is the man with the devil costume?
B: The man with the devil costume is Joe
A: Oh, I see. It is suspicious that he knows him so well.
We can not understand the last clause so that he and him both refer to that individual that we
have already established that is both Joe and the man with the devil costume 6.
16 We can make the sentence good, or at least much better, by changing the tense of the
discourse to past, and by replacing "It's suspicious that" in the last clause by an expression such
as "This is why", "This explains that" or "No wonder then that". I do not think this poses a
problem for the claim that what makes the last part of (19) good is that we are not presupposing
that the individuals that he and him refer to are the same. The use of past tense and of
expressions like "This is the reason why..." facilitates interpreting the sentence with respect to
the context as it was before the previous sentence had been uttered. We can also see this in a text
like (i):
(i) A: I wonder why Tom did not come to the party with his wife.
B: Tom has never been married.
A: This explains why he did not come with his wife.
The use of his wifc in the last clause requires that it is not presupposed that Tom is not married.
This, though, is exactly the information that has been introduced in the context by B.
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5.2 Identity Sentences
Regarding sentences with a so called equative use of the copula like for instance the last part of
(20) (which is the same as (9a))
(20) Who is that woman over there? She is professor Rigau
one might think that the explanation for why they are completely good sentences is the same that
we just gave for (18). However this is not really the case.
5.2.1. A Problem. It is true that usually when we utter a sentence such as the last clause of
(20) we are not presupposing that the two NPs refer to the same individual. Nevertheless it still
might be perfectly fine to utter an identity sentence in a situation where according to what the
participants assume, the two NPs will refer to same individual. For instance, if Diana, Pilar and
Colin are in a room and they all know each other (and know that they know each other, etc),
Diana's utterance of (21) is still good
(21) He is Colin
Nevertheless, the use of "this explains why" makes easier to understand that what follows does
not take for granted the information that this (in "this explains why") refers to.
More could be said about how expressions like "this is the reason why..." affect what the
participants will be able to understand is the context they should use to evaluate a particular
utterance. Examining this any further, though, is beyond the scope of this paper.
-45-
It might be a silly and pointless utterance, but it is still perfectly good from a grammatical point
of view.
5.2.2. Heim's Reply. One reply given to this objection by several authors (in
Heim(1988,1993), Lasnik(1990), and in some way also in Higginbotham(1992)) consists in
claiming that by the very act of uttering a sentence that asserts certain identity the speaker
indicates that we are not presupposing that identity (and so that the hearers should assume that
the identity was not presupposed, even if they had thought it was'). If the context is assumed
to have been such that it was not presupposed that the two individuals were the same, then the
identity sentence is not in conflict with our disjointness conditions.
The reason why the speaker indicates we are not presupposing the identity when uttering
the identity sentence is that it is a general principle governing conversation that what it is
asserted can not be presupposed. This principle follows from Grice's Cooperative Principle, and,
in particular, from the maxim of Relation'.
5.2.3 Objection-1 to Heim's Reply. I do not think we should be satisfied with this explanation
of why identity statements are perfectly good sentences even when the identity is already
presupposed. One way of realizing that this explanation can not be satisfactory is by noticing the
7 This process of reacting to an utterance of the speaker by regarding the context as having
been different from what it actually was is what David Lewis calls accommodation. See
Lewis(1979).
'S See essay 2 in Grice(1989).
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following: The principle that what is said can not be presupposed is just a principle about rational
interchange of information. As with any other principle derived from the Cooperative Principle,
it is possible, at the price of acting silly, not to act in accordance with the principle. I can say
to you "This man is Chomsky", and you might reply "Yes certainly, he is Chomsky", and I might
go on to say "He is Chomsky. He is Chomsky". My utterance would be silly, but completely
acceptable from a grammatical point of view. The reason why we feel that my utterance would
be silly is that it would violate the maxim of Relation ('Be relevant'). So, if in the situation
described we would realize that the maxim of Relation is not operating, we should not expect the
principle "what is said can not be presupposed" (that gets its justification from that maxim) to
apply either. Nevertheless, the sentence is good. So, it is not the operation of the principle "what
is said can not be presupposed" that explains why in the situation described the last utterance of
"He is Chomsky" is still completely correct.
5.2.4. Objection-2 to Heim's Reply. The reasoning just given shows that it can not be that the
explanation for why identity sentences are correct in contexts were the identity is already
presupposed makes essential use of the maxim of Relation, because there are contexts where the
maxim of Relation is violated but where an identity sentence stating some identity that is already
presupposed is still acceptable. Now, a more direct way of objecting to what we have termed
Heim's Reply is to indicate where exactly there is a problem in the argumentation given as part
of the Reply. In order to do so, it will help to make more explicit what the argument that appeals
to the principle 'what is said can not be presupposed' and that I am objecting to is.
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The argument can be formulated in the following way: Let NPI and NP2 be two
referential noun phrases, and C a context where r NP I is NP2' is uttered and where the referents
of NPI and of NP2 are presupposed to be the same; let r val(X,w)1 denote the individual that
the referential expression X picks up in the world w, then, by assumption, we have (i) and (ii)
(i) r NPI is NP2' is uttered in C
(ii) NP1, NP2 and C are such that: Vwe C (val(NPl,w) = val(NP2,w))
Given (ii) we have that what r NPI is NP2' says is true in each world in C, and so that (iii)
holds' 9
(iii) What r NPI is NP2' (when uttered in C) says is already presupposed in C.
By Grice's Cooperation Principle and, in particular, by the maxim of Relation, we have (iv)
(iv) When the speaker utters r NPI is NP21 in C, she is not saying something that is already
presupposed in C.
So, there is a conflict between (i), (iii) and (iv). It is a general fact that conflicts involving the
Cooperation Principle can be solved by accommodating (i.e., by assuming that the context was
different from what it actually was). In the present situation the conflict is resolved by assuming
19 Recall that a context C presupposes that p if for each we C, p is true in w.
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(v)
(v) The context where r NP I is NP2' was uttered was not C, but rather a context C' which
is such that 3we C'(val(NP l,w)•val(NP2,w))
Finally, given (v) we have (vi)
(vi) The context where I NPI is NP2' is taken to have been uttered is such that there is no
conflict between the disjointness conditions and the interpretation of the utterance in that
context.
Now that we have the argument laid out in detail we can see that there is a problem in
(iii). (iii) assumes that the sentence rNP1 is NP21 has an interpretation before the conclusion
(vi) which establishes that the sentence is not in a conflict with the disjointness conditions has
been reached. Premise (iii) could be analyzed into two sub-premises (for concreteness we assume
that what a sentence says is a proposition, that a proposition is a set a possible worlds, and that
identity statements express the diagonal proposition in the sense of Stalnaker(1979) --these
assumptions are not at all essential to the point we want to make, though 2 0):
20 We could take (iii)a and (iii)b simply to be
(iii)a. rNPI is NP2' when uttered in C says that p.
(iii)b. C presupposes that p.
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(iii)a. An utterance of r NP1 is NP2' in C expresses the proposition:
(we C:val(NP 1,w)=val(N P2,w))
(iii)b. C presupposes the proposition (we C:val(NP1 ,w)=val(NP2,w) } (since from (ii) it follows
that C=(weC:val(NP1,w)=val(NP2,w)), and so, in particular, C is included in
(we C:val(NP I,w)=val(NP2,w) } ).
(iii)a is completely unjustified, unless we regard the problem we are trying to solve as already
solved --that is, unless we assume that there is no problem in establishing that, given certain
context, the identity sentence has certain interpretation even though the disjointness conditions
prescribe that the sentence does not have that interpretation given that context. (Notice,
incidently, that the disjointness conditions are not taken at all into consideration in the argument
(i)-(v) that establishes conclusion (vi)).
In particular, under the assumptions accepted by Heim(1982, 1993) (where the disjointness
conditions are syntactic constrains ruling out certain syntactic structures) (iiia) is certainly not
true. Any syntactic representation of r NPI is NP21 that would give rise in C to the interpretation
that (iiia) attributes to the sentence would already be ruled out at the syntactic level by the
Principles (B) or (C) of the Binding Theory21, and so would not express any proposition.
21 Heim(1993) focuses her discussion only on phenomena related to principle (B). What she
says, though, is easily and naturally extendable to phenomena related to principle (C) as well.
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5.2.5. Another Reply. Maybe behind what I called Heim's reply lurks another argument that
does not appeal to the principle 'what is asserted can not be presupposed'. It is the following:
Suppose that a context C is such that a use of the pronoun he would naturally pick up Colin in
each world in C, and so would a use of the NP Colin. If someone utters He is Colin in C, what
would be the natural way of interpreting the two NP conflicts with what the disjointness
conditions prescribe. The hearers, assuming that the speaker is rational and is trying to abide by
the Cooperative Principle, will try to find a way of escaping the conclusion that the speaker's
utterance is not interpretable. There is one way of doing so: to accommodate, that is, to assume
that the context was not C but rather C', where C' is such that for some world in C' the two NPs
pick up different individuals. So the hearers will accommodate, and if accommodation takes place
then there is no problem in interpreting the sentence in accordance with the disjointness
conditions. So, the fact that accommodation will take place explains that an utterance of He is
Colin is grammatical even if uttered in a context where the identity was already presupposed.
I think, though, that this argumentation is not satisfactory. If the reasoning in the previous
paragraph were correct then accommodation should also be an option when trying to interpret
other sentences that also involve a conflict with the disjointness conditions. Consider the contrast
between (22) and (23)
(22) This woman is Pilar. She is Pilar.
(23) This woman is Pilar. She knows Pilar.
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(23) is quite bad (if She is taken to refer to Pilar), whereas (22) is fully acceptable. If
accommodation is possible when interpreting the second clause of (22), then it should also be
possible when interpreting the second clause of (23); and if the fact that accommodation is
possible is what explains that (22) is good then (23) should be predicted to be also perfectly
good; but (23) is not good.
Similarly, we can not explain ' hy identity sentences of the same form as (21) [He is
Colin] are completely good by appealing to an explanation like the one we gave in section 4 to
account for the acceptability of sentences like (10a) or (10c) 22. Sentences like (10a) or (10c)
are only partially acceptable. As pointed out in section 4.2, it is precisely the fact that the
interpretation of these sentences is in conflict with what the disjointness conditions prescribe that
explains why they are only partially acceptable. Identity sentences even when uttered in contexts
as the one described for (21) are perfectly gc'Y, though. So, it can not be that the interpretation
of identity sentences involves a resolution of a conflict similar to the one involved in the
interpretation of (10a) or (10c). So, the explanation of the complete acceptability of identity
sentences can not be along the same lines as the one we gave for (10a) or (10c).
22 Recall that the explanation was that the interpretation of the sentence involves a conflict
between the disjointness conditions and other kinds of information; In sentences like (10a) and
(10Oc) the information opposing the disjointness conditions is strong enough as to prevail and
make the sentence interpretable.
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5.2.6. A feasible solution. I think that a promising way of trying to account for the complete
grammaticality of identity sentences is in terms of the special syntactic character of sentences
containing the verb to be. Several works have pointed out and tried to explain the special
syntactic properties of the so called copular sentences23. In particular Heggie(1988) argues that
the predicate of copular sentences is not the verb to be, but rather one of the NPs24. That means
that there is only one argument in identity sentences: the NP that is not the predicate25. If we
assume that our disjointness conditions apply only to arguments, then (B)' and (C)' do not
provide any information about how copular sentences like (21) should be interpreted. The
interpretation of identity sentences does not, then, involve any conflict with the disjointness
conditions.
Discussing the different arguments that show the special character of copular sentences
23 See, for instance, Longobardi(1985), Rappaport(1987), Heggie(1988) and Moro(1991).
24 According to Heggie this claim requires some qualifications.
25 Argument and predicate are technical notions in linguistic theory. They are usually
characterized in terms of the so called Theta-theory. One alternative way of characterizing the
notions of argument and predicate is in terms of the type of semantic values they can have. We
will not commit ourselves here to any particular characterization of the two notions. Among
many other alternative ways, one of the simplest characterizations would be the following:
We define a predicate of degree-n inductively as follows: A predicate of degree-1 is an
expression whose semantic value is a function from the set of individuals to the set of truth
values; a predicate of degree-n+l is an expression whose semantic value is a function from the
set of individuals to the set of predicates of degree-n. X is a predicate if, for some n, X is a
predicate of degree-n. X is an argument, if X can be functionally combined with a predicate of
degree-1 to yield a truth value. (Notice that under this definition not only expressions whose
semantic value is an individual can be arguments; if the semantic value of a quantificational
expression is a function from predicates of degree-i to truth values, then quantificational
expressions are also arguments).
-53-
and that try to prove that the predicate of copular sentences is one of the NPs, as well as
examining the possible evidence against this view is by itself a lengthy topic. The reader is
referred to the discussion in Heggie(1988) and the other works mentioned in fo tnote 23. Here
we will restrict ourselves to mentioning one kind of data that gives plausibility to the view,
without entering in any further details.
In Catalan the clitic el (1') corresponds to an argument position; the clitic ho can
correspond to predicates but can not correspond to any personal NP in an argument position. This
is illustrated in (24): in (24b) the clitic el stands for the argument el Joan in (24a), while it is not
possible for ho to stand for that argument 26
(24) a. Aquell home estima el Joan
that man loves (the) John
b. Aquell home l'/*ho estima
that man him/it loves
In (25b) the clitic ho stands for the predicate molt felic 'very happy' in (25a), whereas
el can not stand for that predicate
26 Heggie(1987) and Longobardi(1985) describe similar facts to (24)-(26) for French and
Italian, respectively.
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(25) a. El Joan 6s molt feliq
(the) John is very happy
b. El Joan *l'/ho 6s
(the) John him/it is
In contrast with (24a-b), the argument clitic el in (26b) can not be made to stand for the
NP el Joan in the identity sentence (26a), but the predicate clitic ho can:
(26) a. Aquest home 6s el Joan
this man is (the) John
b. Aquest home *l'/ho ds
this man him/it is
The data (24)-(26) suggest that the NP el Joan in (26a) is not an argument but a predicate.
If the disjointness conditions apply only to argument NPs, then the disjointness conditions are
irrelevant for the interpretation of (26a). In particular, there would be no conflict with the
disjointness conditions if we interpreted the two NPs in (26a) in such a way that they determine
the same individual in each world in the context 27
27 I use the word "determine" in an ambiguous way. The two NPs will 'determine' the
individual in a different way, since, presumably, they will have a different type of semantic
value. If the semantic value of the argument NP Aquest home 'this man' is an individual, then
the semantic value of the predicate NP el Joan 'John' might, for instance, be a set of individuals
--actually, a singleton set, which also determines an individual.
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6. Some comments
6.1. The Disjointness Conditions and the Cooperative Principle
That our Disjointness Conditions (B)' and (C)' be concerned with what it is presupposed to be
the case, rather than with what is actually the case, is what allows our proposal to deal with
examples like (18). It could seem, though, that this very same feature gives rise to wrong
predictions regarding the use of sentences like (27) in certain contextc.
(27) He loves him
Usually when someone utters (27) the context will contain information about who each NP refers
to (say, we are talking about John's feelings for Paul, or we are talking about who loves Clinton
and at that point Henry comes into the room, etc). If this contextual information implies that He
and him refer to different individuals (and so that, for each world in the context, the individual
that He picks up is distinct from the individual that him picks up), then we will interpret the
sentence with the two NPs referring to two different individuals. This is in agreement with what
the Disjointness Conditions prescribe (the Disjointness Conditions prescribe that it not be
presupposed that the NPs refer to the same individual, and the contextual information agrees with
that since this information will determine that the individuals that the two NPs refer to are
presupposed not to be the same28).
28 Compare: (i) Not to presuppose that p; (ii) to presuppose that not-p. (i) does not imply (ii),
though (ii) implies (i) (assuming consistency), so to satisfy (ii) is one way of satisfying (i).
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If we hear someone utter (27) and we have to interpret it without being able to use any
previous context (say we have just joined an ongoing conversation), though, we will also think
that the individuals referred to by He and him are distinct, not just that it is not presupposed that
they are the same. This might seem to be a problem for the formulation of the disjointness
conditions that I am defending for the following reason:
If (27) is uttered in a context that contains no information about who the referent of the
two NPs is, then it seems that the hearers, in order to interpret the NPs, will have to rely solely
on the lexical information and the information provided by the disjointness conditions. The
lexical information is just that the individuals the NPs refer to are male and are not the speaker
or the hearers though they are somewhat salient at that point in the conversation. The information
provided by the disjointness conditions is that either (i) it is an open question whether the two
NPs refer to the same individual (i.e., in some worlds in the context they pick up the same
individual, but in some other worlds they do not), or (ii) the two NPs refer to two different
individuals (i.e., in each world in the context they pick up different individuals). The disjointness
conditions do not determine which of (i) or (ii) is the case.
So, using solely the disjointness conditions (and the lexical information) we could not
conclude (ii), but only that either (i) or (ii). But, as pointed out above, (ii) is what we do
conclude when we hear (27) in a context that does not provide any information about the
reference of the NPs. This seems to suggest that there is a problem for my formulation of the
disjointness conditions and that they should be amenlded. If what we conclude when we hear (27)
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in a context that does not provide information on the reference of the NPs is that they refer to
different individuals, and it seems that all the information we use in such a context comes from
the disjointness conditions (and lexical semantics), then it seems that what the disjointness
conditions should prescribe is that (when the relevant syntactic relation obtains) the interpretation
of the two NPs must be presupposed to be distinct, not just not presupposed to be the same.
(Adopting this modification would, of course, be problematic in other respects since, for instance,
we would no longer be able to account for sentences like (18)).
I think, though, that the suggested objection above overlooks one kind of information that
will be available to the hearers when (27) is uttered even if the context does not include any
information about who the NPs refer to: that the speaker is conforming to Grice's Cooperative
Principle. Barring information to the contrary, we will always assume that the Cooperative
Principle and in particular, the Gricean maxims, are respected. And we will rely on this
assumption when trying to interpret what the speaker says.
If we hear (27) in a context that does not contain information about who the referent of
the two pronouns is, but that, otherwise, is a non-special context, we will assume that the speaker
knows who she is talking about. So she knows who the person that she is referring to by He is,
and who the person that she is referring to by him is, and so she knows whether they are the
same or not. If she knew she was talking about one single person, then she would not talk as if
the question whether there is one person or two was open, since doing so would go against the
maxim of Quantity ('be as informative as is required'). So, since she is treating the question as
-58-
open, we can conclude that she is not talking about one single person but two.
Of course there can be special contexts (as, for instance, in (18)) in which it is clear that
the speaker is unsure about the identity of the individuals she is talking about, or where she has
some good reason to act as if she is unsure. This is not, though, what is usually the case. Barring
information to the contrary, we will assume that the conversation does not take place in any of
these special contexts, and so we will assume that the speaker knows who she is talking about,
and that she is open about it. So, assuming disjointness condition (B)' and the Gricean maxims,
it follows, as desired, that in non-special contexts the hearers will assume that when the speaker
utters (27) she is talking about two individuals.
Notice that in a special context where it is reasonable to believe that Gricean maxims do
not apply, like, for instance, when an oracle says something, or in the statement of some puzzle
in, say, the Sunday edition of a newspaper, we would not conclude from the use of (27) that the
individual referred to by He is not the individual referred to by him, but rather only that it might
or it might not be the same.
6.2. Sources of information for the interpretation of NPs
As we have pointed out, there are several sources of information that are used in interpreting the
NPs in a sentence, besides the information provided by the disjointness conditions on the basis
of the structural relation among the NPs. In this subsection we will examine some of the ways
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of generating the information that, as we have seen, in sentences like the ones in (9)-(11) can
conflict with and prevail over the information provided by the disjointness conditions.
6.2.1. Presuppositions. The most common way of generating such information is by making
it clear that the clause in which certain NP X appears expresses some property which is the same
as certain property that has been introduced before. The property involves certain individual or
certain pattern of linking. So X must refer to that individual or be subject to that particular
pattern of linking. One way of having this effect is by repeating several times the attribution of
a property, so as to create a pattern that will make the listener expect that the next attribution of
a property will fit the same pattern (this is illustrated, for instance, in (9c)). Another way of
having this effect is by having mentioned the application of the property as a general case and
then making clear that we are considering a particular application of that general case (this is
illustrated in (9e) and (1 la)). One specially good way of having this effect, though, is by using
some device which introduces a presupposition. We have already commented (with respect to
(9c)) on the effect that the presence of also can have. The word even (that appears in (9b)) has
a similar effect to that of also. The sentences in (9)-(11) illustrate, though, other ways of
introducing presuppositions besides including some specific word. Consider, for instance, (28)
(28) What do you mean no one loves Oscar? He loves him. [2.5]
He clearly refers to Oscar, which is the only salient individual when the pronoun is uttered. In
a more common discourse him would be taken as referring to some other individual different
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from Oscar (because of disjointness condition (B,' and the Cooperation Principle). But a
sequence of the form What do you mean a? P carries the presupposition that 3 implies no-a. In
the case of (28) this means that He loves him implies that it is not the case that no one loves
Oscar. The most simple and likely way for He loves him to have that implication is if He loves
him itself is an attribution of the property of loving Oscar. If this is so, then him must refer to
Oscar, disjointness condition (B)' notwithstanding.
Another way of introducing presuppositions is by stressing some word. Whatever exactly
the presupposition induced by stressing an NP is, it includes that the property being attributed
to the individual determined by the NP, has already been considered. So in (29)
(29) What do you mean John loves no one? He loves JOHN. [5.7]
the stress on John carries the presupposition that the property of being loved by the subject of
the last clause has already being considered. There are two properties that have been considered
in the first clause: the property of being loved by John and the property of loving no one. The
latter, though, can not be the one that the stressing of John carries the presupposition about since
in the last clause --even before determining who the NPs refer to-- it is clear that we are not
attributing the property of loving no one. So the presupposition brought about by stressing John,
is that, in the last clause, we are attributing the property of being loved by John; that means that
He must refer to John, disjointness condition (C)' notwithstanding. There is also, of course, the
presupposition brought about by the structure What do you mean a? P which adds its effect to
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the stressing of John.
6.2.2. Demonstration. Another way of generating information that can override the information
provided by the disjointness conditions is by using an NP demonstratively. (30a-b) illustrate this
(30) a. He refuted HIM [points to the person] [3.1]
b. A: John saw Peter
B: No, John saw HIM [points to John] [5.3]
In, for instance, (30a) He refers to whoever is most salient individual at that point in the
conversation; because of disjointness condition (B)', without demonstration him would be
assumed not to refer to the same individual; the demonstration, though, forces it to refer to that
same individual.
Using an NP demonstratively is a very clear way of indicating what the NP refers to; this
is why the intended reference can be communicated even if the disjointness conditions are
providing opposing information. Notice that most of the sentences considered in the previous
subsection involved several devices that together were able to quite successfully override (B)'
or (C)'. (30a) shows that pointing is effective enough as to have that effect on its own. Still the
combination of demonstration with other devices, as in (30b), makes the overruling of (B)'
clearer and the sentence better.
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6.2.3 Pronominals versus Referential Expressions. A pronoun is very strongly dependent on
the context to determine what it refers to. This is not so for proper names and definite
descriptions. They are to an extend dependent on the context (there are many people named John
and many presidents), but not as much as pronouns are. Proper names and definite descriptions
are able, to a good extend, to determine their referent 'on their own'.
It is usually said that 'Principle (C) violations' are less strong than 'Principle (B)
violations'. Under my proposal we can explain what motivates this claim without having to
accept the queer idea that there is a different degree of prescriptiveness associated to each of the
disjointness conditions".
Notice that the claim does not seem to be true of sentences violating (C) that include a
pronoun but do not contain any indication at all about who the referent of the pronoun is. So, for
instance, I think that without any particular previous context, it is as hard and unlikely to
understand that the NPs in (3 lb-c) (principle (C) configurations) refer to the same individual as
it is in (31a) (a principle (B) configuration)
(31) a. He admires him
b. He thinks that Paul is crazy
c. He admires Paul
29 As we see in the next paragraph, the proponent of a different force associated with each
disjointness condition would also have the problem of explaining why some kinds of sentences
violating (C) are as bad as their analogues which violate (B).
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I think that what motivates the claim that 'violations of (C) are not as bad as violations
of (B)' are contrasts like (32a-b)
(32) a. I talked to Paul today. He admires him
b. I talked to Paul today. He admires Paul
It seems that coreference in the last clause of (32b), even if it is still quite bad, is not as bad as
in the last clause of (32a). I think we can explain why in the following way: Both in (32a) and
(32b) the pronoun He would naturally tend to pick up Paul as its referent. In (32a), nothing
indicates what the referent of him ought to be; disjointness condition (B)' indicates that it can
NOT be assumed to the same individual He refers to; so, because of the effect of (B)', him can
not be understood as also referring to Paul. In the second clause of (32b), unlike what is the case
with respect to him in (32a), Paul would naturally tend by itself to refer to the Paul that is
mentioned in the first clause; because of the effect of (C)', though, the most likely way of taking
an utterance of (32b) (without any other relevant context), would probably be as Paul in the
second clause referring to a person named Paul distinct from the Paul mentioned in the first
sentence. In any case, even if the presence of a proper name, which by itself gives clear
indication of what its most likely referent is, is not sufficient to neutralize and prevail over the
effect of (C)', it is enough to diminish it. This makes it easier to understand the last part of (32b)
as involving coreference than to understand the last part of (32a) as involving coreference; this,
in turn, is what makes us feel that a coreferential interpretation in (32b) is not as bad as in (32a).
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6.3. Corroborating Data
The grade that was given to (the coreference reading of) the sentences in (33) is exactly what
should be expected if the proposal under consideration and the observations in the previous
sections are correct 30
(33) a. What do you mean no one loves Oscar? He loves Oscar [2.9]
b. What do you mean no one loves Oscar? HE loves Oscar [4.2]
c. What do you mean no one loves Oscar? He loves him [2.5]
d. What do you mean no one loves Oscar? HE loves him [3.6]
Sentence (a) is better than (c), and (b) better than (d), in accordance to the fact that proper names
can determine its referent with much less dependence from the context than a pronoun (and so
are less affected by the opposing effect of (B)' or (C)'); (b) is better than (a) and (d) better than
(c), as should be expected if stress introduces the presupposition that the property attributed to
the subject of the second clause is a property that has already been considered in the previous
clause, and if this presupposition helps to make clearer what the referent of the last NP is, and
this, in turn, makes a difference on how acceptable the sentence is. Finally, the sentences in (33)
seem to suggest that those devices that can make coreference in a sentence more or less
acceptable, add to each other: (d) is better than (c), and (b) is even better than (d). ((d) includes
Jo I do not pretend that the results of my linguistic questionnaire provide a completely reliable
measure of the acceptability of the different sentences. More tests would be needed to support
the results I obtained. Still, I think it worth mentioning how well the grades obtained by the
sentences in (33) fit with the proposal I am defending.
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the use of the presupposition generating structure What do you mean at? and the use of stress,
whereas (c) does not contain stress; (b) in addition to the devices in (d), also includes the use of
a proper name).
7. Two-stages in the interpretation of an utterance
The proposal I present in this paper is not yet complete. We have seen that the basis for
explaining the acceptability of sentences like (9b-e) is the fact that the interpretation of these
sentences involves an interaction between, on the one hand, the information provided by the
disjointness conditions and, on the other hand, other information provided by other aspects of the
sentence, or by the context. We will see in this section that it is necessary to be more specific
about what is involved in this interaction in order to satisfactorily account for the data. In
particular we will see that we need to take into consideration the existence of two stages in the
interpretation of a sentence. That something must be missing in the proposal as it stands is shown
by (34)
(34) I refuted me [0]
It is completely clear that the pronouns I and me in (34) should refer to the same person, the
speaker. So it would seem that, according to the proposal I am defending, the effect of
disjointness condition (B)' in (34) should be overridden by the opposing and unequivocal
information about the reference of the pronouns that the very pronouns provide. And so, (34)
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should be, at least, partially acceptable. (34), though, is completely bad.
It is clear that the process of interpretation of a word, sentence or piece of discourse
involves different aspects. For example, part of the interpretation of an utterance of the word she
will consist in recognizing, for instance, that the word has been used referentially and to interpret
the word as an expression that will potentially refer to some human female that is in some way
salient at the moment of the utterance. This is part of the interpretation of the utterance but it is
not all there is to interpreting the utterance. Another aspect of the interpretation is to determine
which specific individual the word refers to (for instance, to determine that it is Delia that the
speaker refers to by his use of she).
In order to satisfactorily account for the phenomena related to the disjointness conditions
we must take into consideration the existence in the process of semantic interpretation of the two
stages suggested in the previous paragraph: in the first stage only structural, lexical and general
semantic information is used, and a partial interpretation is produced. For instance, a partial
interpretation of a referential use of a pronoun like he would identify it as a referential expression
that picks up a male human who is in some way salient31 . The partial interpretation for a
sentence like He loves him would be the pseudo-proposition that a not-yet determined male
31 If we take the full interpretation of a pronoun to be a two dimension individual concept,
that is, a function f that to each world w in the context assigns a function g that assigns an
individual to each possible world (in the case of a rigid designator g is constant, though f might
not be), then a partial interpretation of a pronoun is a function h whose arguments are sets of
possible worlds (contexts) and whose values are individual concepts (h will only be defined for
some contexts: those where an utterance of the pronoun takes place, and where the language is
the one that the interpreter is considering).
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human loves a not-yet determined male human who it is not assumed to be the same as the first
one32. This partial interpretation is produced on the sole basis of the lexical information of the
words and the semantic rules --including the disjointness conditions (which depend, in turn, on
the structural relationship between the NPs).
In the second stage the information from other parts of the discourse and from the context
is brought in and the complete interpretation is produced. For instance, in the second stage of the
interpretation of an utterance of he, the contextual information that, say, John is a salient human
male and the individual that is most relevant for the topic that is currently discussed is used in
order to determine, on the basis of the partial interpretation of he produced in the first stage, that
the speaker referred to John. In the second stage of the interpretation of He loves him, discourse
and contextual information (like for instance that the topic under discussion is James' feelings
for John) is applied to the first stage's partial interpretation in order to produce the final
interpretation of the sentence (for instance that James loves John).
32 If the full interpretation of a sentence in a context C is a propositional concept, i.e., a
function f that to each world in C assigns a function g that assigns a truth value to each possible
world, then we can postulate that the partial interpretation of a sentence like He saw hin is a
function h that takes as an argument a set of possible worlds (a context) and that yields as a
value a propositional concept. h will only be defined for some contexts: those that are such the
utterance of the sentence has taken place, where the language is the one the interpreter is
considering, and which are such that: the interpretation of the two NPs with respect to that
context (i.e. the individual concept that, in accordance to the partial interpretation of each of the
NPs, is the value of that NP with respect to that context) is such that: the diagonal of the two
individual concepts is not the same (this last condition is what incorporates the idea that it is part
of the partial interpretation of the sentence that we do not presuppose that the reference of the
two NPs is the same).
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It might be that the contextual information that is used in the second stage is in conflict
with some aspect of the partial interpretation produced in the first stage. The observations about
how the conflict might get resolved made in the previous sections apply here: the existence of
the conflict might make the sentence to be regarded as bad, but also, if the opposing contextual
and discourse information brought in at the second stage is clear and strong enough, the sentence
might be interpreted in accordance with the contextual and discourse information and be regarded
as (at least partially) acceptable.
What we just said about the possibility of resolving conflicts between the product of the
first stage and the contextual information brought in at the second stage is perfectly compatible
with things working differently when the conflict is internal to the first stage. It does not seem
unreasonable to suppose that when there is a conflict in the information that includes just the
lexical information provided by the different lexical items ard the information provided by the
semantic rules, this conflict prevents the creation of a coherent partial interpretation, and the
sentence is regarded as unacceptable.
This would explain the complete unacceptability of I refuted me. The lexical information
associated with I determines that the word refers to the speaker, and so does the lexical
information associated with me. So, it is part of the partial interpretation of the first stage that
the two pronouns should be understood as referring to the same individual, whichever the actual
world turns out to be. On the other hand, given the structu. ral relationship between the pronouns,
disjointness condition (B)' prescribes that the referent of the two pronouns can not be assumed
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to be the same. The conflict prevents a coherent representation at the first stage, and this makes
the sentence unacceptable.
By referring to the two stages as 'first' and 'second' I am, of course, not claiming that
this is a temporal description of empirical processes. The first stage is previous to the second just
in the logical sense that the second stage presupposes the first, since the partial interpretation
which is the product of the first stage is one of the elements used in the second stage to provide
the final interpretation. It might very well be that, when an actual evaluation of a sentence takes
place, processes corresponding to the second stage take place at the same time as (or even earlier
than) processes in the first, in the same way in which semantic processes might take place before
the completion of a logically previous process (for instance a syntactic process like, say,
determining which was the first word of the sentence uttered --as when we have not clearly heard
what was uttered).
Someone might object to my having regarded the evaluation of presuppositions as
pertaining to the second stage where contextual information is taking into account. It might be
claimed that, since presuppositions are introduced by some specific words or forms of sentences,
they should be regarded as part of what is evaluated at the first stage when the lexical
information, the structure of the sentence and the semantic rules are taken into account. If
presuppositions are evaluated at the first stage then, for many of the examples we have
considered, the conflict between, different sources of information would already arise at the first
stage. So, there would be no justification for my claim that the conflict of information that
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explains the (partial) acceptability of sentences like (9b-e) is of a different sort from the conflict
of information that makes (34) bad.
We can see that this objection is not correct by taking into account one of the points made
by Saul Kripke in Kripke(1990): some presuppositions involve an anaphoric element, analogous
to some uses of pronouns. If someone says "Paul also went to the movies" the sentence involves
an anaphoric reference to certain proposition, like for instance, that Paul went to the library, or
that Arthur went to the movies. We say that some presuppositions involve an anaphoric element
in the following sense: the full interpretation of the sentence carrying the presupposition recuires
the identification of one proposition that has certain characteristics and that is in some way
salient. The full interpretation of a referential use of the pronoun he rzquires the identification
of an individual who is male and that is in some way salient (either by having being just
mentioned or in some other way). Analogously, the full interpretation of an utterance of the
sentence "Paul also went to the movies" requires the identification of a proposition with certain
characteristics (it has to involve the attribution of a property to Paul, or one attribution of the
property of going to the movies) and which is salient in some way --either by having been
recently expressed or in some other way (for instance, by the fact that the speakers are watching
a video where they can see Paul going to the library). In the same way in which the
determination of the referent of a pronoun is carried out in the second stage of the interpretation
where contextual information is brought in, it also belongs to the second stage the determination
of what particular proposition is that is being anaphorically referred to by a sentence carrying a
presupposition which arises because of the presence of words like also or even, or the stressing
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of some word. Similarly for the presupposition that plays a role in interpreting the NPs in the
clause 0 in structures like What do you mean c:? 3, which also depends on identifying a
proposition (the one expressed by a) that has been previously expressed.
8. Relevant Contexts
8.1 Problematic examples
In this last section we are going to consider new data that will show the necessity of modifying
our disjointness conditions so that the context that is relevant for the application of (B)' and (C)'
is identified in a more precise way. Consider the following texts
(35) A: That man over there who is talking to Delia is Miguel
B: Right. But Delia does not know that he is Miguel. Actually, she thinks that he hates
Miguel.
(36) A and B are talking about their mutual friend David, who is an amnesiac:
A: Has David already realized that he is David?
B: No, this very morning he told me that he saw him in a video
(37) A: I would like to know certain thing about Tim
B: Tim is that man over there. Ask him.
A: I see
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B: Even if he were not Tim, you should ask him, because he would be someone playing
in the same band (he is wearing the band's suit) and he would know him well.
These texts seem to pose a problem for the proposal I have been defending (as well, of
course, for Standard Binding Theory). In (35) when She thinks that he hates Miguel is uttered
A and B are assuming that Miguel is the man they are looking at (B's saying "Right" helps to
indicate that what A has said has been accepted and can be taken as being part of the context).
So both he and Miguel pick up Miguel in each world in the context. So the two NPs are
presupposed to be co-valued. So according to our disjointness condition (C)' the sentence could
not have the interpretation that it actually has. Similar considerations can be made with respect
to (B)' and the clauses he saw him in (36), and he would know him well in (37).
8.2. Derived Contexts
I think that we can see what the right way to try to approach the problem is by appealing to the
notion of derived context as introduced in StalnaKer(1988).
The point of an speech act is generally to distinguish among different possibilities that
at a given moment in a conversation are regarded as open. That is, to distinguish among the
possible worlds in the context. Certain parts of the discourse do not primarily distinguish between
the possibilities that the participants in the conversation regard as live options but rather between
some other set of possibilities.
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In a belief attribution, for instance, the clause that expresses what the belief being
attributed is does not primarily distinguish among the possibilities that the participants in the
conversation regard as open but rather among the possibilities that are open according to what
the participants in the conversation take the subject of the belief attribution to believe33.
The set of possibilities among which the embedded clause in a belief attribution sentence
distinguishes plays a role in regard to the embedded clause similar to the role that the context
set plays in regard to the main sentence. Stalnaker calls this set of possibilities a derived context.
It will contain all the possible worlds compatible with what it is presupposed in the main context
that the subject of the belief attribution believes. We will say that it is the derived context for
some particular clause in a sentence, relative to some particular main context.
In the same way that the main context has to satisfy any presupposition carried by a
sentence which is uttered in that context, the derived context for an embedded clause has to
satisfy the presuppositions carried by that embedded clause: the sentence "John believes that Spei
stopped beating her brother" carries the presupposition that John believes that Spei was beating
her brother, and so, requires that it be presupposed in the derived context that Spei was beating
her brother (it is not necessary that main context has that presupposition).
"3 Of course by distinguishing among the possibilities that are open according to what the
participants on the conversation assume that the subject of the belief attribution believes, the
embedded clause will indirectly distinguish among the possibilities that are open according to
what the participants in the conversation believe (what they assume as open regarding what the
subject believes). This is why I say the embedded clause does not primarily distinguish among
those possibilities.
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In the same way that a referential expression is felicitously used only if there is a suitable
individual in each possible world in the context it can pick up, a referential expression in the
embedded clause of a belief attribution must pick up a suitable individual in each world in the
derived context. I will not try here to give any specific semantics for belief attribution sentences.
For our present purposes will suffice to notice that referential expressions in an embedded clause
expressing a belief pick up an individual in each world in the derived context and so the question
can arise if two expressions are presupposed to refer to the same individual in the derived context
(i.e. whether they pick up the same individual in each world in the derived context).
We have seen exemplified in the case of the derived contexts for the embedded clause
of belief attributions three characteristics that identify derived contexts in general: first, a derived
context is the set of possibilities the corresponding clause distinguish among; second, a derived
context must satisfy the presuppositions of the corresponding clause; third, in each world in the
derived context there must be a referent for each referential expression in the corresponding
clause.
Subjunctive conditionals (as well as indicative conditionals) are also evaluated in part with
respect to a derived context: the consequent of the conditional is evaluated with respect to a set
of possibilities similar in some relevant sense to the possibilities which are open in the main
context, but such that what the antecedent says is true. The presuppositions of the consequent
clause must be satisfied in the derived context (as it happens in "If Spei had been beating her
brother, she would have stopped beating him by the time he was 33"). A referential expression
in the consequent of a subjunctive conditional will pick up an individual in each world in its
derived context (as it happens in "If there were a thief on the roof, he would be very cold").
8.3. Disjointness Conditions
I think we will be able to account for sentences like (35)-(37) by modifying the Disjointness
Conditions so that they take into consideration the possible existence of different contexts in the
evaluation of certain parts of a sentence. They could be modified in the following way:
(B)' If a sentence whose LF representation is of the form ... a...p... (where 3 is a
pronominal, and a is an NP that c-commands P in its GC) is used in a context C,
and C' is the relevant context relative to C for a clause containing a and 0, then
it is not presupposed in C' that a and 0 are co-valued.
(C)' If a sentence whose LF representation is of the form ...a...P... (where 3 is an R-
expression, and a is an NP that c-commands P) is used in a context C, and C' is
the relevant context relative to C for a clause containing ca and 0, then it is not
presupposed in C' that a and P are co-valued.
Regarding the notion of the 'relevant context' we stipulate that if C' is the derived context for
a clause s' of a sentence s uttered in C, then C' is the relevant context relative to C for s'. For
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a clause with no special context other than the main context, the relevant context is the main
context.
If we consider (35) and (37) with respect to (B)" and (C)' (we will comment on (36) in
the next section), we can see that they do no longer present a counter-example to the our
disjointness conditions.
The clause He hates Miguel in (35) is part of a belief attribution sentence. The two NPs
would pick up the same individual in each world in the main context, but they pick up different
individuals in the derived context for this clause. According to what A and B suppose that Delia
believes, Miguel and the man that Delia is talking to are two different people (or at least it is not
determined that they are the same --i.e. at least for some world in the derived context, they are
not the same). So the two NPs in He hates Miguel are not presupposed to pick up the same
individual in each world in the relevant context, namely, the derived context for the embedded
clause of the belief attribution sentence.
An analogous explanation applies to the clause he would know him well in (37): in the
relevant context, i.e., in the derived context for the consequent of the subjunctive conditional, the
man A and B are looking at is not Tim, since in all the worlds in the derived context for a
subjunctive conditional what the antecedent says is true, and the antecedent of the subjunctive
conditional in (37) says that the man A and B are looking at is not Tim. So, if for each world
in the derived context he picks up the man A and B are looking at, and him picks up Tim, the
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two NPs are not presupposed to be co-valued (actually they are presupposed not to be co-valued,
i.e., they pick up a different individual in each world in the derived context).
8.4. 'Saying Attributions'
In the case of sentences containing what we might call a saying attribution it does not seem
possible to specify a 'derived context' that plays all the roles that we have seen a derived context
plays for belief attribution sentences and subjunctive conditionals.
One important difference between belief attributions and saying attributions is that the
former are related to a state whereas the latter are related to an event: saying attributions describe
the content of some particular utterance that the subject of the saying-b ttribution performed. Even
when we use several saying attribution sentences about the same subject, there might not be one
single set of possibilities which each saying attribution makes a contribution in trying to specify.
Each saying attribution might be about a different utterance, and it will be concerned with
specifying which worlds are compatible with the content of that particular utterance. This is not
the same as specifying the possibilities left open by all what the subject said. I might report that
John said that he is from Cambridge, and that he said that he is from Newport. The two saying
attributions do not attempt to describe a single set of possibilities --the one compatible with what
John 'said', but rather they report two different utterances of John, each with its own content.
We could still say that the derived context for a saying attribution is the set of possible
worlds compatible with what we believe is the content of the utterance we are attributing to the
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subject when we say that he said so and so. If this were the derived context then it would be
unlike the derived context for belief attributions or conditionals, since it does not have to contain
the presuppositions that the words used in the saying attribution might carry: as it is well known,
sentences with 'verbs of saying' (say, tell, announce, ask) are such that the sentence containing
them does not require any presupposition that might usually be carried by some of the
expressions in the embedded clause". So, for instance, I can felicitously and even truly say of
my bachelor friend Ambrbs that he said that his wife had stopped beating the king of France.
It seems that referential expressions in the embedded clause of a saying attribution
sentence must have a suitable referent in the following set of possible worlds: those worlds that
according to the main context are compatible with what the subject of the saying attribution was
assuming when making his utterance. So, for instance, I can utter (38)
(38) Gemma believed that some moonlight reflected on the room wall was a ghost. She said
that he probably was friendly.
When making the saying attribution we are assuming that in all the worlds compatible with what
Gemma was assuming when she made her utterance there was a ghost in the room. He in the
embedded clause will pick up, for each world in the set of worlds compatible with what Gemma
34 See, for instance, Karttunen(1974).
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was assuming when she made her utterance, the ghost that Gemma thought was in the room35.
I propose that we regard the set of worlds that in the main context are regarded as compatible
with what the subject of the saying attribution was assuming when he made the utterance we are
attributing to him as the relevant context for the embedded clause of a saying attribution
sentence.
Then we can account for (36): the relevant context for the embedded clause in he told me
that he saw him in a video is the set of worlds compatible with what A and B assume that David
was assuming when he made the utterance we are attributing to him. From what is said in the
first part of (36) it is clear that in each possible world compatible with what A and B know that
David believed and that he believed that people who were listening to him believed and, so, in
each world compatible with what they know that David assumed when he uttered a sentence there
are two different people: himself and David. So the pronouns he and him do not pick up the same
individual in the relevant context for the embedded clause, and so the interpretation of this clause
in not in conflict with our new version of the disjointness conditions.
8.5. Checking our examples
As pointed out in footnote 16, the use of certain expressions (such as "this is why...") can alter
what is the context which is relevant for evaluating some sentence. These expressions might
35 Notice that he would not have a referent in each world in the main context, and this is why
we could not say: "Gemma believed that some moonlight on the room's wall was a ghost. He
probably was friendly".
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allow a sentence to have certain interpretation that the disjointness conditions would not allow
the corresponding sentence without these expressions to have. Also it is easy to construct a
sentence that has an interpretation that seems not to accord with what the disjointness conditions
prescribe by using definite descriptions or proper names that have a very salient associated
description (such as the usual "Hesperus", "Phosphorus", "Superman", "Clark Kent"): when
interpreting a sentence the hearers always try to accommodate what they are assuming so as to
make the sentence interpretable; if, for instance, two co-referential proper names each has an
associated description, then, if necessary, it is easy to imagine how a world would be like where
the two names were not co-referential, and to assume that the sentence should be evaluated with
respect to that kind of worlds. In summary: there are several devices that might change the
context where a sentence is evaluated; in order to make sure that what explains (35)-(37) is what
we say that explains them (i.e. that certain parts of the sentences must be evaluated with respect
to a context which is not the main context) and not something else, we should do the following:
we should check that the relevant clauses can not be interpreted as in (35)-(37) when we make
just the minimal changes necessary to prevent evaluating the clause with respect to a derived or
special context (i.e. different from the main context).
Consider (35)', (36)' and (37)*
(35)' A: That man over there who is talking to Delia is Miguel
B: Right. But Delia does not know that he is Miguel. Actually he hates Miguel.
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(36)' A and B are talking about their mutual friend David who is amnesiac:
A: Has David already realized that he is David?
B: No, this very morning he saw him in a video.
(37)" A: I would like to know certain thing about Tim
B: Tim is that man over there. Ask him.
A: I see.
B: You should ask him, because he is someone playing in the same band (he is wearing
the band's suit) and he knows him well.
The clause He admires Miguel in (35)' is no longer acceptable if we intend He to pick
up, for each world in the context, the man that A and B are looking at and for Miguel to pick
up the man A and B call "Miguel". Similarly for he saw him in a video in (36)*, and he knows
him well in (37)'.
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Chapter Two
On the Interpretation of Second-order Quantification:
An Examination of Some Criticisms of Boolos' Proposal
George Boolos offers an innovative proposal of how to understand second order
quantification in two papers: To be is to be the value of a variable (or to be some values of some
variables) and Nominalistic Platonism'. Many times it is difficult to provide much positive
evidence for a proposal that, like Boolos', concerns very basic ideas and intuitions. We will see
that Boolos nevertheless provides some positive evidence. One good way of trying to make one
such basic proposal plausible, though, is by showing that there is no negative evidence against
it. This paper is mainly concerned with this second sort of enterprise. Several authors have
offered criticisms to Boolos' proposal. In this paper I will examine the criticisms that have been
put forward by Charles Parsons, Patrick Grim and Michael Resnik. The criticisms offered by
these authors cover different aspects in Boolos' argumentation. In the first section of this paper
I will briefly summarize Boolos' proposal. In the following three sections I will examine the
criticisms offered by each of these authors.
STo be is to be the value of a variable (or some values of some variables), The Journal of
Philosophy 81, August 1984, pp. 430-449.
Nominalistic Platonism, Philosophical Review 94, July 1985, pp. 327-344.
Both papers are collected in George Boolos' Logic, logic and logic, Harvard University Press,
forthcoming.
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I will refer to To be is to be the value of a variable (or to be some values of some
variables) and Nominalistic Platonism as TB and NP, respectively.
1. Boolos' proposal
1.1 The main ideas
There are some propositions, and, in particular, there are some propositions about set theory, that
we regard as true, which are not expressible by means of a first order formula but that would
seem to be expressible by means of a second order formula. Some examples of them are the
separation principle and set theoretic induction. These principles would seem to be formalizable
respectively as
(a) VXVx3yVz (ze y <-- ze x & Xz)
(b) VX( 3xXx -> 3x[ Xx & Vy (ye x -> -iXy)] )
Standardly, second-order variables are interpreted as ranging over classes of the objects
which are the values of the first order variables. Then, though, consider for instance, the
separation principle: given some sets (for example, the sets that have only one element) and given
a set x there is a set that has as elements all the given sets that are elements of x. The full
expression of this principle under the standard way of interpreting second order quantification
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requires that there are classes that have as elements, for instance, all the singleton sets. If there
were such classes they would not themselves be sets (they are usually called 'proper classes').
So, under the standard interpretation of second-order quantification, if we want a sentence such
as (a) to fully express the separation principle we believe we have to assume that there are
classes which are not sets. This is completely undesirable if we think, as Boolos does, that set
theory is supposed to be a theory about all the class-like objects that there are.
Anotner way of interpreting second other sentences which would not involve accepting
proper classes, would be to require that the objects over which the individual variables in the
second order formula range form a set; but then we would not be able to fully express principles
like the ones above.
George Boolos argues that sure enough we can fully express the principles we believe
(like separation and the induction principle) and that we can express them by means of second
order formulae. Interpreting second order formulae does not require that it be assumed that
second order variables range over classes of the individuals which are the values of the first order
variables. This is so because:
(1) Second order formulae can be interpreted by appealing to natural language plurals, and
(2) This use of natural language plurals does not imply commitment to the existence of
classes of the individuals in the domain of discourse.
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In the next two sub-sections I will examine the arguments given for (1) and (2) in TB and
NP.
1.2 Interpreting second-order formulae by appealing to plurals.
Nonfirstorderizable sentences. In both articles (TB 431-440, NP 327-329) there is a discussion
of different natural language sentences and arguments and the possibility or impossibility of
symbolizing them in a first-order language. These examples serve to show the expressive power
of natural language plurals (sometimes a sentence with plural quantification can not be expressed
in first-order logic, often its most 'natural' symbolization is by means of a second-order
sentence). The discussion of these examples evince a correspondence between second-order
quantification and plurals in one direction: maa"y sentences containing plurals are most naturally
symbolized in second-order logic. What we want to justify, though, is the other direction:
second-order sentences are interpretable by means of natural language sentences containing
plurals. The way in which the discussion of non-firstorderizable sentences helps to justify this
seems to be the following: by showing that several natural language sentences containing plurals
are most naturally formalized by means of second order formulae we also show that the second-
order formulae that formalize the English sentences containing plurals that we have considered
are themselves, in turn, naturally interpreted in English by a sentence containing plurals; this fact
would suggest that, unless we have any reason to suppose that the second-order sentences that
we have seen formalize some English sentences containing plurals have some structural feature
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or other characteristics that distinguish them from other second-order sentences (and we do not
have any reason to think that this is so), these other second order sentences will also be naturally
interpretable by means of sentences containing plurals. The discussion of non-firstorderizable
sentences helps to give some intuitive plausibility to the idea that we can satisfactorily interpret
second order formulas by means of natural language plurals. This discussion does not constitute
by itself, though, a justification of (1).
The claim in (1) is shown to be true in two ways2: (i) first by providing a translation
procedure between a second order language and (an augmented version of) English; (ii) second,
by actually providing a truth theory for a second order language. This second task is
accomplished in a two-fold manner: on the one hand, a truth theory using (an augmented) second
order language is provided; on the other hand, the translation procedure mentioned in (i) makes
it possible to understand the second order language that it used as a metalanguage for giving the
truth theory.
Translation. We can consider an augmented version of English in which pronouns (including the
relative pronoun "that") have subindexes and in which coindexation means co-valueness (i.e., in
the case of referential expressions it means co-reference, in the case of expressions bound by a
quantificational noun phrase, the index indicates which expressions are bound by a given
quantificational noun phrase). This augmented English seems to be as intelligible as English
2 For a general discussion of how these two ways of interpreting a language differ, see
Chapter 3.
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itself. Boolos offers (in TB p. 444) a procedure to translate any second order formula of the
language of set theory into this augmented English. Natural language plural quantification is used
to translate second-order quantification. The procedure is the following:
Vv translates as it' is one of them v
ve u translates as it, is a member of it,
v=u translates as it, is identical with it,,
& translates as and
-, translates as not
3vF translates as there is a set that, is such that F' (where F* is the translation of F)
3VF translates as either there are some sets that, are such that F', or F"
(where F" is the result of substituting an occurrence of -'v=v for each occurrence of Vv
in F)
Notice that if we allow not only pronouns but all noun phrases to have coindexation, then
we can add clauses that translate universal quantification in the following way:
VvF translates as given a set, F' (or also, whatever a setv is, F*)
VVF translates as given some sets, F* and F* (or also, whatever some sets, are, F' and F")
Notice that this translation procedure does not give us an explicit account of how the
semantic value of complex expressions depends on the semantic value of simpler parts. This is
provided by the truth theory:
-92-
The truth theory. The standard view is that the use of first-order sentences carries a commitment
to the objects in the domain the sentence is taken to be about, and that the use of second-order
sentences carries a commitment to all the classes of the objects in the domain. It would seem that
the basis for claiming this is that in giving a truth theory for a language and, in particular, in
giving a definition of satisfaction of a formula by a sequence, first-order variables are assigned
objects in the domain and second-order variables are assigned classes of those objects. If this is
the only basis for claiming the ontological commitment of second-order sentences to classes, then
Boolos refutes it by providing a truth theory for a second-order language in which there is no
assignment of any entity to second-order variables. The language he chooses is among the ones
that would seem more difficult to deal with: the second order language of set theory (since on
the intended interpretation, the domain is not a set). He defines the satisfaction predicate: R and
s satisfy F, where s and F are first order variables, and R is a second-order variable. A formula
F will be true if there are a sequence s and some sets R that satisfy it. The recursive definition
of satisfaction is the following (where "<,>" is the ordered pair function sign):
If F is uE v, then R and s satisfy F iff s(u)e s(v)
If F is u=v, then R and s satisfy F iff s(u)=s(v)
If F is Vv, then R and s satisfy F iff R<V, s(v)>
If F is -G, then R and s satisfy F iff -(R and s satisfy G)
If F is (G&H), then R and s satisfy F iff (R and s satisfy G & R and s satisfy H)
If F is 3vG, then R and s satisfy F iff 3x3t (t is a sequence & t(v)=x &
Vu(u is a first-order variable & uv--t(u)=s(u)) & R and t satisfy G )
-93-
If F is 3VG, then R and s satisfy F iff 3X3T ( Vx( Xx e--T<V,x>) &
VU(U is a second-order variable & U•V -- Vx(T<U,x>•4R<U,x>)) & T and s satisfy G)
The last two clauses could be simplified in the following way:
If F is 3vG, then R and s satisfy F iff 3t ( t is a sequence &
Vu(u is a first-order variable & u#v--t(u)=s(u) ) & R and t satisfy G)
If F is 3VG, then R and s satisfy F iff 3T(VU(U is a second-order variable &
U•V -- Vx(T<U,x> <-> R<U,x>)) & T and s satisfy G )
Three comments: (a) Notice that the truth theory is provided in the very second order
language of set theory (the object language) with the only addition of the predicate 'R and s
satisfy F'; in particular, notice that all the other predicates appearing in the definition (like 'is
a sequence' or 'is a first order variable') can be expressed in the language of set theory: for
instance, 'is a variable' can be seen as a condition on sets since we can regard variables as
(Gdidel) numbers, and numbers as sets. All the appearances of variables written using capital
letters for which I have used a boldface font are not genuine second-order variables of the
language in which we are providing the truth theory, but rather they stand either for a first order
variable or for the functional expression that gives (the set corresponding to) the Gddel number
of the second-order variable involved. (b) This truth theory provides us with what we could ask
from it: from this theory plus standard axiomatic second-order logic we can derive the usual
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lemmas about free variables, and laws of truth; If, after all, the one who claims that we should
interpret second-order variables as having classes of the objects in the domain as values were
right, this theory does not alter the truth values assigned to the sentences. (c) Since the theory
is given in the (augmented) second-order language of set theory, which is not a language we
know, we need the translation procedure to interpret the clauses in the definition of satisfaction.
Combining the translation procedure and the truth theory we have a set of sentences in a
language we understand (augmented English) which tells us in the appropriate way how the
satisfaction conditions of complex expressions depend on those of their parts.
So the general picture is this: we can interpret second order quantification without having
to appeal the classes of the objects in the domain; this is so because we can interpret second
order quantification appealing to natural language plurals. Now, the proposal would not work if
the use plural quantification in natural language were just a covert way of quantifying over
classes of the individuals in the domain of discourse.
1.3 On the ontological commitments of natural language plurals
I think that it is hard, in general, to give an argument to show that a sentence does not have
certain ontological commitment beyond appealing to the intuition that it does not. Suppose; that
someone claimed that in saying 'Bill runs' we are referring to a set that has all the individuals
in the domain of discourse but Bill as its members; how would we argue against this claim,
besides appealing to our clear intuition that there is no such commitment? It seems that the
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burden of proof should be on the one that claims that there is some specific ontological
commitment.
I think that, in addition to appealing to the intuitive apparent lack of commitment to
classes of all the objects in the domain in the use of some sentences containing plurals, there are
basically three kinds of considerations in TB and NP trying to defend the view that plural
quantification does not carry a commitment to classes. The first two are aimed at showing that
some arguments that the defender of the 'commitment to classes' view could put forward are not
good, only the last one is aimed at giving positive evidence that there is not such commitment.
They are the following:
(a) Someone might claim that sentences with plural quantification are intelligible only because
we interpret quantification such as 'there are some dogs...' as 'there is a class of dogs...'.
Someone might say that because she thinks that we are only going to be able to give a semantic
theory of English if we assign semantic values to expressions using set theory: singular referential
expressions may have as a semantic value individuals in the domain of discourse, but plural
expressions will have to have as a semantic value classes (or may be classes of classes, etc) of
the objects in the domain.
Boolos replies by claiming that there is a distinction between (i) what (parts of) languages
we can understand (ii) what (parts of) languages we are able to give a systematic theory for. We
might only be able to give a systematic theory of a kind of 'plural quantification' that works as
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quantification over classes, this does not mean that plural quantification in English has to work
that way or that we could only understand it if it worked that way.
Whatever the plausibility of Boolos' reply, it seems that he is granting something that he
does not need to: that any adequate systematic semantic theory will be stated in terms of set
theory. This is not true in general, and we do not have any reason to think it true for the specific
case of a theory of plural reference and plural quantification in natural language. Even if it is true
in general that: if any adequate theory for certain expression must assign certain sort of semantic
value to that expression then that means that the use of that expression involves that sort of
semantic value, we do not need to believe that the use of plurals involves an appeal to classes
of the individuals in the domain, since we have not been given any compelling reason for
believing that an adequate systematic theory of plurals can only be given if their semantic value
is given in terms of classes.
(b) Someone could claim, following Quine, that to determine what the ontological commitment
of certain sentence is one has to formalize it using first order logic. Then the sentence conveys
commitment to any entity that the variables could take as a value. So, for instance, in the case
of 'there are some dogs that are such that one of them leads the others and no one else' we
would have
3c(cisaclass & Vz(zec->zisadog) &
3y3z(ye c & z~e c & yz & Vx[xe c & x y - y leads x] & Vx[y leads x - x c] ))
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and so, it would be determined that the sentence conveys commitment to a class of dogs.
There are, though, some examples of sentences which clearly do not seem to have any
commitment to classes but that, if we applied the translating-into-first-order criterion would turn
out to have such commitment. Two such examples would be 'For infinitely many stars, there is
no planet around them' and 'Most people like bananas'. So the criterion is not right in general.
So one can not use the general validity of the criterion to argue that some plural sentences carry
a commitment to certain classes.
(c) A sentence like 'There are some sets that are self-identical, and every set that it is not a
member of itself is one of them' says something trivially true, but if it conveyed a commitment
to classes then it would be equivalent to 'there is a collection of sets that are self identical and
every set that it is not a member of itself is a member of this collection' and this sentence is
false. So the first sentence can not convey a commitment to classes. (To make it easy to refer
to this argument later on, I will call it ARG).
It seems that the defender of the commitment to classes view could reply that the sentence
does entail the existence of classes and contra what we could at first think the sentence is false.
The answer given to this reply (in TB-447) is that it is obvious that in general a sentence
of the form "There are some As of which every B is one" is synonymous with the corresponding
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sentence of the form 'There are some As and every B is an A'. If there is no commitment to a
class in the latter, there is no commitment to a class in the former. And it seems harder to claim
with respect to the latter that it involves a commitment to the class of all the As or of all the Bs.
In a similar argument (in NP 331-332) Boolos claims that the following three sentences (a)-(c)
say the same:
(a) There are some classes such that every infinite class is one of them.
(b) There are some classes and every infinite class is one of them.
(c) There are some classes and every infinite class is a class.
If there is no commitment to a class containing all infinite classes in (c), then there is no such
a commitment in (a) either.
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2. Charles Parsons' criticisms
In section seven in The Structuralist View of Mathematical Objects3 Charles Parsons is
concerned with whether, when pursuing an eliminative structuralist program, recourse to
second-order logic can be fruitful in view of being able to eliminate mathematical objects. He
considers two different ways of interpreting it; one of them is Boolos'. Parsons concludes that
"Boolos has ... not made a convincing case for the claim that his interpretation of second-order
logic is ontologically noncommittal." (p. 328). We will examine what I think are the three main
criticisms Parsons presents against Boolos' proposal. Before doing that, though, I would like to
point out the following:
Parsons concentrates his analysis/criticism of Boolos' proposal on the truth theory for the
second-order set-theory language that Boolos offers in NP. Parsons considers the question of the
ontological commitment of natural language plurals only in a couple of paragraphs (pp. 326-327).
He seems to conclude (though he is not very explicit about it) that there is no clear answer to
the issue of the ontological commitment of natural language plurals and that this creates a
'discomfort'. He seems to suggest that Boolos offers his theory of truth to deal with this
discomfort with natural language plurals. But this is not so. According to the general structure
of Boolos' argumentation that we have presented in section 1, the truth theory that Boolos offers
does not directly show anything about the ontological commitment of natural language plurals.
It is the truth theory that gets its point from the fact that natural language plurals carry no
' Syntheses 84, 1990, pp. 303-346.
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commitment to classes, not the other way around4.
2.1 First objection
Boolos claims that in the truth theory for the second-order language of set theory that he gives
in NP he makes no use of an assignment of a value to second-order variables. Parsons says that
"it is hard to agree with Boolos that the treatment of second-order variables in the definition does
not offer scope for the notion of a value comparable to what it offers to the notion of a value of
an individual variable" (p. 328). We could say that the value of the second-order variable V is
XxR<V,x>, that is, the class that has as a member any set a such that the pairing of (the set that
corresponds to the number that is the Gbidel number of the variable) V and a is one of the R's.
Parsons claims that the R's are simply coding an assignment of classes to second order-variables,
and he suggests that Boolos' truth theory does not essentially differ from the standard one in
regard to the use of classes to interpret second-order quantification.
We can agree with Parsons when he says that we can see the R's as coding an assignment
of classes to values and also vice versa, only if we assume that given some sets there is going
to be a (maybe proper) class that has exactly those sets as elements. If we take set theory to be
a theory about all the class-like objects, though, we do not need to concede that assumption.
(Even if intuitions would suggest that given some objects there must always be one thing which
4 The truth theory might be taken to have the following indirect relevance to the issue of the
ontological commitments of natural language plurals: if second order logic could only be
interpreted by appealing to classes then it would seem that any formula that can not be
formalized in a first-order language and can only be formalized in a second-order language
should itself involve reference to classes.
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is constituted by them, the set theoretic paradoxes teach us not to follow these intuitions). If we
accept it, though, then it will certainly be the case that given some R's (i.e. some pairs where the
first member of the pair is a second order variable) a unique assignment of classes to
second-order variables is determined, and given one such assignment some specific sets are
determined.
Given some sets, the R's, which are such that each set is an ordered pair such that the
first member is (the set corresponding to the Goidel number of) a variable, we can define the
corresponding assignment function, which we may call f, in the following way: for each
second-order variable V,
f(V) = the class that has as member any set a such that <V,a> is one of the R's
And given an assignment f of classes to second-order variables we can consider the pairs such
that the first member of the pair is a second order variable and the second member is an element
of the class that f assigns to the first member of the pair.
Having said that, I do not think that Parsons is right in suggesting that from the fact that
we can see the R's as coding an assignment, it follows that when we give the truth theory and
we refer to the R's, we are referring to the corresponding assignment and the values that the
variables would have according to that assignment. From the fact that the R's can be seen as an
coding an assignment, it does not follow that they are one. There is a difference between what
information we can obtain from something, and what that thing is. For instance, we can see every
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object as coding a certain ordered pair: the one that has that object as its first member and
Archibald Leach as its second; and vice versa, we can see each ordered pair of the form
<x,Archibald Leach> as coding an object: the one that is its first member. This does not mean
that talk of one is like talk of the other.
2.2 Second objection
Parsons proposes "an ontological intuition" which is "a little different from but complementing
Quine's" (p. 328), and consists in thinking that the ontological commitment of a natural language
sentence is carried by the expression that plays the role of subject. The subject indicates what
we are talking about, and so what we are committing ourselves to. In a formal language, the
corresponding role to be the subject of a sentence is to be an argument of a predicate. So, a
sentence in a formal language conveys commitment to those entities that can be the interpretation
of the arguments of a predicate. In the truth theory in NP the predicate 'satisfy' has three
arguments whose interpretation will be a sequence, some pairs, and a formula. So, some pairs,
let's call them the R's, can be one of the arguments, and so they constitute a unity (whether we
see it as a class or as a plurality). So, in includirg a predicate, satisfy, that takes a second-order
argument, the truth theory in NP involves commitment to second-order entities like classes,
collections or pluralities.
Leaving aside some other probably minor objections to Parsons ontological criterion (Not
only the subject of a natural language sentence might be an argument of a predicate in its
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formalization, but also the object and some other complements; Are we committing ourselves to
ghosts if we say "Ghosts do not exist"?) I think that the following can be replied: There are clear
cases in which a predicate taking a second-order argument does not convey commitment to
classes. Consider "Joe and Jason met after class". It seems clear that this sentence does not
include any reference to a set, a collection or a plurality (if that is a single entity made out of
many), but only to Joe and to Jason. The same is true of "The students met after class", which
is a sentence where the predicate takes and argument, the students, which is of the same kind as
the argument the R's in the R's and s satisfy F. [If someone replies that even if there is no
reference to a class in "Joe and Jason met" there might be one in "The students met", we can ask
her to consider the following sentences and to tell us in which of them the reference to a class
comes into: "Joe and Jason met", "Joe, Jason and Daniel met", "Joe, Jason and the other student
met", "Joe and the other two students met", "Joe and the other ten students met", "The ten
students met", "The students met" ].
It might be replied to what I just said that the predicate 'satisfy' in the truth theory is
different from 'meet' in that it does not have a single (plural) argument as 'met', but three
arguments (of different kind) and that it is this fact that might make the R's be 'a unity' which
is different from the other two arguments. To this I would answer that we can also consider a
sentence like "Johnny put the pieces together" ( or if you want, "Johnny put piece A and piece
B together", "Johnny put two pieces together", "Johnny put four pieces together", "Johnny put
more than three pieces together", "Johnny put some pieces together", "Johnny put the pieces
together"). If we formalize this example the predicate will take two arguments, a first-order and
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a second-order one. Nevertheless it seems to me that we have intuitions as clear as in the
examples in the previous paragraph that this example does not include reference to a class, but
only reference to, on the one hand, one individual, John, and on the other hand, to some other
individuals, the pieces he put together.
2.3 Third objection
In a footnote (footnote 64, p.344) Parsons observes that, as we mentioned above, in the truth
theory offered in NP, R is a.l argument of the predicate 'satisfy' and he claims that there is a
difficulty for Boolos' proposal to express that predication using plurals. He expresses in English
the last clause in the recursive definition of satisfaction (R and s satisfy 3VG) in accordance to
Boolos proposal of interpreting second-order variables in terms of plurals. Simplifying the
formulation Parsons gives we could express it as
There are some variable-pairs the T's such that for any second order variable U
distinct from V, the pairing of a set and U is one of the T's if and only if it is one
of the R's, and the T's and s satisfy G
Parsons claims that there is a difficulty in the expression "the T's and s satisfy G", since nothing
marks the final "the T's" as a second order argument; "the T's and s satisfy G" could say that
all or most of the T's are x's such that x and s satisfy G.
(Notice that this objection is a kind of contrapositive of the previous objection: We can
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take the present objection to be 'If the R's are not a single unity then there is no way of
identifying them as an argument', whereas the former was 'since the R's are an argument they
have to be a unity').
I would reply the following. First, in regard to the remark that we could interpret "The
T's and s satisfy G" so as to be saying something only about most of the T's: It is true that we
sometimes say "the A's P" when we know it is true only that "most of the A's P"; but this is just
a pragmatic phenomenon: on the one hand, it seems that "the A's P" expresses a simpler thought
than "Most of the A's P"; on the other hand, when not all the A's P, "most of the A's P" is more
informative than "The A's P"; which expression we use in a certain circumstance will depend
on a trade-off between on the one hand, quantity of information and on the other relevance and
simplicity. One characteristic of the mathematical use of language is that it is fully explicit and
does not rely on pragmatic mechanisms. When using the expression "the T's" in giving the truth
theory we have to assume that the pragmatic balance mentioned above does not take place and
that the expression has to be understood in its most literal sense.
Second, I do not think that "the T's and s satisfy G" can be read as 'for each x that is a
T, x and s satisfy G' , in the same way that "Kathrin and her sisters carried the pianos upstairs"
does not have (even marginally) a reading where the sentence is true only if for each of Kathrin's
sisters there is an event of carrying a piano upstairs such that she and Kathrin (and no one else)
are the agents.
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I think, nevertheless, that there is, in principle, a possible reading of the expression "the
T's and s satisfy G" that Parsons does not consider but that does seem to posit a problem for
claiming that we can interpret the truth theory in terms of plurals. It is the following: it seems
that "the T's and s satisfy G" could mean that each of the T's satisfy G and that s satisly G. It
could be claimed, then, that this undesirable reading can only be ruled out if the T's constitute
an unity, and so that we need to appeal to class-like objects in giving the truth theory. To this
I would reply the following.
There is, in general, a distinction between the so called collective predicates and
distributive predicates. 'Gather', 'disperse', 'love each other' and 'to be 12' are examples of
collective predicates; 'sleep' and 'to be red' are examples of distributive predicates. Properly
speaking the distinction is not between predicates but between readings of a predicate, since
many predicates can have both readings. The classic example is "Ten boys carried a piano
upstairs" which in the distributive reading implies that at least ten evenls of carrying a piano
upstairs took place, but it does not in the collective reading. The truth of a sentence with a plural
subject and a distributive (reading of a) predicate will imply the truth of each sentence that has
the same predicate, and has as subject an expression referring to one of the individuals that the
plural subject refers to; this is in general not true of sentence with collective predicates.
The objection under consideration requires that in "The T's and s satisfy G", 'satisfy' has
a distributive reading over the T's and s, if we take "the T's" to refer to many individuals and
not to a single class or plurality.
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The predicate 'satisfy' in "The T's and s satisfy G" does not have such a reading. What
the interpretation of "satisfy" is depends on how we define it. Consider the other clauses in the
recursive definition. If 'satisfy' allowed a distributive reading over the T's and s, then it should
be defined, for instance, what it means that one of the T's satisfies ue v, or that s satisfies Vv;
but this is not defined.
2.4 Is there commitment to classes in some examples involving plurals?
There are some plural expressions that at least in some uses do seem to refer to 'collective
unities'. Consider, for instance, "The Klinons are aggressive". Someone might believe what this
sentence expresses because, say, of what she has learned about the actions of the Klinon army,
and she might believe it even if she does not believe that all or most of the Klinons are
aggressive. This would suggest that her belief is not about some persons, the Klinons, but rather
about some one entity whose properties depend in some complex way on the properties of each
individual who is Klinon. Also we would say that the sentence "The Rolling Stones are in the
room" is false if, for instance, Ron Wood is not in the room5, but at the same time would
maintain that "The Rolling Stones got their first hit in 1965" is true. So, it seems that "The
Rolling Stones" is not a term that simply refers to some individuals.
I am not clear about how exactly these examples should be understood, or what
5 The Rolling Stones original lead guitarist, Brian Jones left the group soon before he died
in 1969. He was then replaced by Mick Taylor, who in turn was later replaced by Ron Wood.
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implications they have. I wish I were.
In any case they do not seem to affect Boolos' proposal. Boolos does not need to claim
that NO use of natural language plurals conveys commitment to a class or collection of the
objects in the domain, but rather that certain uses of plurals (the ones he proposes to use to
interpret second-order formulas) do not convey such a commitment. Also, Boolos does not claim
that ALL uses of plurals are clear enough as to use them in our logic theory, but only that certain
uses are clear enough and that they suffice to interpret second-order languages. Similar remarks
would apply to the case of first-order logic. When giving an interpretation for a first-order
language we use natural language singular quantification and singular terms. This does not mean,
though, that we understand well enough any use of singular quantification or of referring
expressions in natural language as to base our logic on them. For instance, this does not mean
that we are clear enough about all the uses of definite descriptions. It suffices :hat the very
restrictive part of natural language that we use in giving the interpretation of first-order languages
is clear enough.
Do we understand quantification such as "there are some objects that are such that..." as clearly
as we understand "there is an object such that ..." ? I do not know what exactly would be
required to answer the question one way or the other. And, in any case, I will not pursue this
issue any further here.
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3. Patrick Grim's criticisms
At a certain point in The Incomplete Universe: totality, knowledge, and truth6 Patrick
Grim is concerned about using a formal language in which he intends to express quantification
over all propositions. He claims to have shown, though, that there is no set having as members
all the propositions. Nevertheless, 'the only formal semantics for quantification we have is in
terms of sets' (p. 115). It is at this point that he considers abandoning formal semantics, and when
he comments in a very long note on what, according to him, is one attempt of doing so: Boolos'
proposal in TB and NP. According to him7 Boolos' proposal of interpreting second order
quantifiers by appealing to natural language plurals does not offer any "genuine escape" from the
"problems that motivated it". Let's explain and examine Grim's argumentations.
Here are Grim's main assertions:
(1) According to Grim, what Boolos proposes is to substitute the formal semantics for second
order languages in terms of sets or classes or collections for an informal semantics in terms of
natural language plurals.
(2) The aim of this is to "escape from the Russellian problems" which "arise in set-theoretic
6 Patrick Grim, The Incomplete Universe: totality, knowledge and truth. Cambridge, MIT
Press, 1991.
7 All the quotations will be from page 152, unless otherwise indicated.
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semantics when we quantify over sets" and "in class-theoretic semantics when we quantify over
classes".
(3) Boolos' proposal does not succeed, though, since it falls into a similar problem. This can be
shown in the following way:
(3.1) Let's consider a "language rich enough to quantify over plural noun phrases and to express
some of their basic properties. Consider, for instance the following second-order formula:"
(a) 3X (3xXx & Vx [Xx + ->-Axx] )
(3.2) " 'x' is taken as ranging over plural noun phrases and '-,Axx' is taken to indicate that a
noun phrase does not apply to itself (in the familiar sense that 'dog' does apply to Rover, among
other canines, but does not apply to Puss)".
(3.3) According to intuition (a) expresses a truth, namely, the truth "that there is a set X of which
each non-self-applicable plural noun phrase is a member".
(3.4) According to Boolos' proposal about how to interpret second order formulas, (a) should be
read as
(b) There are some plural noun phrases tiiat are all the plural noun phrases that do not
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apply to themselves.
(3.5) Consider the plural noun phrase plural noun phrases that are all the plural noun phrases
that do not apply to themselves; "Does that plural noun phrase apply to itself or not? Is it one
such plural noun phrase or not?". It is if and only if it isn't.
(3.6) So Boolos' proposal leads into paradox --into Russell's paradox.
(4) The above argumentation 'suggests' that there may be no universally adequate form of
semantics (I think this means, a form of semantics that can be used whatever the domain of
objects the language is intended to talk about is).
Let's comment on Grim's remarks:
In regard to (1). It is not clear to me what Grim thinks the distinction between formal and
informal semantics consists in. It seems that his distinction differentiates between what are
commonly regarded as interpretations of first or second order languages (i.e. the standard theories
of truth for first and second order languages) and the interpretation of a second order language
appealing to Boolos' proposal. It seems that the talk of 'appealing to natural language plurals in
order to interpret second order quantification' makes Grim think that the interpretation of a
second order language is going to be 'informal' since it will be in natural language, which is
'informal'. Any other theory of how to interpret a (first or second order) language, though, is also
-112-
given in natural language. How else would we do it? Not all the expressive power and
complexity of natural language is used in giving such an interpretation, though. Only a
particularly suitable part (lacking ambiguities, etcetera) is used. But this is so for both what Grim
regards as formal and as informal semantics 8. For instance, it seems that the following clause
is part of what Grim regards as formal semantics
A sequence s satisfies 3vG iff there is a set a, and there is sequence t such that
t(v)=a and for any variable u, if u~v then t(u)=s(u), and t satisfies G
whereas it seems that he would say that the following clause is part of an informal semantics
Some sets, the R's, and a sequence s satisfy JVG iff There are some sets, the X's,
and there are some sets, the T's, such that: any given set x is one of the X's if and
only if the pairing of V and x is one of the T's, and for any second order variable
U, if U•V then for any given set x the pairing of U and x is one of the T's if and
only if it is one of the R's, and the T's and s satisfy G.
8 Could it be that with the talk of 'formal' and 'informal' semantics Grim is referring to a
distinction like the one we draw in the third chapter between formal languages and regimented
languages? I do not think so. Second order formal languages (in the sense introduced in section
1-(1) of chapter three, i.e. languages that we interpret by providing a theory of truth) are equally
'formal' or 'informal' under the standard truth theory or under Boolos' truth theory; and the same
is true of second-order regimented languages under the standard interpretation (which involves
translation in terms of classes) and under Boolos' interpretation (which involves translation in
terms of plurals).
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I do not see any essential difference between the two clauses. It might at most be argued
that there is a difference of degree on how much intuitively clear natural language singular and
plural quantification are. But Grim does not give any argument for this latter claim.
In regard to (2): What are the Russellian problems Grim is referring to? They have to be the
paradoxes that Russell pointed out we would run into if there were a set S of all sets: on the one
hand we could ask for the cardinality of P(S) which should be no greater than the one of S, since
P(S)cS, but it should also be strictly greater than the cardinality of S by Cantor's theorem. On
the other hand if S is a set then the elements of S that are not members of themselves also
constitute a set, let's call it B; but then B is an element of B if and only if it isn't. It seems that
it is this second paradox (in any of its forms) that Grim has in mind when he talks of 'the
Russellian problems'.
What is the relation of the 'Russellian problems' with the semantics of a second order
language? The standard way of giving a semantics for a second order language involves
interpreting second order variables as sets of the objects in the domain. In some cases, as with
set theory, the objects in the domain may not constitute a set. This imposes a constraint on how
to interpret second order sentences (either we allow second order variables to have as values not
only sets but also proper classes, or we limit the domains second-order sentences may talk about
to those domains which are sets). That the objects in the domain might no constitute a set is
shown by the Russellian paradoxes. So the relation between the 'Russellian problems' and the
semantics for second order languages is that the Russellian problems show something to be the
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case (i.e. some objects might not be such that they are all and only the elements of some set),
and this being the case imposes constraints on how to interpret second order variables.
Boolos' proposal tells us how we can express what we want to express by means of
second order sentences if we interpret them adequately. It tells us how we can use second-order
sentences to talk about some objects even if they do not constitute a set. So it overcomes a
difficulty for other conceptions of how to interpret second-order languages. This difficulty for
other conceptions stems from Russell paradox. And so we may say that Boolos' proposal is an
attempt to 'escape from the Russellian problems'. But one should not get confused by this way
of talking: Boolos' proposal does not say anything about sets or set theory, only how to interpret,
among all the other monadic second-order languages, the second-order language of set theory;
in particular, Boolos' proposal does not say anything at all about Russell's paradox if we take
that paradox to consist in the observation that something which would seem true --given some
sets, there is a set which has them as members-- leads to contradiction. It is as much a paradox
after Boolos' proposal has been made as it was before.
In regard to (3): Before going into the main issue of (3), I would like to make two minor
comments in regard to 3.1 and 3.3.
Grim's request in 3.1 to consider a "language rich enough to quantify over plural noun
phrases and to express some of their basic properties" does not seem to be necessary : if we take
the plural noun phrases as primitive objects in our domain (as it seems he does --in opposition
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to take them as numbers or sets (coding the expressions)) then any first-order language is 'rich
enough' to quantify over them; and as for the enough richness to express "their basic properties",
he is only considering the relation 'applies to' which can be formalized by any two-place first
order predicate. So instead of the sentence quoted above, it would have been more adequate just
to say "consider a language with a two place predicate, which we intend to infterpret as ..
In 3.3, Grim claims that intuition tells us that the sentence
(a) 3X (3xXx & Vx [Xx +- -,Axx] )
expresses a truth. I would say that intuition can tell us something about the truth value of a
sentence in a formal language only with respect to some interpretation of that language. Intuition
by itself does not tell us that (a) expresses the truth that there is a set of plural no, phrliases such
that... ; intuition could only tell us that if we interpret the first-order variables as ranging over
plural noun phrases, and "A" as the relation 'applies to', and interpret second order variables as
having sets of the individuals in the domain as values, then the sentence is true (actually we will
see that (a) is not true with respect to this interpretation, though).
Let's consider now the main argument in (3). "A" is interpreted as the relation 'applies
to'. Regarding this relation Grim gives the following examples: "dog" applies to Rover, since
Rover is a dog; "dog" does not apply to Puss, since Puss is not a dog; and to ask whether "plural
noun phrases that are all the plural noun phrases that do not apply to themselves" applies to itself
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is, according to Grim, to ask whether "plural noun phrases that are all the plural noun phrases
that do not apply to themselves" is one such a plural noun phrase. So 'applies to' is a relation
between a noun phrase and an object (which may or may not be a noun phrase). We might try
to explicate this relation in the following way
For all x, for all a:
x applies to a if and only if x is a noun phrase and a is in the extension of x
Even if we have this explication we might think that the notion of 'applies to' is not clear
enough if we want to use it in a general way (for instance, in the example above it does not seem
that "plural noun phrases such that ..." applies to one object in the same way that a non-plural
predicate like "dog" does). I believe that, without affecting what Grim wants to do with this
notion of 'applies to', we can make it more precise if we focus on its use with respect to certain
objects:
Grim's intention in appealing to the relation 'applies to' is to be able to arrive at a certain
contradiction involving plural noun phrases. To get this we do not have to consider the relation
in general --i.e. as holding or not for any two arbitrary objects. We can make it more precise (and
still be able to arrive at the same kind of contradiction involving plurals) if we consider the
relation restricted to a specific domain containing only certain noun phrases: noun phrases
consisting of a plural common name possibly preceded by some adjectives and possibly followed
by a relative clause. Then we can explicate this restricted sense of'applies to' in the following
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way9:
If NPi is a plural noun phrase and NP, is a plural noun phrase, then
NP, applies to NPj iff " " " ^ NPj "-" " " ^ "is one of the" ^ NP, is true
Notice that whether we consider it in the general or the restricted sense, 'applies to' is
a semantic relation. By this I mean that whether it holds or not of certain noun phrase and
another object will not depend on the noun phrase as a syntactic object, but on what the noun
phrase means. Whatever way we chose to explicate what the relation is we will have to appeal
(as we did above) to notions like 'extension', 'truth' , 'meaning' or 'denotation'.
According to the explication above of the restricted sense of 'applies to' we have that
"dogs that bark at night" does not apply to "plural noun phrases with more than three words"
since " "plural noun phrases with more than three words" is one of the dogs that bark at night"
is false; but that "plural noun phrases with more than three words" applies to "dogs that bark at
nigh", since " "dogs that bark at night" is one of the plural noun phrases with more than three
words" is true.
And also we have that:
9 I use the sign "^" to express concatenation of expressions. So, for instance, "John"^"runs"
= "Johnruns".
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if
"plural noun phrases that are all the plural noun phrases that do not apply to themselves" applies
to itself
then (according to the explication above),
the sentence " "plural noun phrases that are all the plural noun phrases that do not apply to
themselves" is one of the plural noun phrases that are all the plural noun phrases that do not
apply to themselves " is true,
and so,
"plural noun phrases that are all the plural noun phrases that do not apply to themselves" is one
of the plural noun phrases that are all the plural noun phrases that do not apply to themselves,
and so,
"plural noun phrases that are all the plural noun phrases that do not apply to themselves" does
not apply to itself.
But, if
"plural noun phrases that are all the plural noun phrases that do not apply to themselves" does
not apply to itself
then
the sentence " "plural noun phrases that are all the plural noun phrases that do not apply to
themselves" is one of the plural noun phrases that are all the plural noun phrases that do not
apply to themselves" is true,
and so (according to the explication above)
"plural noun phrases that are all the plural noun phrases that do not apply to themselves" applies
to "plural nc'in phrases that are all the plural noun phrases that do not apply to themselves"
and so,
"plural noun phrases that are all the plural noun phrases that do not apply to themselves" applies
to itself.
CONTRADICTION
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So we arrive at a contradiction (as it is claimed in 3.5).
Now, where does this contradiction stem from? Grim's answer ( according to 3.6 and 4)
is that it comes from quantifying over plural noun phrases while interpreting second order
quantification in terms of plurals. I do not think this is right. If we consider, for instance, the
explication above, the contradiction stems only from the explication of "applies to" (and the
corresponding instance of the T-schema). I think that Grim thinks that the contradiction arises
from quantifying over noun phrases while interpreting second order quantification in accordance
with Boolos' proposal because he believes that there is a parallelism between how the
contradiction emerges in this case and how one can derive a contradiction by unrestrictedly
interpreting the second-order quantifiers of the language of set-theory when appealing to sets. If
we made it explicit, the parallelism that Grim seems to assume would be the one between (i)-(iii)
and (i)'-(iii)':
(i) If we interpret second-order quantification in terms of sets and, for instance, we take the
sentence VXVz3yVx ( xy <- [xe z & Xx] ) to express the (unrestricted) separation principle, then
we are assuming that there is a set of all sets.
(ii) So there is a set, let's call it B, which has as elements the sets in the set of all sets which
are not members themselves.
(iii) Then we can ask whether B is an element of itself, and it is if and only if it isn't.
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(i)' If we interpret second-order quantification in terms of plurals, then the interpretation of the
true sentence (a) 3X(3xXx & Vx[Xx < ->,Axx]) will be the true claim that there are some plural
noun phrases that are all the plural noun phrases that do not apply to themselves.
(ii)' So "plural noun phrases that are all the plural noun phrases that do not apply to themselves"
is a plural noun phrase.
(iii)' Then we can ask whether that plural noun phrase applies to itself, and it does if and only
if it doesn't.
We need (i) and (ii) to arrive at the contradiction in (iii), but I think that for the plurals
case we do not need (i)' and (ii)' to arrive at the contradiction. There is no need to justify that
"plural noun phrases that are all the plural noun phrases that do not apply to themselves" is a
plural noun phrase: this is a syntactic fact. I think that the only explanation for why Grim talks
about the sentences (a) and (b), though, is because he thinks that there is the parallelism I tried
to spell out explicitly above.
The contradiction, though, would also arise if we did not interpret the quantifiers in (a)
in terms of plurals but in terms of sets: if there is a set whose members are all and only the non
self-applicable plural noun phrases, then "plural noun phrases that are all the plural noun phrases
that do not apply to themselves" is in that set if and only if it isn't.
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But we do not need to appeal to a second-order language to get the contradiction: if in
a first-order language we have, for instance, a constant c and we interpret it as the noun phrase
"plural noun phrases that are all the plural noun phrases that do not apply to themselves", then
the sentence nAcc is true if and only if it isn't.
Furthermore, we do not need to appeal to a formal language at all to get the contradiction,
not even to plural noun phrases. We could get the same kind of contradiction with singular noun
phrases: Does the singular noun phrase "singular noun phrase that does not apply to itself" apply
to itself or not? It does if and only if it doesn't.
Or instead of noun phrases we could be considering expressions in general ("expression
that does not apply to itself' applies to itself if and only if it doesn't), or adjectives (if an
adjective is heterological if and only if it does not apply to itself, then "heterological" is
heterological if and only if it isn't).
So, in all these cases what we have is essentially Grelling's heterological paradox 'o
Grim's criticism of Boolos's proposal amounts to pointing out that the heterological paradox
exists. But that should not be a criticism at all since Boolos makes no claim of having offered
a 'solution' to it.
'o First presented in K. Grelling and L. Nelson "Bemerkungeen zu den Paradosien von
Russell and Burali-Forti". Abhandlugen der Fries'schen Schule, N.S. Vol. 2 (1908), pp. 301-334.
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In our second explication of the relation 'applies to' it is clear that the contradiction arises
only from how the relation 'applies to' works: certain noun phrase applies to another if and only
if certain sentence is true, and this sentence may include those noun phrases and the relation
"applies to", and so the door for contradiction is open.
Regarding (4): nothing of what has been said above prevents to apply Boolos' proposal about the
interpretation of second order languages to a language where we quantify over plural noun
phrases, whether we take them as primitive or as coded by numbers or sets. Notice that, unlike
what Grim seems to suggest (p. 153), the difficulty of interpreting second order quantification
appealing to sets does not depend essentially on the fact that we are quantifying over sets, i.e.,
it does not depend essentially on the fact that we are quantifying over the same kind of objects
we use in the metalanguage to interpret quantification. If we were quantifying over, say, angels,
and it so happened that there are many of them --for each set one angel-- then there would also
be truths that we would not be able to express if second-order quantification is interpreted in
terms of sets. (For instance "Given some angels, there are some angels who are all the angels
who are not among the former ones" would not say the same as VX3YVx(Yx <-* XXx), if we
interpret that formula as 'given some set of angels there is another set whose members are all
the angels who are not members of the former set' ).
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4 Michael Resnik's criticisms
Michael Resnik claims in his article Second-order logic still wild" that Boolos' proposal
of interpreting second-order quantification in terms of natural language plurals does not succeed
in showing that second-order quantification does not carry a commitment to sets or classes of the
objects the first-order variables range over. I think that his arguments can basically be divided
into two parts. I will examine them in two sections.
4.1 Natural language plurals and commitment to classes
In the first part of his paper Resnik tries to make plausible that, in opposition to what Boolos
claims, certain English sentences containing plurals do convey a commitment to classes.
(a) He starts by pointing out that, according to his intuitions, sentences like, for instance, "There
are some critics such that any one of them admires another critic only if the latter is one of them
distinct from the former" seem 'to refer to collections quite explicitly'. 'How else are we to
understand the phrase "one of them" other than referring to some collection and as saying that
the referent of "one" belongs to it?' (p. 77).
I think that Boolos himself contributes to giving these intuitions all the strength they can
possibly have. The reason is this: Boolos (specially in TB) makes the reader consider a series of
sentences some of which can be formalized in a first-order language, and some of which can only
" Journal of Philosophy, 85 (1988), pp. 75-87.
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be formalized in a second-order language; the reader is then aware of the existence of a
difference between these two kinds of sentences; the difference consists in being firstorderizable
or not; at this point --before Boolos' proposal has been presented-- the reader is understanding
second order quantification in the formalizations in the standard way, i.e., in terms of sets; so the
reader is led to understand the difference between the sentences that are firstorderizable and the
ones that are not as a difference between involving or not a reference to sets of the objects the
sentence is about; so the reader becomes convinced that certain sentences containing plural
quantification involve a commitment to a class of the objects the sentence is about.
(b) After stating his discrepant intuitions, Resnik considers Boolos' arguments that would show
that Resnik's intuitions are not the right ones. He considers the argument (in TB 447) that we
called ARG: the sentence "There are some sets that are self-identical, and every set that it is not
a member of itself is one of them" says something trivially true but if it involved reference to
a class would be false. First, Resnik questions whether, as Boolos claims, the sentence is really
true. Then he goes on into considering the argument Boolos gives to support that the sentence
is true. He considers the version of it in NP (pp. 331-332). As we mentioned in 1.3(c), Boolos
claims that it is intuitively clear that the sentences (1)-(3) say the same and, so, if there is no
quantification over classes in (3) there is none either in (1):
(1) There are some As such that every B is one of them
(2) There are some As and every B is one of them
(3) There are some As and every B is an A
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Resnik claims that they do not say the same. They are naturally formalized as:
(4) 3X( 3xXx & Vx[ Xx -- Ax ] & Vx[ Bx - Xx ] )
(5) 3X( 3xXx & Vx[ Xx - Ax ] & Vxl Bx --x Ax ] )
(6) 3xAx & Vx( Bx -4 Ax )
These sentencus are equivalent within second-order logic. Nevertheless Resnik claims,
and I agree with him, that we feel that, even if they are equivalent, there is a difference between
(3) and the other two. (Actually, I would say that (2) is ambiguous: on the one hand it can be
understood as (1), on the other it can be understood as (3)). Resnik's explanation of this
difference is that they involve different ontological commitments. They are equivalent in the same
way that 'John runs' and 'John belongs to the set of the runners' are; but like these two
sentences, they also involve different ontological commitments. So, the equivalence holds only
under certain ontological assumptions: in the last example, the existence of a set of all the
runners, in (1)-(3) the existence of a set of As among which are all the Bs. Since the existence
of an ontological commitment to classes in (1) would explain the contrast we feel there is
between (1) and (3), the existence of these contrast gives some evidence for the quantification
in (1) being a quantification over classes of the individuals in the domain of discourse.
So if Resnik's observations are correct he would have accomplished two things:
(i) showing that ARG fails, and
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(ii) he would have given some positive evidence that sentences like (1) or (2) involve
quantification over classes.
(c) Resnik gives (p. 80), still, another reason against Boolos' argument that plural quantification
does not involve commitment to classes: even if (contra what he has argued above) Boolos had
succeed in showing that there is no quantification over classes in the sentence "There are some
sets that are self-identical, and every set that is not a member of itself is one of them", he would
not have shown that, in general, plural quantification does not convey commitment to classes:
the sentence that Boolos considers is special since it is equivalent to a first-order one. It could
be that that sentence did not involve commitment to classes but that the ones whose formalization
does not have a first order equivalent did.
Let's comment on Resnik's arguments.
(d) Regarding the criticism of ARG: I think that noting that the sentence considered in ARG is
intuitively true but that it would be false if it contained a reference to sets is a strong argument
for the non-commitment to classes view. I believe, though, that the argument based on (1)-(3)
that Boolos gives as additional support for ARG --to support the intuition that the sentence is
intuitively true-- is much weaker than ARG itself.
Resnik does not offer any direct argument against ARG. All he does is criticize the
'supporting' argument based on (1)-(3), and regards doing so as having shown that ARG fails.
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He has not shown that, though, since arguing against the justification based on (1)-(3) is not
enough to show that ARG is not correct.
(e) What we just said in (d) shows that Resnik does not succeed in the first of the two points I
mention at the end of (b) (i.e., in showing that ARG fails). In (f) and (g) we will examine the
second point (i.e., that he has given positive evidence for sentences like (1) and (2) involving
reference to classes). First, though, I want to present an augmented version of ARG which takes
into account some possible ways in which the proponent of the commitment-to-collections view
could try to escape the force of ARG:
The sentence
(7) There are some sets that are self-identical, and every set that is not a member of itself is
one of them
is intuitively true but it would be false if it involved reference to sets. So plural quantification
is not quantification over sets of the objects in the domain.
It seems that the one who does not want to accept this conclusion could try to reply in
one of the three following ways:
(i) (the objection already explained in (c)) ARG involves a sentence which can be taken to be
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firstorderizable (as in (6): 3x x=x & Vx(xe x -+ x=x) ). Even if the quantification in the sentence
in ARG is not quantification over classes, plural quantification in other sentences might be.
We can reply to this by providing another sentence that could also be used in an argument
like ARG and which is not f.rstorderizable: "There are some sets that are smaller than any set
that is bigger than any of them, and every set with only one element is one of them".
(ii) (Resnik's main reply) Even though at first our intuitions may tell us that (7) is true, if we
think about it more carefully we realize that it is actually false, since it says that there is a set
of all sets.
To this it can be replied: consider the sentence "The sets that are not members of
themselves do not constitute a set"; it seems that our intuitions about the truth of this sentence
are even stronger than for (7) (Resnik himself might have uttered it sometime); so, "The sets that
are not members of themselves" can not mean 'the set of sets that are not members of
themselves'.
The Resnikian might reply: your argument only shows that some referential plural noun
phrases with collective predicates do not involve reference to sets, but this does not show that
plural quantification in expressions of the type "there are some As that..." does not involve
quantification over sets. To this I would reply: the sentence "The sets that are not members of
themselves do not constitute a set" implies "there are some sets that are all the sets that are not
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members of themselves" (if the latter is false the former would either be false or lack meaning);
so, since the former is true the latter is also true, and so, plural quantification is not quantification
over sets of the objects in the domain.
(iii) The third possible reply to ARG woulC be to accept proper classes (collections of sets that
are not themselves sets, and so that are not themselves members of proper classes) and to claim
that plural quantification corresponds to forming an unity or collection out of whatever one is
quantifying over. So we do not have to deny our clear intuitions regarding the truth of "There
are some sets that are self-identical, and every set that is not a member of itself is one of them".
The sentence is true since it is true that there is a (proper) class that contains all sets.
Boolos' idea can also be applied to this case, though 2: it seems intuitively true that there
are some things which are all the sets and proper classes that are not members of themselves. But
it is false that there is a class of all the sets and proper classes. So plural quantification is not
quantification over sets or proper classes of elements in the domain.
To this one might reply in two ways, analogous to (ii) and (iii) 3: [first reply] (ii)' the claim
in the previous paragraph (there are some things which are all the sets and proper classes that
12 I take the idea of applying Booios' argument to proper classes, 'awesome classes', etc.
from David Lewis, Parts of Classes (1991), Basil Blackwell, pp. 67-68.
" It does not seem possible to reply in a way analogous to (i) (i.e. to say that the claim that
there are some sets and proper classes that are all the sets and proper classes that are not
members of themselves is formalizable in first-order as in (6)), since a formalization with the
form of (6) would not 'capture' the sense conveyed by the word "all".
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are not members of themselves) is actually false; To this, a contra-argument analogous to the one
in (ii) would apply. [second reply] (iii)' there are 'awesome collections' which contain even the
proper classes as members, and so the sentence above means that there is an awesome collection
which contains all and only the sets and proper classes that are not members of themselves which
is something true. Counter-argument: the idea in ARG also applies to awesome collections: if
there are awesome collections, then it seems true that there are some things that are all the sets,
proper classes and awesome collections that are not members of themselves, and so this claim
is not the same as claiming that there is a set, proper class or awesome collection whose
members are all the sets, proper classes and awesome collections that are not self-members, since
in this case the claim would be false.
For any ultimate kind of making-one-out-of-many objects that a singularist might
postulate, the type of argument in this section will apply to these objects and show that plural
quantification can not involve that kind of collecting over the objects we are talking about.
There is still a position that the singularist may hold: there is no ultimate kind of
making-one-out-of-many objects. So it might seem that he can always escape the argument in
this section by going 'one step higher'. But this is not quite so, since we can consider the
intuitively true sentence "there are some things such that every thing is one of them" or "there
are some things which are all what there is". This can not mean that there is a collection-like
entity that contains everything, since then the sentence should be false.
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It might be replied that the sentence is true but that it does not say what we might have
thought: the sentence says that there are some things that are all the things we are talking about,
but this does not mean that they are 'absolutely everything that existst'. This is so because it is
not possible to quantify over absolutely everything. One might be tempted to reply to this that
the one who says that it is not possible to quantify over absolutely everything is himself, when
making this claim, actually quantifying over everything. The one who denies the possibility of
completely general quantification could reply, though, that when saying it is not possible to
quantify over everything he is just claiming that whatever our domain on certain particular use
of quantification is, there is another possible domain of quantification that includes it' 4. Still,
if this more careful formulation really says what the foe of the possibility of quantifying over
everything wants it to say, then it should be saying something about all domains of
quantification; and if a domain is just the individuals we quantify over on some specific use of
languge, quantifying over all domains involves quantifying over all individuals.
Moreover, it seems quite obvious that if I say, for instance, that everything is identical
to itself I am talking about everything that there is (there is no one object whose being or not
being identical to itself is irrelevant for the truth of my statement). We should need good reasons
for abandoning the view that we can quantify over everything. But as already argued by Richard
14 Objecting to the one who claims that we can not quantify over absolutely everything by
saying that in making her claim she is already quantifying over everything, seems to be
analogous to objecting to the one that claims that Santa does not exist by saying that in making
her claim she is already committing herself to the existence of Santa.
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Cartwright in his Speaking of Everything there simply does not seem to be any such good
reasons1
Notice also that if one believes that plural quantification is quantification over classes, and
also believes that is not possible to quantify over absolutely everything, then he can say that the
intuitively true sentence "there are some things which are everything there is" is true, only at the
price of having to admit classes that are members of themselves: if "there are some things" is just
equivalent to "there is a class of things", and both "there is" and "every" are interpreted with
respect to the same domain, then the class of objects must be one of the objects in the domain.
(f) Let's now comment on Resnik's criticism of Boolos' supporting argument for ARG based on
the intuitive equivalence of sentences (1)-(3). As we saw, this criticism would not only show that
the supporting argument for ARG has no force, but would also seem to provide some positive
evidence for the non-commitment to classes view. As I mentioned before, I think that Resnik is
right in saying that there is a difference in meaning between (3) and the other two sentences.
Consider, for instance, the following sentences corresponding to (1) and (3) respectively:
(8) There are some shops on my street such that every pet-shop in town is one of them
(9) There are some shops on my street and every pet-shop in town is a shop on my street
" Nots 28:1 (1994), pp. 1-20.
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The difference between them becomes clearer if we add another sentence to them:
(10) There are some shops on my street such that every pet-shop in town is one of them. They
are the mayor's favourite shops.
(11) There are some shops on my street and every pet-shop in town is a shop on my street.
They are the mayor's favourite shops.
(10) is a correct text and "They" in the second part refers to the shops the first part talks
about --some shops which are in my street and among which are all the pet-shops in town. But
(11), unlike (10), is strange if not unacceptable, since it is not clear what "they" refers to.
Someone might claim that the difference pointed out above is only a
syntactic/grammatical one with not clear bearing on questions of meaning and ontological
commitment which is what we are interested in here. I do not think that this is correct: both
clauses in each text are grammatical, and they are independent at the syntactic level; the relation
between the two is only at the level of their meaning. (I think that what I say below will make
this clearer).
So there is a difference between the two sentences. Contra Resnik, though, I do not think
that this difference has to do with different ontological commitments. We discuss this question
in sub-section (g).
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(g) The use of natural language always takes place with respect to a background of common
believes and assumptions --a so called context. The context in which natural language use takes
place provides the domain of individuals we are talking about. So, for instance, we say that in
the sentence "The math teacher is sleeping", the expression "the math teacher" denotes that
unique individual that is a math teacher, but we do not mean, of course, 'the only being in the
universe who teaches math', but rather 'the only person in our domain of discourse --in our
context-- who teaches math'. Also the context is crucial in determining the referent for such
expressions as "I", "tomorrow", "here", etc.
Sometimes it is said that the idea of interpreting formal language sentences by means of
an interpretation that has certain domain corresponds to the idea that natural language expressions
are interpreted against the backdrop of a context. I think that this is only partially true: the
context in a conversation changes constantly, and so does the domain of objects we are talking
about; but I do not think it is adequate to see this as a constant reinterpretation of the language
using interpretations with different domains 6.
The context may contain one or several individuals who are 'salient' or 'prominent'.
Expressions like "she" or "he", for instance, denote the only prominent female human or male
human, respectively, in the context (if there is no such prominent individual then the use of the
expression would be inadequate). Also the expression "they" will denote some individuals which
are 'highlighted', 'salient' or 'prominent' in the context. In natural language once an individual
16 For more on this idea see section 2 in chapter 3.
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has been introduced or made prominent we can keep on referring to it by the use of pronouns.
Analogously, once several individuals have been made salient we can keep on referring to them
by the pronouns "they" or "them").
Two sentences might say the same (have the same truth conditions) but affect the context
in a different way. This is what happens with (1)-(3). By uttering (1) ("There are some As such
that every B is one of them") we affect the context in that it comes to have some prominent
individuals --they are As and all the Bs are among them--. By uttering (3) ("There are some As
and every B is an A") one describes a situation identical with the one described by (1) (there has
to be some individuals which are As, and all the Bs have to be also As), but there are no
individuals in the context made salient as a consequence of uttering the sentence. This explains
the difference we observed between (8) and (9). (8) and (9) are equivalent but modify the context
in a different way: (8) introduces some individuals as prominent (some shops in my street among
which are all pet-shops in town) whereas (9) does not. This is why after uttering (8) we can add
"they are the mayor's favourite shops" since "they" will refer to that salient individuals, but if
we add it after (9) the text is non-felicitous, since there is no clear referent for "they"' 7
17 Another example illustrating the same point which involves just one jingle individual:
Consider the sentences
(a) There is exactly one typo in this footnote.
(b) It is not the case that there are no typos in this footnote and it is not the case that there
are two or more typos in this footnote.
They say the same (describe the same situation), but affect the context differently. This is why
(c) is correct but (d) is bad
(c) There is exactly one typo in this footnote. It is in the first line.
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This diverse way in which (1) and (3) affect the context is also what explains that even
if we realize that they are equivalent, we feel that there is a difference between them. This
difference, though, has to do with the different way the two sentences affect the context where
they are used, and not with a distinction in the ontological commitments of each sentence. So,
contra Resnik, we do not need to believe that (1)-(3) convey different ontological commitments
in order to explain the difference we feel there exist between them.
4.2 Second-order quantification and natural language plurals
(a) According to Resnik, the arguments he gives that we explained in the previous section have
established that Boolos does not succeed in showing that natural language sentences containing
plural quantification do not involve commitment to classes. Then he goes on into considering
what is the main issue on Boolos' proposal: whether we can interpret second-order languages'
quantification without appealing to classes.
He considers Boolos' theories of truth for the first and second-order set theory languages
in NP. He claims that the use of sequences in those definitions obscures what the is commitments
are. For that reason he wants to offer a truth theory of the same kind as Boolos' but where the
commitment of existential quantifiers is displayed more perspicuously.
(d) It is not the case that there are no typos in this footnote and it is not the case that there
are two or more typos in this footnote. It is in the first line.
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He recursively defines truth for an interpretation I in a domain D. In the first order case
an interpretation relates each variable of the language with a unique element of D; in addition
to that, in the second-order case the interpretation also relates each second order variable with
0 or more elements of D.
The clause for the existential quantifier in the second-order case is:
3VS is T for I in D iff there is a relation R over D consisting solely of 0 or more
ordered pairs of the form <V,d> (d in D) such that S is T for I[V/R] in D
(where I[V/R] is like I except for containing the pairs in R in place of the pairs
<V,d>)
If we interpret "there is a relation R" as 'there is a class of ordered pairs' then it is clear
than we are committing ourselves to classes; if we interpret it as 'there are some ordered pairs',
then the existence of a commitment to classes will depend on whether the plural quantification
conveys such a commitment or not.
So whether it has been shown that there is a way of giving a theory of truth for the
second-order language of set-theory without interpreting the variables in terms of classes or not
will depend on whether the plural quantification "there are some ordered pairs" conveys a
commitment to classes. He claims that 'perhaps the most straightforward method' to find out
whether it does or not is 'to see it as a question of deciding whether such sentences should be
represented in second-order logic or in class theory' (p. 83). He says that Boolos himself seems
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to endorse this suggestion, but that it would be 'of no avail unless we already know what ontic
commitment second-order quantification carries'. But what the commitment of second-order
quantification is is precisely what we were trying to find out in the first place. So, Resnik
concludes, 'Boolos is involved in a circle'.
To this I think that the following could be replied.
As we pointed out, Resnik thinks that Boolos has not succeeded in making it plausible
that plural quantification is not quantification over sets of the objects in the domain. Even if
Resnik were right on this, the charge of circularity would not be justified, since it is not true that
Boolos endorses that to find out the ontological commitment of a sentence containing plurals we
should see whether it should be formalized in second order-logic. Resnik does not mention in
which of the articles and in which place in the article Boolos makes such a claim; neither does
he say which of the claims that Boolos makes would justify inferring that Boolos' endorses such
a view.
When Boolos argues that natural language plural quantification does not convey
commitment to classes he does not appeal to second-order quantification. There is no circle: first
(first at the logical level, not necessarily at the expository level) he makes plausible that plural
quantification does not imply commitment to classes, then he gives a theory of truth for a
second-order language using natural language plurals. If plurals do not involve a commitment to
classes, then there is no appeal to classes in the truth theory. And that plurals do not convey
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commitment to classes has previously been made plausible. If plural quantification were
quantification over classes then his proposal would fail, but still there would be no circle in his
argumentation.
(b) The last argument in Resnik's paper that we will examine also deals with the relation
between plurals and second-order quantification (it is in p. 87): Let's assume that Boolos is right
in claiming that sentences like (1)-(3) are synonymous. Then we have that there are two kinds
of sentences containing plural quantification: the 'irreducibly plural' which can not be formalized
by means of a first-order sentence, and the 'non-irreducibly plural' which are firstorderizable.
What does differentiate the two kinds of sentences? Resnik suggests that a way of explaining the
difference would be to point out that there are two senses of "There are some things such that"
and that in cne sense it just means 'There is at least one thing such that', and that in the other
it means 'there is a collection of things such that'. But, of course, this is something Boolos would
not want to say. So, Boolos does not have a way of explaining what the difference between the
two senses is. Resnik says that 'that puts him in the ironic position of saying that in the other
sense it simply means what it says'.
It seems to me that to make his point about the difficulty in explaining what the two ways
of understanding sentences with plural quantification consist in Resnik did not have to assume
that (1)-(3) are synonymous. He could have pointed out to the difference we feel there is between
the sentences which are most naturally formalized in second-order and the ones which are not,
and ask what the difference between the two consist in. Whatever the way the question is
-140-
presented, though, I think that the following could be replied:
There are not two senses of "There are some things such that". Both in the sentences
which are formalizable in first-order and in the ones which are not it means the same: it selects
some arbitrary individuals of which something is going to be predicated. The difference between
the two kinds of sentences lies in the predicate. There is a relation between firstorderizable
sentences and sentences with distributive predicates, and also between non-firstorderizable
sentences and sentences with certain collective predicates. When the predicate is distributive we
will be considering the application of the predicate to each of the arbitrary things selected by
"There are some things such that"; if the predicate is collective then it applies only with respect
to all of them. There are certain constructions such as "each other" and "one of them" that can
be used in forming a complex collective predicate out of a (possible non-collective) simple
predicate; for instance 'are such that Daniel painted one of them' is collective even though 'were
painted by Daniel' is distributive; or also, 'are faster than Zev and also faster than the sire of any
horse that is slower than all of them' is collective, even though 'are faster than x' is distributive.
Now we can explain the difference that Resnik suggests can only be explained by
appealing to classes, without appealing to them: The sentences containing plural quantification
that are firstorderizable are the ones for which there is one equivalent sentence whose predicate
is distributive; the sentences that are non firstorderizable are the ones for which there is no such
equivalent sentence.
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If instead of considering the difference 'firstorderizable/non-firstorderizable' we consider,
as I suggested, the difference 'most naturally formalizable in first-order/most naturally
formalizable in second-order' we have that: the sentences whose most natural formalization is
in second-order are the ones containing collective predicates constructed on the basis of a
distributive predicate; the sentences whose most natural formalization is in first-order contain
distributive predicates.
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Chapter Three
On the Interpretation of Formal Languages
and the Analysis of Logical Properties
We will be examining some aspects of the relationship between natural language and the
so called formal languages'. We can not pretend to be making claims about all formal languages,
since there are infinitely many different kinds of sign systems that could be regarded as formal
languages, and we would not know even how to approach the task of trying to say anything
about all of them. We will restrict our attention to the languages of standard propositional logic
and standard first and second order logic. Almost all of the time we will focus our attention
specifically to standard first order languages.
We will approximate the issue of the relationship between natural language and its
'fomalizations' by means of formal languages by considering first the following question: What
does a sentence of a formal language mean?
SWe will be making three distinct uses of italics: (i) for emphasis; (ii) to talk about an
expression type of which we are exhibiting a token, i.e. we might use italics instead of quotation
marks; (iii) to talk about expressions type while exhibiting tokens of some of them and/or using
metavariables, i.e. we might use italics instead of corners. We do this for simplicity. Only when
being precise becomes essential we will have recourse to quotation marks or comrners.
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1. Formal Languages and What They Mean
I think we can distinguish at least four main senses in which we say that a sentence of a formal
language, and specifically, of a first order language, has certain meaning. For our purposes the
two important senses will be the ones we will consider in subsections (1) and (3) below. The four
senses are the following:
(1) We could say that a sentence of a formal language does not by itself mean anything
unless we interpret it, and to interpret it consists in providing in the standard way a so called
model for it (models are also called interpretations, or structures).
There are different ways of specifying what a model for a first order language L is. One
common way of doing it is to say that a model M is an ordered pair <D,F> such that D is a set,
the so called domain (or universe) of M, and F is a function that assigns an appropriate value to
each non logical primitive symbol of L: an element of M to each constant, a subset of D to each
1-place predicate symbol, a subset of n-tuples of elements of D to each n-place predicate symbol
(n22), and a subset of n+l tuples to each n-place function symbol.
A model by itself does not yet endow the formal language L with meaning. If it does so, it
is only with respect to a theory that tells us what the interpretation or the value of complex
expressions is, and specifically, what the interpretation of the sentences is. There are some
differences in the specific form that such a theory can have. We will consider here two slightly
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different presentations which are both standard. (Several other presentations are possible,
including some which are hybrids of the two considered here).
One way to proceed is to provide a truth theory for L and to do this through a definition
of satisfaction: we define first that a model M (=<D,F>) and an appropriate sequence (or
assignment) s satisfy a formula a of L. (A sequence is a function whose domain is the set of
variables, an appropriate sequence for M is a sequence whose range is D). Then we can say that
a formula a is true in a model M if there is an appropriate sequence s such that M and s satisfy
a (or alternatively, if for any appropriate sequence s, M and s satisfy a). In order to define
satisfaction for a first-order language it is common to proceed in the following way:
First, we give a recursive definition of the denotation (designation, or value) of a term
t with respect to a model M and a sequence s, which we will notate as M/s(t):
if t is a variable then M/s(t)=s(t),
if t is a constant then M/s(t)=F(t),
if t is ft,...t, then M/s(t)=F(J)(M/s(t,),...,M/s(t,))
Then we give a recursive definition of M and s satisfy formula a that has the following form
(where M=<D,F>):
If a=tzt2, where t, and t, are terms, then M and s satisfy a iff M/s(t,)=M/s(t2),
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if a= Pt, where P is a monadic predicate symbol and t is a term, then M and s satisfy a iff
M/s(t)e F(P),
if a=Rt&...t,, where R is an n-adic (nŽ2) predicate symbol and t,...t, are terms, then M and s
satisfy a iff <M/s(tQ),...,M/s(t,,)>e F(R),
if a=-13, where P is a formula, then M and s satisfy ca iff M and s do not satisfy 3,
if a=(p A y), where [ and y are formulas, M and s satisfy a iff M and s satisfy both P and y
if a=3xa, where a is a formula, then M and s satisfy a iff there is an element of D, a, such that
M and s.' satisfy a, where sx" is a sequence that assigns a to x and which otherwise is
just like s.
An alternative way to proceed in order to provide an interpretation for the sentences of
the first-order formal language L is the following: given a model M=<D,F> for L, we recursively
define the function I, which we might call the interpretation under M, that assigns a value to
every primitive non logical expression of L, to every closed term and to every sentence of L. To
each sentence of L it assigns either the value True or the value False.
If e is a constant, a function symbol, or a predicate symbol of L, I(e)=F(e),
if f is a n-place function symbol and t,,...,t, are closed terms then I(ft...t,)=l(f)(<l(t),...,l(t,)>),
if a=tj•zt 2, where t, and t, are terms, I(a)=True if I(tj)=I(t1), and I(a)=False if I(t,)•I(tQ),
if a= Pt, where P is a 1-place predicate symbol and t is a closed term, then I(a)=True if I(t)e I(P ),
and I(a)=False if l(t)0 I( 6?,
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if a=Rt,,...,t., where R is an n-rlace (nŽ2) predicate symbol, and t,,...,t, are closed terms, then
I(a)=True if <I(t1),...,(t,,)>e I(R), and 1(ac)=False if <I(t4),...,l(t,)>e I(R),
if a=3xj, where 0 is a formula, I(a)=True if Ia(P3)=True for some e in D, I(a)=False if
I,'(P,,)=False for all e in the domain of D, where ., is a sentence obtained from 3 by
replacing all free occurrences of x with a new constant a which does not appear in P, and
Ia' is a function that assigns e to a and which otherwise is just like I.
Now, let's consider some specific formal language, say the language S that has one
constant symbol a and one predicate symbol P, and some specific interpretation for the language,
i.e. one model for the language, say the model M whose domain is the set of humans, that assigns
David Armstrong to a, and assigns the set {x: x philosophizes) to P.
Given this interpretation, does the sentence of S Pa mean the same as the English
sentence Armstrong philosophizes? I think it is clear that it does not. If we consider the second
presentation given above we see that the 'value' or 'interpretation' that we assign to a sentence
is either True or False. In our specific example, we would have that the value of Pa is True. All
the other true sentences of S would be assigned the same value as Pa by the interpretation
function under M. If what determines the interpretation of Pa in M, i.e. what determines the
meaning of Pa according to M, is the value that the sentence gets assigned by I, the interpretation
function under M, then certainly Pa does not mean the same as Armstrong philosophizes, or
otherwise we would be equally justified in claiming that, for instance, 3:xPx means that
Armstrong philosophizes, since 3lxPx gets assigned by I the same value as Pa.
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Maybe someone might argue in the following way: it is incorrect to take 'having the value
True' as being all that the second approach above says about the interpretation of Pa. Given the
way the interpretation function is defined it also tells us 'when' Pa is true, namely when
Armstrong philosophizes. So we would have that given the interpretation function or, at least,
given the way it is defined, we can conclude that Pa means that Armstrong philosophizes. This
is obscured by the very fact that we use a function and we assign an object to each expression.
We should understand the claim that I(a)=True as just another way of expressing that a is true.
Viewing things this way the second approach is just like the first in that it is a way of providing
a theory of truth for the language on the basis of a model.
I think that the view expressed in the previous paragraph is not correct. First, the claim that
the value of I(a) is True, taken by itself, is a completely different claim from the claim that a
is true. True is an object (or so me must assume if the definition of I is to make sense) --an
abstract one. So is a. Given any two objects we can always define a function that will make one
the value of the other, but this fact by itself does not imply anything about the two objects or
their relationship other than we have stipulated that the function we have defined assigns one to
the other. We could define another function G that made blueness (if such entity exists) the value
for the argument the flag of the People's Republic of China. Then it would be the case that
G(China's flag)=Blue, but this does not mean that it would also be the case that China's flag is
blue. Analogously, the claim that I(Pa)=True is a claim about which objects happen to be related
by I, not about whether a is or not true. If we want the second approach to yield a theory of truth
we should incorporate a clause such as: if I(a)=True then a is true, if 1(a)=False then a is false.
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Notice that given that we need a clause such as the one just stated, instead of postulating the
range of I to be the set (True, False), we could postulate it to be the set ({ 1,0) and then have the
clause: if I(a)= 1 then a is true, if I(a)=O then a is false. The only difference between having one
or the other set as the range for I is that in the first case is easier to infer on the basis of I (and
the fact that I is presented as an interpretation function) the clause that would allow us to obtain
a truth theory.
Second, even if we left the considerations in the previous paragraph aside and considered
the second approach basically as the same as the first one, i.e., as a way of providing a truth
theory, it would still not be the case that interpreting Pa in accordance with this second approach
would make Pa to mean that Armstrong philosophizes. This is so because the first approach does
not make it the case either. Let's see why it does not:
It is true that, given the model M above, the truth theory that the first approach provides
would yield the following biconditional:
(a) Pa is true iff Armstrong e (x: x philosophizes)
But even if the truth theory yields this biconditional, it does not make it the case that Pa means
that Armstrong philosophizes. We can point two three sort of facts that show that this is so, the
most relevant being the first one:
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(i) The biconditional in (a) involves only material implication. That is, in order for the
biconditional to be true all that is required is that the sentences appearing on the right and on the
left of iff be both true or both false. Given that the set {x:x philosophizes) does in fact have
Armstrong as a member, (a) allows us to conclude that Pa is true. We could have obtained this
exact same information if instead of (a) we had (a)'
(a)' Pa is true iff Lennon was be I in Liverpool
The sentence appearing in the right hand side of if does not tell us 'when' Pa is true, only that
it is true. From (a)' we can not conclude for instance: if Lennon had not been born in Liverpool,
Pa would not be true.
Maybe it could be replied that what mare¶, Pa mean that Armstrong philosophizes is not
just that the biconditional (a) follows from the truth theory, but the whole interpretation for the
language, including the interpretation of the expressions in Pa. I do not think this is correct,
though. Suppose we interpret the language SE with respect to the same model as before, and with
the following minor modification to the definition of satisfaction: instead of having the clause
in (b) as before, we have (b)'
(b) if a=Bt, where P is a monadic predicate symbol and t is a term, then M and s
satisfy a iff M/s(t)e F( )
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(b)' if a= Pt, where P is a monadic predicate symbol and t is a term and Pt • Pa, then
M and s satisfy a iff M/s(t)e F( ), if At = Pa then M and s satisfy a iff
Lennone {x:x was born in Liverpool.
Every primitive symbol of S2 would still be assigned the same value as before. And all the
sentences of SC would have the exact same truth value. So, there seems to be no reason to claim
that under one presentation of the interpretation of 2S Pa means that Armstrong philosophizes, but
under the other it means something else --we must keep in mind that a biconditional that follows
from the theory does not say anything about any connection between what the two sentences on
each side of the iff express; otherwise put: from the truth of a biconditional and what one of the
two sentences expresses, we can not conclude anything about what the other sentences expresses,
other than it expresses something that determines the same truth value as the one determined by
what the former sentence expresses.
(ii) A second way of realizing that the fact that the truth theory yields (a) does not make it the
case that Pa means that Armstrong philosophizes is by noticing that sets are extensional. The set
(x:x philosophizes) is presumedly the same as {x:x philosophizes and x is a rational being), or
as {x:x philosophizes and x is not a new born). We would still have the same model M if we had
specified the value of P as being the set { x:x is not a new born and x philosophizes). We would
then say that the truth theory would have as a consequence (c):
(c) Pa is true iff Armstrong e (x:x is not a new born and x philosophizes)}
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If having (a) as a consequence made it the case that under the interpretation induced by M Pa
meant that Armstrong philosophizes, then if the theory yields (c) we would have to say that Pa
means that Armstrong philosophizes and is not a new born. This is absurd since, as we pointed
out, the model is the same no matter how we specify the set that is the value of P.
(iii) A third way of realizing that the fact that the interpretation induced by M yields the
biconditional (a) does not suffice to make it the case that Pa means the same as the English
sentence Armstrong philosophizes is by noting that the English sentence does not say anything
about sets or the membership relation, whereas the sentence in the right hand side of (a) is about
the membership of an object in a set2. And even if we think that (a) is not by itself what
determines what the meaning of Pa is, we should note that the value assigned to P is a set, and
whatever we might want to say about how the value of P contributes to what Pa means, it is this
set and no something else that will play a role.
There seems to be very good reasons, then, for thinking that Pa when interpreted in the
standard way on the basis of M does not mean the same as the English sentence Armstrong
2 The position according to which asserting some predication is the same as asserting some
membership relation does not agree with intuition and the burden of justification is on the side
of the one that wants to hold that view. Still here are two reasons, in addition to its conflict with
basic intuitions, for not holding it: (a) someone can believe that Armstrong philosophizes but not
believe that Armstronge {x: x philosophizes); (b) if we accept the principle that assertion of
predication is assertion of certain membership relation then we have to accept that the principle
also applies to the assertion that Armstronge { x:x philosophizes), and so that this assertion is the
same as: <Armstrong, { x:x philosophizes)>e { <x,y>: xe D & ye P(D) & xc y9; and the principle
would also apply to this latter predication of membership, etc.; it becomes intuitively less and
less plausible that all these other assertions of membership are the same as the original assertion
that Armstrong philosophizes.
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philosophizes. Does Pa so interpreted mean the same as any English sentence? Well, which
English sentence could it be? It seems that the most plausible candidate would be Armstrong is
a member of (x:x philosophizes). It seems clear, though, that this English sentence will not do
either. First, there is the fact that, as noted in (ii) above, whatever Pa might mean is not sensible
to the different ways of specifying the set { x:x philosophizes), whereas this is not true of the
English sentence under consideration. Moreover: even if we were interested only in a notion of
'sameness of meaning' according to which the sentences (x:x is author of Carrie] has one
member and [Stephen King] has one member would have the same meaning, the sort of
difficulty raised in (i) above would also apply to the candidate English sentence we are now
considering: Given the same model M we can provide an alternative formulation of the truth
theory that provides the same interpretation for each expression in the language, but which does
not give any condition involving reference to any set when specifying the truth condition of Pa
(we can use, for instance, a clause such as (b)').
It seems, then, that Pa does not mean the same as any English sentence. I believe that this
fact makes it plausible to think that it does not mean anything at all, if for a sentence to mean
something requires not just that it possesses some semantic property or other like, for instance,
to include some expression that refers to some specific individual, but also that the sentence does
'the same sort of thing' that natural language sentences do. If Pa had the sort of meaning that
natural language sentences have then it seems that anyone who understands what we do when
we provide the interpretation of se on the basis of model M, would understand what the meaning
that Pa is endowed with is, and should be able to express it in English.
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If Pa, when evaluated with respect to the model for S? M, does not mean anything, what
do we do when we provide in the standard way a so called interpretation for a first order formal
language? Do the expressions of the language have any sort of semantic property? We will try
to say something about this later on, in section 3.
(2) Sometimes we might claim that, for instance, sentence (d) says that R is transitive; or that
sentence (e) says that there are infinitely many things; or that (f) says that nothing is P
(d) VxVyVz(Rxy A Ryz -4 Rxz)
(e) 3X(Vx3yVz(Xxz <- z=y) A VxVy(3z(Xxz A Xyz) -> x=y) A 3xVy-'Xyx)
(f) -3xPx
These claims exemplify another sense of what a sentence of a formal language means. The claims
here about what a sentence a means have to be understood as claims about what will be the case
in all and only the models in which a is true. Furthermore, what we pretend to be claiming about
some primitive symbol of S appearing in a ('R is transitive'), is actually what will be true of the
interpretation of that primitive symbol in each model where a is true. So, for instance, we say
that (d) means that R is transitive because (d) is true in all and only the models where the
interpretation ofR is a transitive relation; or we say that (e) means that there are infinitely many
objects because in each model in which (e) is true the domain will be an infinite set and,
furthermore, (e) is true in all models with an infinite domain.
154
Maybe there is also a looser use of this sense of 'the meaning of ot' where a sentence of
a formal language is said to mean that p if a being true in some model is enough to guarantee
that p is the case with respect to that model. That is, a is said to mean that p if in all the models
in which a is true it is the case that p (without requiring as well that a be true in only those
models with respect to which it is the case that p). For instance, in this looser sense we could
say that (g) means that there are infinitely many things
(g) VxVy(fx=fy -ý x=y) A 3xVy-'fy=x
Any model in which (g) is true has a domain with infinitely many objects. Nevertheless there
might be models with an infinite domain but where (g) is false.
Be it as it may, these two senses of a sentence of a formal language meaning something
that we have considered in this section (2) are not the senses that interest us the most here. We
have considered them just not to confuse them with the ones we do have a primarily interest in.
(3) Sometimes we take a formal language to be just like a regimented version of a part of
natural language. We might, for instance, regard a just as another name for David Armstrong,
and to take P to make the same contribution to the meaning of the sentences where it appears
as philosophizes makes to the meaning of the English sentences where it appears, and to take
Pa just as another way (in addition to Armstrong philosophizes, Armstrong filosofa, and many
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others) of expressing that Armstrong philosophizes; and we might take 3xPx just as one
alternative way of expressing that there is a thing that philosophizes. A formal language is one
kind of language artificially created, just like Esperanto is.
Understood in this way then the sentence Pa can mean the same as the English sentence
Armstrong philosophizes. The question now is, how do we manage to make a particular formal
language, understood in the sense we are describing here, to mean what it means? When
considering the sense in subsection (1) of a sentence of a formal language meaning something,
we saw that providing a model and a truth theory in the standard way was not enough to have
a formal language whose sentences would possess the characteristic that we are considering here:
to mean the same as some sentences of a natural language. It might be thought, though, that we
can obtain a language with such a characteristic if we amend the truth theory we were
considering in (1) so as to avoid the features that were the basis for our argumentation that the
sentences of Se did not mean the same as any English sentence.
We could avoid having the value of a predicate symbol to be a set by not assigning a
value to it through the model but rather having one clause in the definition of satisfaction for
each predicate symbol, this clause being of the same sort as the one we offer here for P:
if a=Pt, where t is a term, then M and s satisfy a iff M/s(t) philosophizes
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Then we would have as a consequence:
(h) Pa is true iff Armstrong philosophizes
We could as well decide to use a stronger biconditional, instead of the one involving only
material implication. There are several possibilities here, since conditionals can be postulated to
be more or less strong'. For the sake of the argument let's suppose we chose the strongest
possibility and make the biconditional to be metaphysically necessary equivalence (we can think
of it as placing a necessary operator in front of the whole biconditional sentence in (h)). This
biconditional would intuitively be too strong since would require Pa to be true in any world
where Armstrong philosophizes, even in those where Pa does not have its actual meaning, and
means something which is not the case in that world. Nevertheless, this strong biconditional
would still be too weak to avoid the difficulty (i) pointed out in subsection (1): we could still
have another theory with respect to the same model such that all expressions would be assigned
the same value and all sentences declared as true in exactly the same possibilities but that yields
a biconditional where Pa is true is not paired with Armstrong philosophizes but with another
sentence that intuitively has another meaning. For instance, this alternative theory could yield (j)
(j) Pa is true iff the square of I is 121 and Armstrong philosophizes
3 We could require that the equivalence holds in all worlds where Edinburgh is the capital
of Scotland, or in all physically possible worlds, in all worlds where the interpretation of
language S is the same, etc.
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Both the theory that would have (h) as a consequence and the theory that would have (j) as a
consequence would assign the same value to all expressions and declare all sentences true or
false in exactly the same circumstances. They are indistinguishable with respect to what they say
about the language S. So if we claim that according to one of the theories Pa means that p then
we should also maintain that according to the other Pa means that p. On the other hand, though,
we would like to claim that according to the first theory, and given (h), Pa means that Armstrong
philosophizes, but then, given (j), we should claim that according to the second theory Pa means
that the square of 11 is 121 and Armstrong philosophizes. We are led, then, to the contradiction
that the sentence Pa does and does not mean the same according to the two theories. The
contradiction seems to arise from supposing of each of the theories that it suffices to endow Pa
with certain specific meaning, in the same way that English sentences have meaning.
Even if the kind of theories considered so far do not suffice to make the sentences of SE
to mean in the sense that we are considering in this section (3), there is another way of
accomplish it, which seems to be what we, one way or other, in fact do when introducing a
formal language which is used and understood in the way we are considering here. This other
way is to provide a translation from the formal language into a natural language. Unlike what
was the situation in subsection (1) here there is no standard way to proceed, since the translation
procedure is not usually presented in an explicit way. One possible way of interpreting the
expressions of • by explicitly indicating how to translate them into English would be the
following4:
4 Regarding the sign "^" see footnote 9 in chapter 2.
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(If a translates as 0, we will also write tr(a)=P)
"a" translates as "Armstrong "
if v is a variable, v translates as v
"P" translates as "philosophizes "
if t, and t2 are terms, rt,=t2' translates as tr(t,)^" is identical with "'tr(t2)
if P is a predicate and t is a term, rot" translates as tr(t)^tr(P)
if ao is a formula, then 'nal translates as "it is not the case that "'tr(a)
if a and P are formulas, rA[p31 translates as "it is both the case that "^tr(a)^"" and that "'tr(p)
if a is a formula and v is a variable, raval translates as "there is an object "^v^" such that
" ^ tr(a)
So we have, for instance, that the sentence of 3x(-'Px A x=a) translates into English
as there is an object x such that it is both the case that it is not the case that x philosophizes and
that x is identical with a. And, of course, Pa translates as Armstrong philosophizes. Since we
understand the English sentences we understand what the meaning that we postulate for the
sentences of Sf is.
One comment about how formal languages are sometimes, and maybe even often, taught
in introductory courses to logic which I believe has a significance beyond the pedagogy of logic:
when formal languages and, in particular, first-order formal languages are first introduced, it is
common to begin by explaining what sort of things can be expressed with these languages. So,
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for instance, students are taught that John loves Mary can be expressed as Ljm, or that there is
something that loves everything is expressed in a first order language as 3xVyLry. That is: the
semantics for the formal language is presented in the sense of (3): students are told what the
expressions and the sentences of particular formal languages mean by giving English equivalents,
and they are trained in translating from English into a formal language and from the formal
language into English. Then they are told something of the following kind: 'Now we are going
to do in a rigorous way what we have done so far in an intuitive way'. And then they are
introduced to models, interpretation functions, assignments and the recursive definition of
satisfaction. That is, they learn how to interpret a formal language in the sense of (1). Notice,
though, that, whatever reasons there might be for presenting the topic in this way, the teacher
who proceeds in this way is in some respect fooling her students: to interpret a language as in
(1) is not a rigorous way of doing what we do when we interpret it as in (3). It is to do
something else. We can see this in the fact that the sentences do not mean the same. To use our
example once more: in the case of SE, the sentence Pa can mean that Armstrong philosophizes
when interpret as in (3) but not when interpreted as in (1).
At this point we can introduce some terminology that will distinguish among different
senses of what we have so far ambiguously called a formal language, or simply a language. We
will refer to what sometimes is called uninterpreted language (which, if it does not have any
semantic property would seem not to deserve the name language at all) as a system offorms; the
only systems of forms we will be concerned with here are those of standard propositional logic,
first-order and second-order logic, so that when we say 'a system of forms' we mean one the
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those three types; we will refer to a system of forms with an interpretation in the sense of (1) as
a formal language, and we will refer to a system of forms with an interpretation in the sense of
(3) as a regimented language.
(4) Sometimes the sentences of a formal language or a regimented language that have some
specific interpretation are said to mean in addition also something else because we are employing
encodement: the objects the language talks about can have other objects associated with them,
and some formulas of the language can be seen as codifying or playing the role of predicates
about these other objects.
The most significant kind of encodement is the so called Gddelization where we codify
the primitive symbols of the language (system of forms) of arithmetic by means of natural
numbers. One way of doing it is, for example, to associate the numbers 1,3,5,7,9,11,13 and 15
to, respectively the constant 0, the monadic function symbol s, the 2-place function symbols +
and., and the primitive logical symbols 3, -1, A and =. To the constant x, we assign the number
2i+17. Furthermore we can assign an (even) number to each sequence of primitive signs of the
language of arithmetic, and we also assign an (even) number to each finite sequence of finite
sequences of primitive symbols of the language5. Then when we interpret the language of
arithmetic in the usual way as about natural numbers, we can see the sentences of the language
' We could do this using a 'pairing function' and Gidel's n-function. See, for instance,
George Boolos' The Logic of Provability, (1993), Cambridge University Press, pp. 17 ff.
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of arithmetic as also encoding claims about the symbols and sequences of symbols of the
language of arithmetic, and to see formulas of arithmetic with n-free variables as encoding
predicates about the language of arithmetic. A very simple and uninteresting example would be
the formula -'x=sssO which because in its usual interpretation is true when the value of x is not
3 (and because the number that corresponds to the function symbol s is 3), can be seen as
encoding the predicate 'it is not the symbol s'.
When all the objects that are the interpretation of the language are encoding some object
or other (in the example of the previous paragraph: if every natural number encodes some
primitive symbol of the language of arithmetic, or some sequence or sequence of sequences of
primitive symbols) then instead of 'encodement' we could directly talk of just 're-interpretation'
of the language: the encoding provides us with another way of giving an interpretation for the
language. In the case of the language of arithmetic and the encoding of expressions and
sequences of expressions of the very language of arithmetic by means of natural numbers, we
could understand the codification as providing another interpretation of the language of
arithmetic: the domain of this alternative interpretation has as individuals the primitive symbols
of the language of arithmetic, sequences of those, and sequences of those sequences; and we
would give an interpretation for the different primitive non-logical symbols making use of the
correspondence we have between the elements of the domain of the usual interpretation (natural
numbers) and the elements of the domain of this alternative interpretation (symbols, sequences
of symbols, and sequences of sequences of symbols). For instance, according to the alternative
interpretation we would interpret the function symbol s as the function that assigns to an element
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of the domain e (a symbol of the language of arithmetic, or a sequence of symbols, or a
sequence of sequences of symbols), the symbol or sequence that is associated with a number
which is the successor of the number associated with e (i.e., if e is associated with the number
n, n' is the successor of n, and e' is the symbol or sequence associated with nr , then the
interpretation of s assigns e' to e).
We could distinguish different levels in how a formula or sentence that has certain
interpretation about certain objects 'says' something or codifies some claim about some other
objects. For instance we can say of a certain formula of the language of arithmetic with one free
variable that codifies the predicate 'to be a formula provable in the theory Z'6 (or that it says
that the value of the variable x is a formula provable in Z), only because on the usual
interpretation of the language of arithmetic the formula is true for exactly those values of x that
are numbers that are associated by the codification with sequences of primitive symbols of the
language of arithmetic that are formulas that can be proved in Z. We could have stronger
reasons, though, for saying of a formula a(x) of the language of arithmetic that it expresses or
corresponds to the predicate 'to be a formula provable in Z'. It could be that the formula a(x)
not only is true for exactly those values of x that are numbers that correspond to formulas that
are provable in Z, but also that a(x) is built up from subformulas that are coding the predicates
'to be a formula of the language of arithmetic', 'to be an axiom of Z', 'to be a sequence', 'to
be a member of a sequence', 'to be earlier in a sequence than', 'to be the result of applying
6 Z is the theory of Elementary Peano arithmetic. For a list of its axioms see, for instance,
Boolos, op. cit., pp. 18-19.
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Modus Ponens to', and a(x) can be seen as saying that 'there is something that is a derivation
of x from the axioms of Z' or more explicitly 'there is something that is a sequence of formulas
such that each one is either an axiom of Z or the result of applying Modus Ponens to two earlier
formulas in the sequence, and the last formula of the sequence is x'. The subformulas of ca(x)
can, in turn, be built up from other subformulas that are also coding predicates about the
language of arithmetic (for instance the formula P(x) corresponding to 'to be a formula' can
contain subformulas that correspond to the predicates 'to be an atomic formula', 'to be the
negation of', 'to be the conjunction of, 'to be an existential quantification of, and P(x) can be
seen as saying that 'there is a sequence such that each member is either an atomic formula, or
the negation of an earlier member, or the conjunction of two earlier members, or an existential
quantification of an earlier member, and x is the last member of the sequence'). It seems clear
that one such formula a(x) can be said in a more proper or fuller sense that expresses the
predicate 'to be provable in Z' than one formula that simply is true for the right values of x.
There would be a lot more to say about encodement and Gidelization (in particular, it
would be interesting to clarify what exactly the distinction between 'expressing in a more/less
full sense' consists in). We leave it here, though, since the sense of a sentence having certain
meaning that we have considered in this section is not one we want to focus in in this article,
and we have included it just for the sake of completeness and to distinguish it from the other
senses.
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2. Natural language and regimented languages
What is the relationship and the differences between natural language and regimented languages?
In this section we are going to briefly look at three or four aspects of this relationship. Some of
our comments will be tentative or inconclusive. This is a difficult topic. One point of considering
here the relationship between natural language and regimented languages is simply to see what
sort of issues arise regarding this relationship and to be able to separate them from the issues that
arise about the relationship between formal languages and regimented languages.
As we saw a regimented language is interpreted by using part of natural language. A
regimented language, though, has some differences even with that part of natural language that
is used to interpret it. One of them has to do with the domain of quantification. When we
introduced one particular regimented language in section 1-(3) we did not provide any specific
domain of quantification --we took our quantifiers to range over everything there is. We already
mentioned that, unlike what is the case for formal languages, there is no standard way of
characterizing regimented languages. When they are provided, though, a domain of quantification
is usually specified, i.e., there are some things which are stipulated to be the ones the language
will talk about. So if the domain of quantification consists of the things that are p, then an
existential quantification 3x will be translated as 'There is a thing x which is p such that'. The
domain of quantification is the same for all the sentences of a particular regimented language.
This is not the case with respect to natural language, where the domain of quantification can
change from one sentence to another, or even from one part of a sentence to another, as in (k)
and (1):
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(k) I entered the room. Everything was in order. I looked into the fridge. Everything
had been stolen.
(1) After the attack on Ganymede, someone was happy to learn that everyone was
dead.
In (k) what has been stolen is not what was claimed to be in order, and in (1) whoever was happy
after the attack is not someone who was dead.
Having a fixed domain for all uses of quantifiers is, then, a feature that distinguishes a
regimented language form natural language. This feature of regimented languages is one aspect
of two related general characteristics of these languages: not to be subject to context dependency
and to approximate the ideal of displaying in an explicit way all the features that are relevant for
the meaning of the sentence.
Another such feature is that in a regimented language different syntactic categories
correspond to different semantic categories. We will not go here into the very interesting and
very difficult topic of characterizing what a semantic category is. We will make just one
comment regarding predicate symbols. Predicate symbols are translated by means of expressions
whose meaning is such that either applies or does not apply to an individual (in the case of a
monadic predicate) or to n individuals (for an n-place predicate). We might, for instance, interpret
the 1-place predicate symbol R by indicating that it translates as runs. Then we would have that
166
it applies to those individuals that run and does not apply to those individuals that do not run.
Now: we could also interpret the monadic predicate symbol Q by indicating that it translates as
runs quickly. If we translate the constant a as Armstrong, do Ra and Qa mean, respectively, the
same as Armstrong runs and Armstrong runs quickly?
Our concepts of 'meaning' and 'meaning the same' are probably not precise enough as
to allow us to go into too fine-grained distinctions, but I would just want to point out that it is
not obvious that the answer to the question is 'yes'. Armstrong runs follows logically from
Armstrong runs quickly, whereas it would seem that Ra does not follow logically from Qa (we
are here appealing to the intuitive, pre-theoretic notion of 'following logically from' or 'being
a logical consequence of). If we believe that logical properties depend only on the meaning of
the expressions (and not, for instance, on their spelling or pronunciation), then the two pairs of
sentences must differ in meaning.
We might wonder: given the interpretation that Ra and Qa have, is it really the case that
Ra is not a logical consequence of Qa? I think that it's clear that Ra is an analytic consequence
of Qa (or that -,(Qa^A-Ra) is an analytic truth). Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to believe that
Ra is not a logical consequence of Qa, in the same way that we believe that the English sentence
John is an unmarried man is not a logical consequence of John is a bachelor. This situation
regarding sentences of a regimented language and sentences of English does not arise because
of any special features of regimented languages. In Catalan a donkey is called a ruc and a young
donkey is called a pollf; the adjective jove means the same as young. The Catalan sentence
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Francis ds un pollf would seem to mean exactly the same as the English sentence Francis is a
young donkey (if Catalan speakers did also speak English they could have introduced the word
polli into their language by postulating while using English 'from now on in Catalan with pollf
we are going to mean a young donkey'). But while the English sentence Francis is a donkey is
a logical consequence of Francis is a young donkey, the Catalan sentence Francis ds un ruc is
not a logical consequence of Francis es un pollf7 . We might want to say that the meaning of a
sentence is structured and that two sentences can 'have the same meaning' because they are
'describing the same situation'" but, nevertheless, mean something with different structure'. This
is what seems to be the case with respect to the sentences of a regimented language Ra and Qa
considered above, and the English sentences that we used to interpret them.
Notice that the situation would have been different if the sentences of a regimented
language were regarded as notational simplifications or abbreviations of English sentences. We
could have introduced such type of language by means of some clauses that would look very
much like the ones we gave to introduce our sample regimented language in 1-(3): all we would
need to do would be to substitute "is an abbreviation of" for "translates as". If "Ra" abbreviates
"Armstrong runs", "Ra" means something only through its connection with "Armstrong nruns".
7 If we want steer clear of the difficulties posed by adjectives like fake, we could consider
instead the fact that Francis is a young donkey is a logical consequence of Francis is a young
donkey, but Francis ds un ruc jove is not a logical consequence of Francis ds un polli.
8 It would, of course, be an important and interesting task to try to make more precise what
we mean by saying that two sentences describe the same situation. We will not attempt to do it
here.
9 See also footnote 17 and, in general, subsections 4.2(f)-(g) in chapter 2.
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This relation of 'being an abbreviation of' can not simply be analyzed in terms of those of 'being
a name of, 'being a token of' and 'being a type of. If "Ra" is an abbreviation of "Armstrong
runs" then it is not the case that "Ra" names "Armstrong runs", since to use "Ra" is not to
mention "Armstrong runs" but rather to express something about Armstrong; it is not the case
either, though, that when we make a particular use of "Ra" we have used a token of the sentence
"Armstrong runs": we have only used a token of the expression "Ra". If Ra and Qa are just
abbreviations of Armstrong runs and Armstrong runs quickly then certainly the same logical
relations must hold between Ra and Qa, and the fully expanded English sentences.
Another difference between regimented languages and a natural language like English
arises because the use of regimented languages is not subject to the conversational norms that
in the case of natural languages have an influence on what is communicated with the use of some
sentence. For instance, if I say There is a man waiting for John it will be understood that there
is only one man who is waiting, whereas the sentence 3xWxj (with the appropriate interpretation
of W and a, and quantifying over men) can not be taken to communicate that there is only one
man waiting for John. This is not because the existential quantifier in the regimented language
has a different interpretation from the existential quantifier in natural language (this could hardly
be the case given that we have interpreted existential quantification in the regimented language
by means of existential quantification in English and problems such as the ones regarding the
structure of meaning that we mentioned above do not arise here). The use of the English sentence
There is a man waiting for John is subject to the effect of the Cooperative Principle and, in
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particular, to the maxim of quantity: the maxim requires to give as much information as might
be needed; whether there is only one man or more would usually be relevant information in a
context where the sentence is used; lacking information to the contrary it will be assumed that
the person using the sentence knows whether there is only one man or there are more; that there
are two men, that there are three men, that there are several men or that there are many men can
be expressed with as much brevity and simplicity as that there is a man; the speaker is abiding
by the Cooperative Principle and chose to say that there is a man rather than any of the other
stronger claims, this must be because he knows the stronger claims not to be true and, so, there
must be only one man. A reasoning of this kind is what makes it the case that when we use
There is a man waiting for John we usually communicate that there is only one man waiting for
John.
Similar observations could be made with respect to other contrasts between sentences of
a regimented language and natural language sentences that are used to interpret them. (For
instance: the effect of the maxim of manner and the difference between John got rich and he
took up philosophy and John took up philosophy and he got rich, but the equivalence between
(Rj A Tj) and (Tj A Rj) [with their obvious interpretation]).
This distinction between natural language and regimented languages seems to be not so
much about the languages themselves but about their use. The sentences of a regimented
language do not communicate anything other than what constitutes their meaning because they
are not evaluated within the framework that is assumed when we consider the use of a sentence
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as part of the cooperative effort of a conversation.
So far we have been commenting on the relationship between regimented languages and
that part of natural language that is used to interpret them. The sentences of a regimented
language, though, can also 'express' or 'formalize' what it is expressed by sentences not
belonging to that part of natural language that is used to interpret the regimented language. For
instance we can formalize in a first-order regimented language where we quantify over humans
and where M translates as is a man, P translates as philosophizes and c translates as Bill Clinton
the English sentence All men philosophize as --3x(MXA-,Px) (or if we were to introduce two
clauses that would interpret "V" and "->" in the obvious way, we could 'formalize' the English
sentence also by Vx(Mx-->Px)). We could 'formalize' a sentence with negation inside the verb
phrase like Bill Clinton does not philosophize as --Pc. A large part of English, though not all,
could be 'formalized' by means of a first-order regimented language. Now, what does it mean
that a sentence of a regimented language 'formalizes', 'corresponds to', 'symbolizes', 'expresses
the same as' or 'represents' some sentence of English? I think that in different occasions people
mean different things by 'formalize' (or any of the other expressions).
What it does not mean, it seems clear, is 'sameness of meaning' in an strong sense: a
sense such that, for instance, according to it to mean that some men do not philosophize is not
the same as to mean that it is not the case that there is a thing x such that it is both the case that
x is a man and that it is not the case that x philosophizes. If we assume such a strong sense of
meaning the same, then to provide a formalization can not consist in providing a sentence with
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the same meaning or otherwise it would not even be possible to formalize Some men do not
philosophize as 3x(MxA-nPx).
Sometimes to 'formalize' an English sentence in a regimented language is understood so
that it amounts to giving the logical form of the English sentence. I will not try here to explain
what giving the logical form of an English sentence consists in (this is a difficult question), let
just point out that it involves indicating what kind of expressions there are in the English
sentence (i.e. the semantic category of the different expressions in the sentence) and how they
are combined; to formalize in a regimented language is a particularly suitable way of indicating
the logical form of an English sentence, since the sentence in a regimented language that
formalizes the English sentence shows in a clear and explicit way what the different semantic
categories of the expressions are since they correspond to the different syntactic categories.
Sometimes we speak of formalizations in what seems to be a more relaxed sense: different
sentences of a regimented language can all be regarded as good formalizations of an English
sentence provided that the regimented sentences are logically equivalent (even if we might also
want to say that some of them are more 'natural' formalizations than the others). So for instance,
given a regimented language where K translates as is king of France, and B translates as is bold,
we can consider each of (n), (o) and (p) as good formalizations of (m)
(m) The king of France is bold
(n) 3xKx A VxVy(Kx A Ky -x=y) A 3x(Kx A Bx)
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(o) 3xVy((Ky <- x=y) A Bx)
(p) 3xVy((Ky -- -i(y=x -> -,By)) A Kx)
This sense of 'formalization' seems to be the one that is appealed to when claiming that the
English sentence Some critics admire one another and no one else is not only formalizable by
means of the second order formula (q), but also by means of the first order formula (r)'O, in a
regimented language where A translates as admires:
(q) 3X(3x3y[Xx A Xy A xy] A Vx[Xx->Vy(Axy+->{Xy A y#x})])
(r) 3z(3yAzy A Vx[(z=x v Azx)->Vy(Axy <-> ((z=y v Azy) A y#x))])
It might seem that in this sense of 'formalization', what is required of the formalization of an
English sentence by means of a sentence of a regimented language is that (at least some of) the
logical properties (logical truth, and the relation of logical consequence) are (in some sense to
be made precise) preserved.
Two questions: First, how can we make clear and explicit this notion of 'preservation of
the logical properties when an English sentence is formalized by means of a sentence of a
regimented language'? It is not obvious how to make this notion precise. Notice, for instance,
that this requirement of preservation of logical properties does not involve just one single English
10 See Boolos' To be is to be the value of a variable (or some values of some variables), The
Journal of Philosophy 81, (1984) p. 439.
173
sentence and one single regimented sentence, but rather 'many' English sentences and 'many'
regimented sentences. Second, does one such requirement of preservation of logical properties
really provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a sentence of a regimented language to be
a correct formalization in the sense in which we believe that, say, (n) or (o) are correct
formalizations of (m)? Answering the first question will, of course, provide the basis for trying
to address the second one.
I think we can make precise the idea of 'preservation of the logical properties when
formalizing' in the following way. We will say that a function F from a set of English sentences
A into the set B of all the sentences of a first-order regimented language S? is interesting if
conditions (Cl) and (C2) hold
(C1) F upholds translation (by this we mean that if s is an English sentence that,
according to the translation procedure that gives the interpretation of S?, is the
translation of some sentence s' of Sf, then se dom(F) and F(s)=s').
(C2) If 'cB, a'e B, £'"a', F(a)=o' and F[X]=X', then ZEa
Here we use the expression X-a simply as an abbreviation of a is a logical consequence of E.
We will presently make some comments on our definition of F. Let's already state,
though, how this definition of a function being interesting attempts to make precise the notion
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of 'formalization that preserves the logical properties': If a function is interesting then it is a
function that preserves the logical properties (as we will see in comment (v) below, an interesting
function might not preserve all the logical properties); regarding a single sentence we can now
say the following: a sentence s' of a regimented language preserves the logical properties of an
English sentence s iff there is an interesting function F such that F(s)=s'. Notice that in this
precise sense of 'a sentence of a regimented language preserving the logical properties of an
English sentence' we have just introduced if a function is interesting then all the sentences in its
range preserve the logical properties of the English sentences of which they are the value.
Five observations on our definition of F:
(i) Notice that F[(]=X' iff XcFR'[S'] and for each o'e I' there is a ace such that o F'[{ o' ].
(ii) If F is interesting and F(s1)=s=F(s2) then s, and s2 must be logically equivalent. Justification:
{s})s, F(s,)=s and F[{s,)]={s), so by (C2) {sS )s, 2; analogously {Is2}A S.
(iii) Condition (Cl) ensures that there are no 'permutations of non-logical symbols'. By this we
mean the following: Suppose that Sf has two predicates K and B interpreterc as is king of France
and is bold; if we only had condition (C2), then if F is interesting so would be a function F'
which is such that if F(s)=a then F'(s)=&', where a' comes from a by substituting all occurrences
of K for B, and all occurrences of B for K; since the sentences of ? are interpreted, though, it can
not be that both F and F' are providing intuitively good formalizations of the English sentences
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in their domain.
We could have dispensed with (C 1) if we had taken a somewhat different approach. What
we have done is to assume that we start off with an (interpreted) regimented language and then
we look for conditions that ensure that each English sentence in the domain of the function gets
assigned a correct formalization (i.e. a sentence of the regimented language that means 'the same'
as the English sentence in some weak sense of 'meaning the same' --two logically equivalent
sentences mean the same in this weak sense). An alternative way to proceed would have been
to start off with an (uninterpreted) first-order system of forms and look for a condition on the
function that ensures the following: that it is possible to interpret the system of forms (i.e. to
make it become a regimented language) in such a way that each Englirh sentence in the domain
of the function gets assigned a correct formalization. If we had proceeded in this second way
there would be no need to prevent 'permutations of non-logical symbols', and so we might think
that we do not need condition (Cl) (see also, though, observation (iv)). Also, if we proceeded
in this way, in (C2) we would not be using the intuitive pre-theoretic notion of logical
consequence, but rather the model theoretic notion (of which we will talk in the next section).
This would not be problematic since it is undisputed that this model theoretic notion is at least
extensionally correct.
(iv) Condition (C1) also ensures that the set of English sentences in the domain of function F is
'big enough'. If the set A had, say, just two English sentences then F could be interesting and
that would not yet give us any guaranty that F assigns to each of the English sentences in A a
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sentence of the regimented language that correctly formalizes it. Condition (Cl) ensures that F
will be a function onto B. If we did not have (Cl) we could introduce this effect of condition
(Cl) by directly requiring F to be a function from A onto B.
(v) Should we also have a condition such as (C3)?
(C3) If ScA, ac A, D-a, then F[X]-F(a)
We might think that this condition would place too strong a restriction on F. It would not allow
us, for instance, to have both John runs and John runs quickly among the English sentences in
the domain of the function. Still, if we wanted to restrict the English sentences that can be in the
domain of the function to those all of whose logical properties can be captured in a first-order
regimented language, then we should certainly have (C3) in addition to (Cl) and (C2).
Let's now consider the second question we posed above. If s' is a sentence of a
regimented language that preserves (in the sense we have introduced) the logical properties of
the English sentence s, is s' a correct formalization of s, in the same sense in which, say, (n) and
(o) are good formalizations of (m)? I don't believe it is, though I do not have conclusive
evidence that it is not. All what I will do here is to try to show that the requirement of
preservation of logical properties is much weaker than one might at first have thought.
That a sentence of a regimented language s' preserves the logical properties (in our sense)
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of an English sentence s is certainly a necessary condition for s' to be a correct formalization of
s.". I want to argue that it is not clear that it is also a sufficient condition. I believe this is so
even if we add condition (C3) to our definition of an interesting function. Actually, for the
purposes of our discussion of the sufficiency of preserving the logical properties for being a good
formalization we can suppose that our definition of an interesting function includes (C3).
We will show the following: if SE is a regimented language, and F is an interesting
function whose domain is a set of English sentences A, and whose range is the set of sentences
of 59 then there is a function G whose domain is A, that satisfies (C2) and (C3) and whose range
is a set of sentences of the language of propositional logic. (Notice that we are not claiming that
G also meets (Cl)). This result indicates that meeting conditions (C2) and (C3) is not sufficient
for 'capturing' any property of the English sentences that depends essentially on the predicational
structure or on the quantificational structure. This fact would seem, in turn, to take off
plausibility from the idea that every interesting function assigns correct formalizations to the
English sentences in its domain.
Let's prove the claim stated in the previous paragraph. We will use the following result:
Let Q be the set of sentences of some language for quantificational logic. (A language for
" Notice, though, that (C2) prevents formalizing (i) as (ii) (and, in particular, for instance,
prevents formalizing the antecedent of (i) as the antecedent of (ii)), since (ii) is a logical truth
whereas (i) is not:
(i) If there are at least three things then there are at least two things
(ii) 3x3y3z(xfy A xfz A yfz) - 3x3y(xfy)
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quantificational logic is a first order system of forms that has a denumerable number of non-
logical primitive symbols of each category [constants, n-place function symbols (for each n), n-
place predicate symbols (for each n)], so that any specific first order system of forms can be seen
as a subset of this language for quantificational logic); Let P be the set of sentences of some
language for propositional logic. (A language for propositional logic contains a denumerable
number of sentence letters); then there is a on-one function H with domain Q and range P such
that: for any Sc;Q and ae Q, S•=a iff H[S] -H(Q). This result is due to George Boolos 2.
Let F be an interesting function from a set A of English sentences into the set B of all
the sentences of a regimented language S?. Let Q be the set of sentences of some language for
quantificational logic that includes the sentences of Sf. Let P be the set of sentences of a language
for propositional logic. Let H be a 1-1 function from Q onto P such that: for any ScQ and ae Q,
S'=a iff H[S]=H(a) (We know that H exists by Boolos' result). Let H1 be the restriction of H to
B. We have that: H1 is a one-one function from B onto H[B] and that
(*) for any Sc;B and oaeB, Sz-a iff Hf[S]ýH t(a).
12 George Boolos (1970?), 'Quantificational and Propositional Logic are Isomorphic'.
Unpublished manuscript, MIT, Cambridge. (Regarding the question mark on the date: no one I
have asked, including the author himself, has been able to recall when exactly this short paper
was written). The proof of the result has the following structure: We show that the Lindenbaum
algebras of Q, and of P are atomless. We apply the well known theorem that says that any two
atomless Boolean algebras are isomorphic. Given an isomorphism between the two algebras we
define an isomorphism between Q and P.
I am indebted to Richard Cartwright for letting me know about the existence of Boolos'
paper and for pointing out to me its relevance for this discussion.
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Let G be the composition of F and H1. G is a function from A into H'[B], i.e., into a set of
sentences of propositional logic. Let's see that G satisfies (C2) and (C3)
(C2): Suppose that (1) X'cH4 [B], (2) a'e Hf[B], (3) Z' ica', (4) G[X]=E' and (5) G(a)=c'.
We want to see that X-oa.
Given (1), H1'-[Z']cH-i[Ht [B]], and since H1 is one-one H4 '[H4 [B]]=B, so we have (1)*
H-'[IX']cB. Given (2), H t (C(a')e H1'[Hf[B]], and so we have: (2)4 H"(a')e B. Given (1)', (2)'
and the fact that H1 satisfies (*) we have that: H -'[X']JH ~'(a') iff Ht [H'-'[Z']] =H[Ht I'(C')].
Since H1(H'•' ['])=E' and H'(Hk '(cO'))=oa' we have: H -'[X']=H••(c') iff '1e tx'. Given (3) we
have (3)' H"[-'[J'] =H&"(o').
Given (4), H1(F[X])=X', since H1 is one-one we have (4)* F[X]=H* 1[E']. Given (5),
H1(F(a))=ca'. Since H1 is 1-1, we have (5)' F(oa)=H 'l(N').
Given (1)', (2)', (3)', (4)', (5)* and the fact that F satisfies (C2) we have that Xtca.
(C3): Suppose that EcA, a• A and £=oa. We want to see that G[A] =G(a). Given that act
and since F satisfies (C3) we have F[R]F(a). Given that H1 satisfies (*), Ht[F[I]]frH(F(a)),
and so G[L]MG(a). Q.E.D.
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We have shown, then, that if there is an interesting function, i.e., a functior that preserves
the logical properties of the English sentences in its domain, that has as a range all the sentences
of a first-order regimented language, then there is another function that also meets (C2) and (C3)
but whose range is a set of sentences of propositional logic. This suggest that preserving the
logical properties is a weaker requirement that it might seem.
Notice, though, the following: the range of function G might not be 'closed', that is, there
might be sentence letters that appear in some formulas of G[A] (i.e. H[B]) but that are not
themselves members of G[A]; and there might be a formula a that appears in some formula of
G[A] but which is such that, for instance, -ac is not in G[A]. We could have made a stronger
case in showing the weakness of the requirement of preservation of logical properties if our
function G did not only meet (Cl) and (C2) but also two other conditions that an interesting
function meets: (a) it satisfies (a version of) (Cl), and (b) the range of G contains all the
sentences of a particular propositional language (not just a subset). If G met (b) then we would
also have (a): we could interpret each sentence letter s by giving as an English translation one
(any of them if there is more than one) of the English sentences that G assigns to e (this
requirement for sentence letters would already guarantee that more complex sentences meet the
equivalent of (Cl) for propositional calculus). Whether we can define a function that in addition
to (Cl) and (C2) also meets (b) is, at present, still an open question.
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3. Regimented languages and formal languages
In this last section we will make some comments on the relationship between formal
languages and regimented languages. In this way we will also indirectly talk about the more
important relationship between formal languages and natural language. Having so to speak broken
the relationship between formal languages and natural languages in two parts (natural language-
regimented language and regimented language-formal language) will help, I hope, to make clearer
that this relationship gives rise to issues that are of different kind and that should be
distinguished.
What is the relationship between formal languages and regimented languages? I want to
claim that formal languages are models of regimented languages. Here by model we do not mean
what is meant in model theoretic semantics, i.e., an structure or interpretation, but rather what
we usually mean when we say that we construct a model of something: something else that has
some of the same properties as the original object, and that it is usually made in order to
facilitate studying those properties that the two objects have in common. To avoid terminological
confusions we will call a modei in this (when not talking about logic) most common sense a
modelation.
One fact that makes it easy to overlook that formal languages are not regimented
languages, but just modelations of them, is that it is often very easy to go from a formal language
to a 'corresponding' regimented language and vice versa. For instance given a formal language
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where, say. the interpretation of the predicate symbol P in the model M=<D,F> is given with a
clause of the form in (s)
(s) F(P)=(x: x so-and-so)
we have a corresponding way of interpreting the predicate symbol P in a regimented language,
namely with a clause of the form in (t)
(t) P translates as 'so-and-so'
And conversely, given a clause of the form in (t) which allows us to interpret the predicate P in
a regimented language, we can think of the corresponding way of interpreting P in a formal
language by means of a clause like (s). The same could be said for the other kinds of
expressions.
Even if in many cases an interpretation of a system of forms as a regimented language
already suggests an specific way of interpreting the system of forms as a formal language, and
also vice versa, the two sorts of 'language' are very different. Remember that as we saw at some
length in section 1 a sentence of a formal language does not really mean anything in the way that
sentences of natural language or of a regimented language do.
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George Boolos writes"
When we say that + denotes plus in N, using "plus" or a synonym to say so, we
allow it to be understood that + is to have the sense of "plus", whatever that might be
(and not, say, that of "plus the cube root of the square root of the cube of the square of').
Similarly for the other symbols of the language, including tle variables, the manner of
specification of whose range, i.e., as over the natural numbers, contributes in large
measure to the determination of the meanings of quantified sentences of PA.
In this passage professor Boolos seems to be aware of the difference between having a
formal language (whose sentences would not really have any meaning) and having a regimented
language (whose sentences can have the sort of meanings that we intuitively attribute, for
instance, to the sentences of the 'language' of arithmetic), and of the tension that arises between
interpreting the 'language' (system of forms) of arithmetic as a formal language while pretending
at the same time that the sentences have meaning and say things about the natural numbers in
the way that English sentences say things about the natural numbers. He seems to pretend to be
having both a formal language and a regimented language when he introduces the standard
formal language for the 'language' of arithmetic. He suggests that when introducing a formal
language we are also introducing a corresponding regimented language. Other authors also seem
to assume something like this, even if they do not make it explicit in the way Boolos does. Doing
so without saying anything else, though, is unjustified. If nothing else is added the definition of
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13 op. cit. p. 33.
a formal language does not provide by itself anything else other than the formal language itself,
and this sort of 'language', as we have argued, is not a regimented language.
We claimed above that a formal language is a modelation of a regimented language. In
what sense is a formal language a modelation of a regimented language? At least in the following
sense: a formal language models the way the truth of the sentences of a regimented language is
affected by the combined effect of the meaning of the expressions of the regimented language
and the way the world is. Here by 'the way the world is' we do not just mean 'the way the world
actually is', rather we mean that the formal language models how one way the world might be
and the meaning that the expressions of some regimented language have would affect the truth
of the sentences of the regimented language. With respect to each specific expression of a
regimented language, a formal language models how the meaning of the expression in the
regimented language and a way the world is affect the contribution that the expression makes to
the truth value of the sentences where the expression occurs.
I believe we can see more clearly what I take to be the way a formal language models
a regimented language if we look at it from the perspective of the distinction that John
Etchemendy draws between representational semantics and interpretational semantics'4. The
truth of a sentence depends on two parameters: 'broadly speaking, the language and the world'
(p. 18). If we keep the language parameter fixed and we give values to the expressions of a
'" In his book The Concept of Logical Consequence (1990). Harvard University Press.
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
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language trying to reflect the effect that the different ways the world might be would have on
the truth of the sentences of the language we are engaging in representational semantics. An
interpretation or a model (here in the model-theoretic sense) would correspond to one way the
world might be. If we keep the world parameter fixed and give values to the expressions of the
language (respecting the semantic category of each expression) to reflect the different ways that
the different possible meanings of the expressions would affect the truth of the sentences of the
language we are engaging in interpretational semantics. When doing interpretational semantics
an interpretation or model corresponds to one meaning that the language can have 5 .
Etchemendy notes that sometimes the same interpretation or model can be seen from the
representational or from the interpretational perspective, but he insists that the two sorts of
semantics are two different sorts of enterprise and that often they do not overlap. He explains that
the usual way in which we give a model-theoretic semantics for a first order language (in our
terminology: the usual way we proceed when we provide a first order formal language) accords
only with viewing models from the interpretational perspective and not with viewing them from
the representational perspective. For instance if we have two predicates P and Q and we feel free
to consider a model where, say, both predicates get assigned the set { 1,2), then we can not be
giving a representational semantics of a language where P means 'to be completely green', and
Q means 'to be completely yellow'.
" Again, when respecting the semantic category of each expression. From now on when
talking about 'the different meanings' or 'interpretations' that 'an expression can have' it can be
assumed that we mean 'different meanings in the same semantic category'.
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There is a third possibility regarding what we do when interpreting a first order system
of forms by giving a model that Etchemendy does not consider. I contend that the right way to
view what we do when we use model-theoretic semantics is to view it in accordance to this third
possibility: each model corresponds not to one possibility of how the world might be
(representational semantics) or to one possibility of what the language might mean
(interpretational semantics), but rather to one possibility of the combination of the two factors,
i.e. to one way the world might me and one meaning that the expressions of the language might
have. Here we should add a qualification: in the standard way to proceed, these different possible
interpretations of the expressions of the language that we consider with each model do not only
have the constraint of respecting the semantic category of each expression but they also have the
constraint of keeping fixed the value that assign to the so called logical symbols.
When we interpret, for instance, the system of forms that has just one predicate symbol
P with a model that has as a domain the set (1,2,3) and that assigns (1,2) to P we are
considering a way the world could be and a meaning that the system of forms could have (a
meaning in the way regimented languages have meaning) such that: the world has some
individuals such that our (regimented) language talks about (has as a domain) three of them and,
furthermore, the world is such that the meaning that P has applies to two of the three individuals.
It might turn out (in fact this is what happens, for instance, for first order languages) that
if, on the one hand, we consider just all the models that correspond to different meanings that
the expressions of a system of forms could have given that the world is as it is (interpretational
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semantics) and, on the other hand, we consider all the models that correspond to all the possible
combinations of a way the world could be and a meaning that the expressions of the language
can have we end up considering the same models. Still, even if (unlike what was the case with
respect to representational vs. interpretational semantics) here there is no extensional difference
between taking the interpretational approach or our 'third way' approach, there is an important
conceptual difference between viewing what we do when doing model theoretic semantics as
doing interpretational semantics or as doing semantics according to our 'third way' approach.
This difference becomes crucial when we consider the use we can make of formal languages to
study the fundamental logical properties --logical consequence and logical truth.
Our intuitions about these two fundamental properties (which because they are
fundamental we are particularly interested in clarifying) seem to be roughly the following: a
sentence (of a natural or a regimented languag -) is a logical truth if it is true just in virtue of the
meaning of certain expressions, the so called logical expressions, and the 'form' of the sentence.
'Form' here does not mean 'grammatical form' but rather 'the semantic category of the different
expressions of the sentence and the way the expressions are combined'. As for the logical
expressions they are expressions characterized by having a meaning of a particularly general
kind; unlike the other expressions, it is meaningful to apply logical expressions to all sorts of
discourse. Besides this vague and general idea, our intuitions about logical expressions seem to
include enough as to allow us to recognize one when we see it, with the limitations imposed by
the vagueness that the concept of 'logical expression', as most others, surely has: 'or' and 'every'
are logical expressions, but 'John' and 'dog' are not, we might not be completely sure regarding
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expressions such as 'is one of them' or 'exactly five'. A sentence is a logical consequence of
some sentences if: the sentence is true if all these other sentences are and this is so just in virtue
of the meaning of the so called logical expressions and the 'form' of all the sentences involved.
For simplicity we will from now on focus just on the notion of logical truth.
We are certainly interested in making these intuitions more precise. One way of doing so
is by realizing that we capture these intuitions if we say that a sentence is a logical truth if it is
true whatever way the world might be and whatever the meanings of the non-logical expressions
might be, provided that they have a meaning that keeps them in the same semantic category. This
formulation does not appeal to the notion 'in virtue of' which was certainly in need of
clarification.
Having this formulation of what it is for a sentence to be a logical truth we might want
to restrict our attention to regimented languages since they seem to be rich enough so that what
we say about the logical properties as applied to them is extendable to a language in general but
at the same time, since they are regimented, they avoid some of the unwelcome complications
of natural language (some having to do with facts that we already mentioned in section 2, like
the effect of Gricean maxims, others having to do with some facts about natural language such
a, the vagueness about which expressions are logical expressions --in a regimented language we
list the logical expressions, and all of them will be among the ones for which we have no doubt
that they are logical). Now, if each formal language is a model of how the meaning of a
regimented language and a way the world might be affect the truth of the sentences of the
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regimented language, and for each regimented language and a way the world might be we have
a corresponding formal language that models it in the sense we just mentioned'", we can say
that a sentence is a logical truth iff it is 'true' in all formal languages that share the same system
of forms as the regimented language. Of course, once we talk about formal languages it does not
really matter if the property that the sentences have is that of being true or simply, say, that of
being assigned the value 1. All that matters is that it is a property that can model the property
of being true that the sentences of the regimented language do indeed have. For this it is enough
that it be one of two properties that will be assigned to the sentences depending in the right way
6" Here is, very schematically, a justification of the bi-conditional:
Suppose that S is a first-order system of forms, and that the value that models (structures,
interpretations) assign to each sentence of S is either I or 0, 1 being the value that all models
assign to 3xx-x. We can say that a model M corresponds to the combined effect of an
interpretation (as a regimented language) of S, I, and a way the world could be, W, iff (1) holds
(i) Va(M assigns 1 to a iff what a would say according to I is the case in W).
Analogously, we also say that an interpretation for S, I, and a way the world might be W
correspond to a model M iff (i) holds. Let's see that the two directions of the bi-conditional in
the main text hold:
(a) Given some I and W let's see that there is a corresponding M: Given I and W let A be the
set (a:ae S and a is true with respect to I and W); from A we can not deduce 3xxtx (otherwise,
since the deductive rules are intuitively truth preserving, 3xxgx should be true according to I and
W, but it is not); By completeness, it is not the case that A=3xxfx; so there is a model that
assigns I to all the sentences in A; so M assigns 1 to exactly those sentences that are true with
respect to I and W.
(b) Given some M, let's see that there are some corresponding I and W: Let W the way the
world actually is; let the domain of I be the individuals that are on the set-domain of M, Let each
constant of S be a name of the object which is its value according to M; as for the meaning of
a predicate symbol P, if B is the set that is the value of P according to M, let the meaning of P
according to I to be such that P would translate as is a mnember of C in a metalanguage where
C was a name for B. Analogously for n-place predicates.
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on the values that the expressions in the sentence have. (In fact, given that the sentences of a
formal language do not really mean anything, probably it can not be said in a proper sense that
they are true or false).
Now, given the last rendering of what it is for a sentence to be a logical truth, and given
that which formal languages we have is determined by which models or structures we have, we
can say that a sentence of a formal language is logically true iff it is true (has value 1, etc) in
all models. This is, of course, the standard formulation.
Notice that if we took a formal language (or, equivalently, if we took the interpretation
of a system of forms in a structure) just to model one possible meaning that the non-logical
expressions can have (and not the combined effect of a possible meaning and a way the world
might be), then that a sentence is true in all models would not, by itself, 'capture the idea',
'correspond to' or 'model the fact' that the sentence is a logical truth. Consider the following
metaphor: there is a person in a room, there is a light behind him in the wall whose position can
be changed to any point in that wall, the person projects a shadow on the floor of the room. How
the shadow of the person is, and in particular some property of it like, say, that there are two
points inside the shadow that are at least 2 yards apart, depends both on the position that the
person adopts and on the location of the light. The position of the person's body is the meaning
of a sentence, the location of the light in the wall is the way that the world is, the property of
the shadow of having two points which are 2 yards apart corresponds to the sentence being true.
If we want to explicate what it means that the shadow has the property just by virtue of the
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position of some partfthe p rson's b dy,sa , the arms, we can not just say: it consists in thc
shadow having theproperty wha ever thposition of the otheir parts of the body is if we keerfixed the light in some sp cific location on t e wall. Rather w atwe should haveis: the shadouhas the property just by virtue of hposition of the arms iff the hadow w uld have thaiproperty whatever thposition of the other pa ts of the person's b dy is and whatever thlocation of the l ght i  t e wall is.
To conclude, let's stresswhat is already indicated above about what we claim ndwhal
we do not claim regarding our 'th rd-way' vie  of the standard model theoretic analysis.
We are not claiming that when lo icians apply the standard definitions  their dailypractice they are a tually viewing models  the way wecontend is mostappropriate to view
them. Neither are w  claiming that if we r ard e ch model (or, equivalently, each formallanguage) as mod ling a coinbinatrion2 of one w y the world might beand one meaning (as 
regimented language) that certain system of forms can have, andthen weuse the standard model-
theoretic analysis of he logical properties w  are going to nd up with results that are
extensionally different rom what wewould get if we were regarding each model as modelingjust one possible meaning of the la uage (whilkeeping the world fixed). There is no such
extensional difference n, for instance, the cas  of tandard first order languages.
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osition f ome art of th  erson's ody, ay, the rms, e an ot just ay: it onsists in the
shadow aving the roperty hatever the osition f the th r arts f the ody is if e eep
ixed the light in ome pecific location n he all. ather hat e hould ave s: he hadow
as the roperty ust y irtue f he osition f the rms ff the shadow ould ave that
roperty hatev r the osition f the th r arts f the erson's ody is d hatever the
location f the light in the all is.
o onclude, let's tress hat is lready indicated bove b ut hat e l im nd hat
e o t laim regarding ur 'third-way' iew f the tandard odel theoretic nalysis.
e re ot laiming that hen logicians pply the tandard efinitions n heir aily
ractice they r  ctually iewing odels in the ay e ontend is ost ppropriate to iew
them. either re e laiming that f e egard ach odel or, quivalently, ach ormal
language) s odeling  omnbination f ne ay the orld ight e nd ne eaning as a
egimented anguage) hat ertain ystem f orms an ave, nd hen e se he tandard odel-
heoretic nalysis f he ogical roperties e re oing o e d p ith esults hat re
xtensionally ifferent from hat e ould et f e ere gardin  ach odel s odeling
ust ne ossible eaning f he anguage while eeping he orld ixed). h re s o uch
xtensional ifference in, or nstance, he as  f tandard irst rder anguages.
What we do claim is that there is a difference at the conceptual level: if we view what
e don in rcrnrconrd to oulr 'third-way'app rroarc h then wea can see wrthyl the• tanrard mordel-
theoretic definitions of the concepts of logical truth and logical consequence are good analysis
of the intuitive concepts, since they capture the essential features of those concepts --like, for
instance, their modal character. If we view models in accordance to the interpretational
perspective we can not justify at a conceptual level that the standard definition capture all the
features of the intuitive notions that we want to capture. We can, of course, justify that even if
we view models under the interpretational perspective, we get the appropriate extensions when
applying the standard definitions. I contend, though, that we can see the standard definitions as
providing more that just an extensionally correct method of determining which formulas are
logically true, or which formulas follow logically from other certain formulas.
One question that would require further discussion but which we will not examine here
is this: the standard model-theoretic analysis of the logical properties can be seen as having two
parts. One the one hand, we have what is properly the conceptual analysis of the logical concept,
where we say, for instance regarding the concept of logical truth, that a sentence is logically true
if it is true in all models that correspond to one combination of a way the world might be and
a meaning the sentences could have. Only with this first part we are not yet able to apply the
analysis to any specific sentence. We need to know which all the models are that correspond to
a combination of a way the world could be and a meaning the expressions could have (in order
to see whether the sentence is 'true' in all of them). In the second part we throw in our
substantive metaphysical assumptions about how the world could be, and what sets we actually
have to model them, in order to determine which are all the models that should be considered
when applying the analysis that we arrived at in the first part.
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